On naturalism and consciousness

[bennyboy]

I can even provide a definition of physical reality to assist you with YOUR model: "Locatable, at least theoretically, in time and space." Want to guess what % of QM particles meet this definition?

Depends on how accurate you want be :p

Accurate to the particle's diameter at least, I'd say.

[pocaracas]

The smallest particle in normal matter is the electron... and it's still fairly large, compared with plank's length..., if I remember correctly...
So you should, theoretically, be able to locate every particle's position and speed with that accuracy.

[Ben Davis]

Hmmmm. It's fun when people make assertions for me. Then I don't have to bother making my own.

I assume this response is because you can't show it.

The fact that there is nothing one can be truly gnostic about but direct experience.

You're conflating the existence of reality with human capability of experiencing reality. Our intelligence has granted us the luxury of being able to ask these questions but matter would still exist even if humans didn't, as would the rest of existence.

Hmmm. And what philosophically water-tight non-experiential method are you using to confirm the validity of this evidence, or your means of collecting it?

Once again, our ability to experience reality has no bearing on the actual existence of reality, unless you can show that mind-without-brain exists and that reality is a consequence of the experiences of this mind. You're on far shakier ground than I am.

Really? I think we should slam on the brakes right here, and you can explain how we demonstrate things without the necessity of them being experienced.

And again! You seem to be stuck on this conflation. There's no evidence to suggest that our ability to demonstrate reality shapes or creates reality. With or without human experience, matter would still attract matter with a force in relation to its mass.

You use the word "evidence" too much, and wrongly.

I use the word to mean 'whatever can be used to support an assertion'. I've asked for any evidence from you without making a judgement on its potential value or validity. So far, you've avoided providing any.

You imply that only experiences which are sharable can be true, valid, or valuable.

In demonstrating the nature of reality, yes. But not just 'sharable' also testable, falsifiable and validatable. That methodology has proven itself to be reliable with practical results.

But this is false, because qualia are not sharable, and they are the only thing that can be said to be real without making any philosophical assumptions.

Just because qualia are not directly sharable doesn't mean they aren't repeatable or reproducable. For example, music might give you goose-pimples but it can also do the same for someone else. Neurological examination of those common experiences are telling.

Anyway, what does "evidence" actually mean? You clearly take it to mean objective support for a positive assertion. But that's not what evidence really is-- it is actually an experience which one uses to demonstrate coherence with ideas about past experiences. See? Here you are arguing for an objective reality, and the only means you have of arriving at that conclusion are subjective. Escher, eat your heart out!

I gave my definition of evidence earlier but the best kind of evidence is data. Cold, hard data. Data is not an experience, it is measurement, divorced from one's personal experience by way of repeatability & reproducability, accuracy & precision. My personal experience of the data, whilst necessary to gather it, has no bearing on the fact of the data.

If all you can come up with in support of dualism is this constant handling of experience and reality as the same entity, without being able to give me a reason, some evidence, to suggest that they are in fact the same thing, I'm going to have a hard time accepting your supposition.

[bennyboy]

Once again, our ability to experience reality has no bearing on the actual existence of reality, unless you can show that mind-without-brain exists and that reality is a consequence of the experiences of this mind. You're on far shakier ground than I am.

You talk about our "ability to experience reality." This ability has not been established. What has been established is the ability to categorize our experiences and look for coherence among them.

And again! You seem to be stuck on this conflation. There's no evidence to suggest that our ability to demonstrate reality shapes or creates reality. With or without human experience, matter would still attract matter with a force in relation to its mass.

Strawmen are bad. I don't feel like debating the positions you are projecting onto me.

Just because qualia are not directly sharable doesn't mean they aren't repeatable or reproducable.

Forget about reproducibility. You are not even able to establish clearcut criteria for demonstrating whether they exist.

I gave my definition of evidence earlier but the best kind of evidence is data. Cold, hard data. Data is not an experience, it is measurement, divorced from one's personal experience by way of repeatability & reproducability, accuracy & precision. My personal experience of the data, whilst necessary to gather it, has no bearing on the fact of the data.

