Good and Evil

[Neo-Scholastic]

If the wise choice were to consist in behaving according to one's own nature, then it is still incomprehensible why the survival of a human being should matter more than the self-replication of a virus.

If your point is that human life only has value to humans, then it is a trivial one. Questions about ethics only apply to creatures endowed with reason and the capacity to freely act upon their thoughts.

So as to really annoy believers in truth, I would also like to throw in a quote from Michel Foucault: "'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, circulation and of operation of statements. 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A 'regime' of truth.”

The Foucault quote makes no reference to the conformity of propositions with objective reality. So in actuality, he’s only talking about how people use diction and grammar. The quote says nothing whatsoever about knowledge.

Adam LOV introduced the question of whether essences are real in any meaningful sense…one can point to the sociological essentialism holding that traits like race, ethnicity, and gender are immutable. This essentialism was cited to help support colonialism and racial apartheid policies no longer considered ethical. We now hold that race, ethnicity, and gender are all social constructs.

You are correct to say that race, ethnicity and gender are social constructs. It does not follow from that fact that there is no such thing as human nature. The theory of evolution was used to justify eugenics, genocide, and social Darwinism. Those misapplications of the theory did not invalidate the theory of evolution.

…the fact that ethics evolve over time shows that whatever's "inside" situations of right and wrong isn't immutable, that is, it isn't a pure essence like "triangleness" is for triangles.

Scientific understanding also has evolved over time. People today have a much more accurate and precise understanding of objective reality than their predecessors. Just because it is easier to understand the nature of triangles (or electrons) doesn’t mean that something as complex as a human being doesn’t have an essential nature. It just takes more effort and discernment to uncover it. Understanding human nature will always be a work in progress, but if you abstract away all the accidental properties of something what remains are the essential properties without which a particular would cease to partake of the universal. With respect to people, the things that differentiate one human from the next, like skin color and sex, are accidental features. The common features shared by all humans are essential features, like rationality. The objectivity of moral judgment depends on keeping these distinct.

[Neo-Scholastic]

The valuing of health is certainly not a matter of science. That people generally do value health is a matter of fact, but that they ought to so desire it is something quite different from a mere poll of what people value.

According to Hume, the notion that someone could choose poorly negates the possibility of anyone making a valid objective judgment about what is best. But that cannot be because even scientific inquiry is impossible without making value judgments, like determining that a pure sample of something is better to study than an adulterated sample. Anyone can see that the researcher choosing a sample is making an objective value judgment.

Adults tell children that they shouldn’t play in the street because they could get run over. Imagine a smart kid saying, “The fact that I could get run over if I don’t watch out does not mean I shouldn’t play in the street.” Anyone can see that the ‘is-ought’ objection for what it is: juvenile. Life is an essential part of being an animal. The act of making value judgments is a necessary part of rationality. When someone acts irrationally and unnecessarily endangers his life that means that he doesn’t value being human, not that human life is without value. To actually want what undermines your humanity makes you a worse instance of human. You ought to be the best person you can. That is an objective moral imperative.

[Hatshepsut]

Just because it is easier to understand the nature of triangles (or electrons) doesn’t mean that something as complex as a human being doesn’t have an essential nature. It just takes more effort and discernment to uncover it....

What does this essential nature consist of? The best I can come up with is that it's a minimal set of properties sufficient to distinguish human beings from other things in the cosmos. Although many possible sets of sufficient properties can be advanced, I have doubts that there exists a single minimal set. Deciding what criteria makes a thing human thus becomes a judgment call. What you've called "discernment" above.

I'm not versed in ethics or philosophy in general, so I don't know much in detail about the takes of the "great thinkers" Kant, Hume, Mills, Rawls, etc., or how you would go about determining who has the "best" theory. My guess is that any one of the various theories may turn out most applicable in a given situation, but that no episcopal theory of ethics is feasible in the way it is for physics.

I agree that abuse of essentialism to create a fixed Caucasoid-Mongoloid-Negroid scheme doesn't invalidate the former. I think it's the apparent impossibility of finding those minimal sets I've mentioned that renders essentialism problematic. Not that it's failed of contribution to understanding; economical categorization is important when studying any phenomenon and it can make practical sense to speak of a thing's "nature." In mathematics, where precise definition is possible, we may even have essentialism realized in practice. Nonetheless, it remains a philosophical preference we would be wise not to over-rate.

