On naturalism and consciousness

[Mudhammam]

No I'm not. I'm stuck on the idea that everything I can know as a human being is based on experience, and that the source of those experiences cannot be determined.

It can be infered! Do you not understand how you can reasons things out?

What can be inferred is that an external object exists which makes an impression on your mind, which to your sensations appear be the constituents that you have conceptualized as a "desk." The nature of that object as it really exists, however, apart from its relation to your human experience of it, remains unknowable.

The problem is that you are asserting as reality a model which cannot explain the mind, cannot identify what physical systems do/do not have a mind, and does not include mind in any part of its calculus of mechanical interactions. The problem is you keep saying, "Mind is X," when you have no means of proving this to be the case.

And I disagree. We might be using different definitions of mind. What definition are you using?

I think I have to agree with Benny on this; the mind as arising from a complex configuration of objects, that in conjunction with one another form a subject that can in turn experience itself as a subject-apprehending-those-objects, is in no way explained by the current model of physics.

(My apologies in advance if you find my self-injection into your guys' conversation obnoxious--which I am enjoying immensely by the way).

[pocaracas]

And I disagree. We might be using different definitions of mind. What definition are you using?

I think I have to agree with Benny on this; the mind as arising from a complex configuration of objects, that in conjunction with one another form a subject that can in turn experience itself as a subject-apprehending-those-objects, is in no way explained by the current model of physics.

Aye... neither is the mind as an independent entity from the physical brain.
Actually, if any of these views is to be properly explained by any model of physics, the emergent mind seems to be the only possibility.

(My apologies in advance if you find my self-injection into your guys' conversation obnoxious--which I am enjoying immensely by the way).

ditto!

[The Grand Nudger]

I think I have to agree with Benny on this; the mind as arising from a complex configuration of objects, that in conjunction with one another form a subject that can in turn experience itself as a subject-apprehending-those-objects,

You just described a staggering array of mechanical systems currently in use. My children have toys that can do this. You'll have to add some special sauce somewhere, to separate what my kids toys do from what we do. They "just are" different, etc etc. The problem isn't that we can't explain something like mind with any current theory, it's that we can't determine which - if any- of the current theories about mind -apply to human minds-.

[Ben Davis]

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I remember doing a thread like this over a year ago now, but I thought it might be best to start with a clean slate, and see how we go. Also, I really like discussing this topic especially on an atheist forum because being in the minority is more fun. Here we go:

I don't believe consciousness can be explained by way of a naturalistic account. Why? Because I don't think particles have it in them to act in such a way as to recreate what we mean by consciousness i.e. our thoughts, beliefs, attitudes etc.

Let's use an example; my belief that spoons are curved. So to make things easier, let's call this belief p. Now, how can we possibly arrange particles in such a way that they would express p? How could some physical arrangement *ever* describe p? I don't think it's possible to physically arrange particles in such a way that would then inherently possess the belief that other sets of particles - aka spoons - have the property of being curved.

Maybe we could place a spoon on the kitchen counter, and put beside it a piece of paper pointing to it, saying "curved". But I wouldn't say the particles of lead forming the word "curved" are arranged in a way that make them hold p. The reason being that it takes an already conscious being *to make that connection*. The already conscious being has the ability to give meaning to such an arrangement of lead, and mind you, it has to be a being that speaks English. Therefore, in no way is the arrangement of lead inherently a beholder of p, since not even all conscious beings can arrive at that conclusion to begin with.

As we can see, for a particle to be "about" another particle, consciousness is a prerequisite... almost as if it weren't made up of particles in the first place

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Sorry, not been able to wade through the 13 pages yet so I apologise if I'm going over old ground.

For me, it's quite simple: there's no evidence for any mechanism of consciousness other than the brain. Although dualist speculation can be interesting & fun, it's ultimately nothing more than speculation: it can't even be a decent hypothesis as there are no falsifiable, testable propositions. Before we can start examining the 'seat of the soul', we first need to show that there is a soul. Until that happens, all we're left with is naturalistic, material causes; just like always.

[bennyboy]

For me, it's quite simple: there's no evidence for any mechanism of consciousness other than the brain.

That's kind of a quirky statement. Both "evidence" and "mechanism" are an attempt to railroad any view of consciousness into a physicalist vocabulary. If mind is in fact the fundamental reality upon which all is built, then there's no mechanism, and no evidence to which we could have access. Your simple assertion is like asking someone to show by what mechanism the universe exists.

The reality is that we have experiences, and that we are trying to understand why this is so. Given this, it would be strange to take physical monism as the default position. Reality must be considered by default purely experiential, unless proof can be made that this is not so. The problem is that you are only able to collect information about experience BY experience. Anybody should be able to see that this is a highly suspect process.

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No I'm not. I'm stuck on the idea that everything I can know as a human being is based on experience, and that the source of those experiences cannot be determined.

It can be infered! Do you not understand how you can reasons things out?