It does when you're trying to support assertions you're making about the ultimate source of the data.

[Mudhammam]

Of course they do, but not because toys are so advanced as to adequately emulate human beings - more because (and I guarantee you this) you wont be able to tell me what a "personal feeling" or "sensuous experience" -is- that does not also apply to some sort of machine logic/language/architecture (bet I could map either to a pocket calculator, btw).

The "just different" explanation is, honestly, implied in your response. You've written off machines before we even begin.

I wouldn't say I have written them off. By all means, if a machine ever becomes so depressed as to request medication because of distress over such questions as "Who am I? What is my purpose? What happens to me after I die?" I will concede that consciousness is no more than an organization of minute information processors performing one hell of a trick (to be sure, that is what I think consciousness probably is... but how that is the case, I don't find physical monism on much firmer ground than say, interaction dualism, albeit the slightest advantage that we have some framework to work with). I also think the question as to whether or not this phenomenal quality of mind is more intrinsic to matter than our current physical sciences account for, as panpsychism claims it is, would still be left unanswered. Maybe we need ourselves another Einstein to do for mind and matter what he did for time and space. Mattermind?

I'm watching yall turn this into a circlejerk of assumptions and useless claims. It bothers me. We have practical, observable, quantifiable systems that can offer insight. We have practical, observable, quantifiable experiments involving "mind" and brain (and our ability to manipulate one by manipulating the other, etc). It's almost like we have to avoid them because they're "diseased".

That's a bit harsh, I'd say! This is what philosophy does! It attempts to refine our definitions so as to "copy" reality into terms that allow us to better understand it, and well, maybe use it to our advantage.

[Surgenator]

So we are using different definitions of mind. It's funny how you define the mind that only makes sense in your world view, and not in any world view like my definition. No wonder we're arguing in circles.

I find physicalists strangely jealous of the duelist or idealist vocabulary. We already have sufficient words to describe the physicalist model: brain function, interaction, data processing, input/output, etc. Why is it that the physical position so eagerly attempts to make words objective that are specifically intended to talk about the subjectve?

Just to make sure. this is my definition of reality: "the world or the state of things as they actually exist." Please provide yours.

The conformity of an idea with the source of the experiences from which the idea was drawn or inferred.

I can even provide a definition of physical reality to assist you with YOUR model: "Locatable, at least theoretically, in time and space." Want to guess what % of QM particles meet this definition?

This is the reason why we're arguing past each other. We can't even agree on definitions. The rest of the discussion if mostly pointless until we do. I'm not gonna accept your definitions because they're inherently biased. I recommend we use mine.

I'm not sure why your asking me these questions. You already know what I'm going to say. The framework is really represents physical monism. Yes. Yes. And yes.

Okay. So let me ask: is a desk a solid surface, or is it a gazillion particles, each unobservable by the senses, vibrating in 99.99999% space? (with the .00001% probably being pretty generous)

Your lack of understanding QM is showing. First off, the particles are observable by the senses thats why you can see the desk. You obviously don't realize that your senses require a certain threshold of interactions to send a signal to your brain, which a single electron at room temperature doesn't have enough energy to do so. Second, the electrons that orbit the nucleus interact through EM interactions i.e. photons exchanged between electrons. Their interaction length is ~0.1 micrometer which is more than enough to interact between several atoms. The electrons do not actually touch each other.

I noticed that you didn't provide a better answer to my question on falsifiability. I provided the observations that would disprove mine. Where is yours?

You did no such thing. You rolled out a bunch of fanciful baloney which is not coherent in any educated person's experience, and said that if that baloney were found true, you would accept it as evidence.

It's nice that you realize what needs to disprove physical monism is baloney.

You also ignored my reponse by discarding it as not answering your question. So I'll repeat it: you can falsify idealism by showing that physical monism can adequately handle the fact of subjective experience, since my argument for idealism is that it is the simplest view which encompasses all of human experience. If you can do the following, you are the hands-down winner:
-establish criteria which allow one to determine whether a given system does/does not experience qualia
-demonstrate a plausible mechanism for the existence of subjective qualia in an objective physical framework
-include the fact of mind in the mechanical calculus which is supposed to encompass all of reality

I have shown these in earlier post. The fact we were using different definitions may explain your lack of understanding my points. I may have not address your last bullet point, because I cannot figure out what your saying there. Nevertheless, continuing this topic is pointless until we agree on definitions.