[IATIA]

Does participation in dangerous sports go against this "objective moral imperative"?

[Pyrrho]

The valuing of health is certainly not a matter of science.  That people generally do value health is a matter of fact, but that they ought to so desire it is something quite different from a mere poll of what people value.

According to Hume, the notion that someone could choose poorly negates the possibility of anyone making a valid objective judgment about what is best.

You need to explain that a bit.  What, exactly, do you mean by "objective?"  That someone does not agree is not a problem for Hume.  Indeed, his list of "monkish virtues," which many religious people claim to cherish, Hume regards as vices.  I already quoted that earlier in this thread:

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid934918

But that cannot be because even scientific inquiry is impossible without making value judgments, like determining that a pure sample of something is better to study than an adulterated sample.  Anyone can see that the researcher choosing a sample is making an objective value judgment.

There are a couple of things to be said about that.  First, the fact that an experiment with an adulterated sample will not necessarily tell one what would happen with the same experiment with a pure sample is not a value judgement.

Now, the desire to run the test is a motivator to get it right, but the desire to run the test is not a part of the test.

Furthermore, the motivation to do anything always involves emotions.  That was something Hume noted.  So scientific enquiry is impossible without emotions, as one would never have the motive to do such a thing without emotions.  But this is not involving "an objective value judgement."

Adults tell children that they shouldn’t play in the street because they could get run over. Imagine a smart kid saying, “The fact that I could get run over if I don’t watch out does not mean I shouldn’t play in the street.”

The smart kid probably does not want to get run over, just as most children don't want to get run over.  And the smart kid, being smart, will know that his mother is right about the fact that he might get run over if he plays in the street.

No moral judgement has to be made at all in this kind of case.  A pragmatic "ought" is all that is necessary in such cases (or what Kant called a "hypothetical imperative").  If one does not want to be run over, then one ought to be careful about playing in the street.  It is about means to an end, and does not require any moral judgement at all.  The hypothetical is only relevant to those to whom the antecedent is applicable (to those who do not want to be run over).

Anyone can see that the ‘is-ought’ objection for what it is: juvenile.

I happen to think that the mainstream interpretation of Hume on 'is-ought' is wrong.  That is to say, I don't think Hume said what people claim he said.  If you want to discuss that, please start a new thread on it, and we can discuss it there.  If I don't respond there, you can either tell us of the new thread in this thread, or you can send me a PM telling me about the new thread.

Life is an essential part of being an animal.

No.  A dead animal is still an animal.  One might even be tempted to say that dying is essential to being an animal, but we should probably avoid this sort of digression, as it has no bearing on either what Hume had to say or on morality.

The act of making value judgments is a necessary part of rationality. When someone acts irrationally and unnecessarily endangers his life that means that he doesn’t value being human, not that human life is without value.

Many people feel as you do on that, but it is a feeling on your part.  Evidently, your idea of "rationality" includes more than bare reason, but also feelings.

To actually want what undermines your humanity makes you a worse instance of human. You ought to be the best person you can. That is an objective moral imperative.

First, explain what you mean by "an objective moral imperative."  Then prove your claim.

[Neo-Scholastic]

No.  A dead animal is still an animal.

It is no longer animate, is it? Therefore, it is not an animal anymore; but rather, a pile of inanimate material, i.e. the corpse of an animal.

[Hatshepsut]

Does participation in dangerous sports go against this "objective moral imperative"?

Without raising an "objective moral imperative" (a term I've not heard before), we can state that extreme sports enthusiasts impose some costs on the broader society. They demand, as part of a "right to be free from discrimination," to be insured without paying higher premiums, forcing the rest of the insurance pool to subsidize the extra medical risks they take, which may well exceed those taken by street drug abusers, and to pay death benefits to survivors. Balanced against these costs is the fact that extreme sportspersons tend to be members of high-income households that pay more taxes, and perhaps the jobs and industries they create.

I would guess that cost/benefit or utility calculations are our best attempt at "objectivity" in morals, yet deciding what to include in a cost/benefit worksheet and what to leave out is a matter of judgment which can tip the results.