Do you not understand how circles work?

huh? I'm talking about the relationship between how you actually experience people you know well, and the physical "reality" of a human being that your model of choice actually supports.

If you want to bring up human relationships, then just say a "human relationship like a mother and her son." I do not like using terms like "your mother" because it can lead to an emotion response rather than to a logical one.

I apologise if any hard feelings were led to. I will change my terminology in the future.

The physical model does a poor job of explaining your experience of humans and relationships between them. Pick another person you know very well, and the point still holds. So go ahead, pick a person, and describe the relationship between your experience of them and the physical description of what they "really" are.

No, a physical model does a pretty damn good job of explaining human relationships.

Does not not not.

The only fundamental truth is that experiences are experienced. The default position for a model of reality is that this capacity for experience is the only reality.

So solipsism is the default model of reality, right?

No, even solipsism requires an assumption. The purest model of reality would be a complete lack of a model, IMO.

Because you can't prove you're not hallucinating all of your experiences. How do you go from solipsism to idealist monism?

For pragmatic reasons, I accepted some philosophical assumptions-- in particular, the existence of minds other than my own.

Did you infer a third body from your experiences? Did you weigh the probability of a third person against the probability of a hallucination? What is stopping someone from infering the existence of an inanimated object (like a desk) from their experiences? I would really like to know.

Nope. Redefining mind in physicalist terms is just begging the question.

I'm not redifining the mind. I'm explaining how it can arise using physicalist terms.

I don't see that you've actually made this explanation. Maybe I missed that post. Or maybe you're using a narrative that seems to explain, but is really just a string of confidently-coined words strung together in a non sequitur.

Nobody has shown that an ANN actually experiences qualia,

Did you miss the part about people are working on it? Do not conflate "haven't shown" with "cannot show."

Either something has been shown, or it has not been. You don't get to write a raincheck, even (especially?) in the name of science, because "yet" is a statement of faith-- Scientism rather than science. You only get to say "we're working on it" when the conclusion is only a function of time-- for example, if you say, "We haven't finished mapping the genome of this particular species of butterfly yet, but we should be finished sometime early next year."

On a seperate note, another requirement of a good model is that it has to be falsifiable. What test can be done where the results would be inconsistent with idealistic monism?

I'd start with the inclusion of mind in physical formulas, with physical descriptions which adequately describe what mind is, with concrete criteria which can be used to establish whether any given physical system does or does not experience, and with an even halfway-plausible mechanical description of subjective experience.

So far, all I've heard are made-up narratives: "Oh, of course it was a great benefit to animals to develop consciousness, because this allowed them to survive better," for example. But this is a kind of Science-of-the-Gaps argument: we don't know why and how mind exists, so must have been evolution."

[tjakey]

I lean to the other extreme. At the quantum scale it appears that entanglements between sub-atomic particles spanning space, and perhaps time, give every part of the cosmos a kind of Plank limit minimum of awareness. Every particle reacts to the state of other particles - aware in some way - of what is going on around them. So I regard awareness much like I envision any of the fields in physics, permeating and enfolding all of the interactions of energy / matter. Which makes awareness is as much a part of the physical universe as gravity or electromagnetism.

So consciousness is, in my view, a completely natural phenomena that is integral to the cosmos. Self-awareness is evident anywhere there is a sufficiently concentrated and complex enough series of quantum events, like that in a human brain. Conscious beings are places in the field of self-awareness dense enough to spark some level of intelligence, just like (on a different scale) stars are concentrations of mass / gravity dense enough to spark fusion. The measure of that self-awareness possible for human kind and individuals as we evolved on this planet, and what might be possible in other places and configurations in the cosmos, is an entirely different discussion.

This, it seems to me anyway, fits well with what has become one of my favorite quotes ...

"The universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine." James Jeans

[Whateverist]

For me, it's quite simple: there's no evidence for any mechanism of consciousness other than the brain. Although dualist speculation can be interesting & fun, it's ultimately nothing more than speculation: it can't even be a decent hypothesis as there are no falsifiable, testable propositions. Before we can start examining the 'seat of the soul', we first need to show that there is a soul. Until that happens, all we're left with is naturalistic, material causes; just like always.

[my bolding]

To my mind the word soul is one that has picked up a wide array of meanings besides the biblical one. For me, showing there is a 'soul' is no more worrying than showing there are such things as "dispositions", "personality", "character" and so on. If the bible is read as parables, then something like these becomes the translation for "soul". "Magic spirit bodies" would be my suggestion for those intent on reading the bible like a lawyer.

[Ben Davis]

For me, it's quite simple: there's no evidence for any mechanism of consciousness other than the brain.

That's kind of a quirky statement. Both "evidence" and "mechanism" are an attempt to railroad any view of consciousness into a physicalist vocabulary.