[bennyboy]

This is the reason why we're arguing past each other. We can't even agree on definitions. The rest of the discussion if mostly pointless until we do. I'm not gonna accept your definitions because they're inherently biased. I recommend we use mine.

Nope. I use the words as they are meant. You use the words as they would mean given your world view is true. I won't accept any definition of consciousness, mind or qualia that don't explicitly define them in terms of subjective experience-- because that's what ALL people mean by those words, except the ones trying to argue for physical monism.

I have shown these in earlier post. The fact we were using different definitions may explain your lack of understanding my points. I may have not address your last bullet point, because I cannot figure out what your saying there. Nevertheless, continuing this topic is pointless until we agree on definitions.

You think because I disagree with you that I cannot have understood you. That's arrogance on your part, but forgivable because most people in a debate feel the same way.

I don't think this way. I think our world views are a natural byproduct of the philosophical assumptions we've made, many of which are arbitrary, and most of which are unnecessary except for psychological reasons. We've both accepted the assumption that not-self exists, and that our experiences are about things not of the self. You've taken the additional step of believing that the things which are not-self are of a particular nature. I'm not willing to take this additional step, because it seems to me that the method of drawing conclusions-- the experience of thinking-- is at odds with the objective nature which you assume.

I agree that we are done. So if you like you can take your last shots if you like, but unless you have new ideas to add, there's little more to say. I'm satisfied that I've expressed my own position clearly enough, and comfortable with the fact that you disagree with it.

[Mudhammam]

To sum everything up:
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[The Grand Nudger]

I wouldn't say I have written them off. By all means, if a machine ever becomes so depressed as to request medication because of distress over such questions as "Who am I? What is my purpose? What happens to me after I die?" I will concede that consciousness is no more than an organization of minute information processors performing one hell of a trick (to be sure, that is what I think consciousness probably is... but how that is the case, I don't find physical monism on much firmer ground than say, interaction dualism, albeit the slightest advantage that we have some framework to work with).

This is precisely what I mean. -If a machine ever- begs the question -do they already-. Machines do ask those first two questions constantly, the third is meaningless because they aren't biological entities - in the same way that meds are meaningless. You're asking for an entirely dissimilar architecture to express itself in a way understandable more as "human" than as "conscious" - wouldn't you say?

I also think the question as to whether or not this phenomenal quality of mind is more intrinsic to matter than our current physical sciences account for, as panpsychism claims it is, would still be left unanswered. Maybe we need ourselves another Einstein to do for mind and matter what he did for time and space. Mattermind?

I don't think pan-psychism has anything to offer us. Not all claims are created equal. We -do- have "Einsteins" doing that btw. Curiously, those einsteins aren't testing beach sand for consciousness, nor are they attempting to understand our architecture as some sort of radio transceiver. They have a good idea as to what they're looking for and where they'll find it (I mention this not because it's indicative of them being right, just that they're doing work on "something" that has a demonstrable effect - juxtaposed with claims that get no further than the claiming). I simply cant place pan-psychism on the same shelf as these. The field isn't wide open, for me.

[Whateverist]

I don't think pan-psychism has anything to offer us. Not all claims are created equal. We -do- have "Einsteins" doing that btw. Curiously, those einsteins aren't testing beach sand for consciousness, nor are they attempting to understand our architecture as some sort of radio transceiver. They have a good idea as to what they're looking for and where they'll find it (I mention this not because it's indicative of them being right, just that they're doing work on "something" that has a demonstrable effect - juxtaposed with claims that get no further than the claiming). I simply cant place pan-psychism on the same shelf as these. The field isn't wide open, for me.

^^This^^

There is no shortage of questions which could be posed using the English language which make little or no sense. Failing to have an answer to these should be no cause for concern.