Furthermore, the motivation to do anything always involves emotions.  That was something Hume noted...  But this is not involving "an objective value judgement." ...Evidently, your idea of "rationality" includes more than bare reason, but also feelings.

But we've chosen to divide human thought into two categories, "reason" and "emotion," and declare only the former "rational." This decision about the taxonomy of thoughts was already long in effect by the 18th century and is taken for granted unconsciously today. We might ask why emotion, a thing generated by the brain, does not represent the results of any kind of objective calculation. Often feelings are eminently rational. When we feel fear, it's a fair bet that it's because we're in danger of some kind.

I will agree that "reason" is broader. The brain makes emotional calculations very quickly albeit based on partial information and with biases toward the welfare of self and kin. And emotion "thinks" only about certain things. The slower-moving reason can aim at almost any topic and reach a higher level of verbal abstraction. Yet is this grounds enough to exclude emotion from universe of rationality? I might lean toward Chad Wooter on this issue, adding that it's the simultaneous use of both reason and emotion that produces "rationality." Remove either one and we're in trouble: Emotionally disordered people don't behave in a rational manner, while folks who refuse to reason act in a petty, self-centered way.

[Edwardo Piet]

There are epistemologically objective answers in principle to what is and is not good for the well being of conscious creatures just as there are for matters of health. At the beginning of his book Sam Harris makes it clear that he is talking about epistemic objectivity and not ontological objectivity.

I understand Hume's is ought distinction perfectly and see no proof that prescriptive statements cannot be understood descriptively as Sam Harris suggests.

[Pyrrho]

...

Furthermore, the motivation to do anything always involves emotions.  That was something Hume noted...  But this is not involving "an objective value judgement." ...Evidently, your idea of "rationality" includes more than bare reason, but also feelings.

But we've chosen to divide human thought into two categories, "reason" and "emotion," and declare only the former "rational." This decision about the taxonomy of thoughts was already long in effect by the 18th century and is taken for granted unconsciously today. We might ask why emotion, a thing generated by the brain, does not represent the results of any kind of objective calculation. Often feelings are eminently rational. When we feel fear, it's a fair bet that it's because we're in danger of some kind.

I will agree that "reason" is broader. The brain makes emotional calculations very quickly albeit based on partial information and with biases toward the welfare of self and kin. And emotion "thinks" only about certain things. The slower-moving reason can aim at almost any topic and reach a higher level of verbal abstraction. Yet is this grounds enough to exclude emotion from universe of rationality? I might lean toward Chad Wooter on this issue, adding that it's the simultaneous use of both reason and emotion that produces "rationality." Remove either one and we're in trouble: Emotionally disordered people don't behave in a rational manner, while folks who refuse to reason act in a petty, self-centered way.

No, emotions are not rational.  If we consider your example of fear, many times the fear is based on the possibility of something happening that one does not want.  But that not wanting it is just another desire, another emotion.  It is not based on reason at all.

Fear is more instinctual than rational.  We see fear-behavior in animals of many kinds.  Such instinct tends to help keep an individual alive, which in turn tends to help keep the species alive.  This is more basic to how animals are than reason is.

The reason (or more properly, "cause") such instinct exists in species is because those animals that lacked such instincts tended to die off and not reproduce.  That does not make it rational.  That just means that one way of being is more likely to result in a longer life and offspring than the other.


Reason is helpful for determining means to ends, but it does not give ends in themselves.  If you have a goal, then choosing appropriate means to achieve that goal is "reasonable," but the goal itself isn't based on reason.  For example, if you want to live, then drinking poison is probably not a reasonable thing to do.  But if you want to die, drinking poison may very well be a reasonable thing to do.  What is "reasonable" to do is determined by the goal one has.  But the ultimate goals themselves are not determined by reason.

I state "ultimate goals" for a reason.  Once one has an ultimate goal, one can use reason to find intermediate goals, which are simply the means to achieve one's ultimate goals.  This discovery of intermediate goals may mislead some people into supposing that goals are somehow based on reason, but the fact is that intermediate goals can only exist if there is an ultimate goal.