No, the words 'evidence' & 'mechanism' are an attempt to railroad facts into a discussion that is otherwise devoid of them. Show that there's a mind-without-a-brain (thanks whateverist!) because all the evidence at the moment demonstrates direct causal link between brain & mind.

If mind is in fact the fundamental reality upon which all is built,

Again, what's the evidence for this assumption?

...then there's no mechanism, and no evidence to which we could have access.

How could you know this? If mind is the fundamental reality upon which all is built, there would have to be a mechanism by which interactions occur. It could be no other way or we wouldn't see the link between cause & effect that manifests itself in our reality. These interactions would leave evidence which we could access... you can't just try to convince me that all enquiry is beyond our reach solely to cover a lack of evidence.

Your simple assertion is like asking someone to show by what mechanism the universe exists.

Indeed it is. And you know what, there are people working on that problem right now. And all the evidence tells us that it was a naturalistic, physical mechanism.

The reality is that we have experiences, and that we are trying to understand why this is so. Given this, it would be strange to take physical monism as the default position.

Why strange? It's all that the evidence suggests.

Reality must be considered by default purely experiential, unless proof can be made that this is not so

Nonsense. Reality would exist irrespective of our ability to experience it. We know this because we've been able to demonstrate mechanisms which work irrespective of the existence of experience.

The problem is that you are only able to collect information about experience BY experience. Anybody should be able to see that this is a highly suspect process.

Not quite, we're only able to collect information about experience because we can experience. There's no evidence to show that our experience is causal (creates our reality) but it's the mechanism by which we can interact with it and is developed & even improved by those interactions.

[Mudhammam]

I think I have to agree with Benny on this; the mind as arising from a complex configuration of objects, that in conjunction with one another form a subject that can in turn experience itself as a subject-apprehending-those-objects,

You just described a staggering array of mechanical systems currently in use. My children have toys that can do this. You'll have to add some special sauce somewhere, to separate what my kids toys do from what we do. They "just are" different, etc etc. The problem isn't that we can't explain something like mind with any current theory, it's that we can't determine which - if any- of the current theories about mind -apply to human minds-.

Rhythm, your children do not have toys that have "personal feelings" or "sensuous experiences." If they do, you'd better make sure your children treat them with the utmost respect and care!

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Aye... neither is the mind as an independent entity from the physical brain.

We just don't know really. I'm not saying I think a mind can exist independent of physical properties, as in floating along in a vacuum of some sort, but that they may be interdependent on one another in ways a that purely physical analysis of matter and energy cannot account for, I think that is at least an open possibility until further loose threads are more tightly bound together.

Actually, if any of these views is to be properly explained by any model of physics, the emergent mind seems to be the only possibility.

Perhaps, but then is there a universal law of nature that says "when matter and energy configure into X, you get mind?" How fundamental to the Cosmos is this law?

[bennyboy]

No, the words 'evidence' & 'mechanism' are an attempt to railroad facts into a discussion that is otherwise devoid of them. Show that there's a mind-without-a-brain (thanks whateverist!) because all the evidence at the moment demonstrates direct causal link between brain & mind.

Hmmmm. It's fun when people make assertions for me. Then I don't have to bother making my own.

If mind is in fact the fundamental reality upon which all is built,

Again, what's the evidence for this assumption?

The fact that there is nothing one can be truly gnostic about but direct experience.

Your simple assertion is like asking someone to show by what mechanism the universe exists.

Indeed it is. And you know what, there are people working on that problem right now. And all the evidence tells us that it was a naturalistic, physical mechanism.

Hmmm. And what philosophically water-tight non-experiential method are you using to confirm the validity of this evidence, or your means of collecting it?

The reality is that we have experiences, and that we are trying to understand why this is so. Given this, it would be strange to take physical monism as the default position.

Why strange? It's all that the evidence suggests.

Reality must be considered by default purely experiential, unless proof can be made that this is not so

Nonsense. Reality would exist irrespective of our ability to experience it. We know this because we've been able to demonstrate mechanisms which work irrespective of the existence of experience.

Really? I think we should slam on the brakes right here, and you can explain how we demonstrate things without the necessity of them being experienced.

The problem is that you are only able to collect information about experience BY experience. Anybody should be able to see that this is a highly suspect process.

Not quite, we're only able to collect information about experience because we can experience. There's no evidence to show that our experience is causal (creates our reality) but it's the mechanism by which we can interact with it and is developed & even improved by those interactions.

You use the word "evidence" too much, and wrongly. You imply that only experiences which are sharable can be true, valid, or valuable. But this is false, because qualia are not sharable, and they are the only thing that can be said to be real without making any philosophical assumptions.

Anyway, what does "evidence" actually mean? You clearly take it to mean objective support for a positive assertion. But that's not what evidence really is-- it is actually an experience which one uses to demonstrate coherence with ideas about past experiences. See? Here you are arguing for an objective reality, and the only means you have of arriving at that conclusion are subjective. Escher, eat your heart out!