For example, if one wants to be able to eat, one might decide that it will be good to have money in order to buy food (because that is how most people get food in many societies).  And to get money, one may decide to get a job, because that is often a way in which one can get money.  Reasoning about such things can give one the intermediate goals, which is to say, it can discover the means to particular ends, but if we eliminate the ultimate ends, then there are no intermediate steps to achieve one's ultimate goals (since one lacks any ultimate goals), and consequently there can be no intermediate goals.


As for your comments on "emotionally disordered people," those are simply people who have different desires from what is considered normal by a society.  It is not a matter of reason, but of attitude (i.e., feeling).  To give an example that might help make this clear to you, before 1973, the American Psychiatric Association classified homosexuality as a mental illness.  In 1973, they no longer classified homosexuality as a mental illness.  Nothing changed about homosexuality itself.  What changed were societal attitudes toward homosexuality.

If one had exclusively heterosexual desire, then homosexual behavior would be "irrational."  But it is in all cases a hypothetical matter, based on the sorts of feelings one has.  For someone with homosexual desire, homosexual behavior is "rational."  It is all a question of what one desires, or, in other words, on the emotions one has.  Change the emotions, and one changes the behavior that would be rational.

This is why Hume stated, rather provocatively:

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hume-a...man-nature

Reason is not the ultimate source of the passions (i.e., emotions).  Reason is used to discover the means to the ends one has, not to give one the ultimate ends one has.  The ultimate ends (goals) one has are a matter of feeling and emotion.

That some people have a prejudice in favor of their own feelings is not a sign that they are more reasonable than different feelings in someone else.  Yet many people imagine such a thing, and it tends to cloud their judgement and get them to classify others as being "irrational" for feeling differently about things.  Sometimes they try to rationalize their opinions, but they ultimately end up begging the question, presupposing that their feelings are rational and that contrary feelings are irrational.  Thus, they reason fallaciously, showing that their position is not really based on reason at all.

[Neo-Scholastic]

What does this essential nature consist of? The best I can come up with is that it's a minimal set of properties sufficient to distinguish human beings from other things in the cosmos. Although many possible sets of sufficient properties can be advanced, I have doubts that there exists a single minimal set. Deciding what criteria makes a thing human thus becomes a judgment call.

Actually, the notion that identity comes from a particular set of properties is something that I would prefer to avoid. It leads to the inescapable paradoxes of nominalism and conceptualism. Lately I’ve been a bit cavalier when talking about nature, essence, and identity. I should clarify.
I hold to the moderate realist position. I do not think, like Plato, Forms/Ideas have independent existence. (For the sake of simplicity I will use the capitalized word ‘Form’ for the philosophical meaning of both form and idea.) Nor am I ready to dispense with the notion that reality excludes any objective unifying principles. Or to say it from the other direction, I do not believe that people differentiate universals and particulars arbitrarily from a contiguous reality. Forms are manifest in various instances that partake of the Form, to one degree or another. To intellectually conceive of a Form is not synonymous with imagining it. For example, most people can conceive the Idea of a chiliagon (a polygon with a thousand sides) but very few can fully imagine such a thing
Where I differ from Aristotle and the Neo-Scholatics, is that I do not think types of sensible bodies have their own real Forms; but rather, combine pure Forms within substances to manifest. The hylomorphic union of the Forms and substances give things unique potentials. So I say that if you want to know the essence of a thing it is a matter of knowing 1) the Forms of which it partakes 2)what it is made of and 3) its dispositional properties.
Therefore in one sense I agree with you. Properly identifying what a thing is and of what it potentially become (i.e. its essence) is a judgment call, but it is not an entirely arbitrary one.

… it [essentialism] remains a philosophical preference we would be wise not to over-rate.

People should take care when applying any philosophical principles.

Without raising an "objective moral imperative" (a term I've not heard before)…

I linked together three concepts. Objectivity means that everyone shares a common reality even if their level of understanding about it varies. Moral means the conduct necessary to maximally manifest a person’s potential. Lastly, imperative means an unavoidable obligation.

By linking them, I say people share a common reality and understand that reality by applying reason to experience; that reason applied to experience yields knowledge of the real Forms, materials, and dispositions that constitute the essences sensible bodies; that each human being partakes of a common essence; that people face an existential choice to either conform to that essence or act contrary to it; that to act contrary to one’s essence is to be less of the thing that one is (i.e. less good); and that therefore to be and remain human entails the obligation to conform to the essence of what it means to be human.