Good and Evil

[bennyboy]

And he wasn't wrong.

He was wrong! Per me!   But in all seriousness, why would anyone resist laughing me out of the room if I said the following statement?
"As God of my own existence, I hereby decree myself, and only myself, qualified to decide what is true and false." Or, instead of true and false, "rational and irrational." Or, "scientific and unscientific." Just as we believe there are critics of art who have more experience in determining what is good art versus bad art, and experts in the sciences who are better at interpreting data (which we also determine in large part by the consensus of expertise), and so on and so forth, why wouldn't we also believe there are moral philosophers who have also spent more time analyzing different states of the mind and situations whereby people experienced greater fulfillment out of life so as to trust their judgment (supported by facts and reasons, of course) about ethics in the same way that we rely on other experts?

Okay, about Manson.  He was right in that he had the capability of establishing a moral system for himself (or more amoral, it seems).  He was even persuasive enough to convince a few people to accept him as god of THEIR worlds, as well.  And this is not that different than how Nazi morality allowed the branding of gypseys as baby-eaters, or Jews as shifty, subhuman non-humans.

Whether there are others who have a better grip on morality is irrelevant if we accept that morality is subjective.  I'm free to arbitrarily establish whatever ideas I like about good and evil.  HOWEVER, and this is the big caveat, so is everyone else.  Being god of my own existence won't be much use to me if I have a bullet hole through my head, or if I'm trapped in prison.

[Mudhammam]

Okay, about Manson.  He was right in that he had the capability of establishing a moral system for himself (or more amoral, it seems).  He was even persuasive enough to convince a few people to accept him as god of THEIR worlds, as well.  And this is not that different than how Nazi morality allowed the branding of gypseys as baby-eaters, or Jews as shifty, subhuman non-humans.

Whether there are others who have a better grip on morality is irrelevant if we accept that morality is subjective.  I'm free to arbitrarily establish whatever ideas I like about good and evil.  HOWEVER, and this is the big caveat, so is everyone else.  Being god of my own existence won't be much use to me if I have a bullet hole through my head, or if I'm trapped in prison.

I don't accept that morality is subjective, and that good and evil are arbitrary distinctions made on the whims of each individual's preferred object of gratification. I think there are things that actually are good and evil, regardless if everyone wakes up tomorrow and decides otherwise.

[Pyrrho]

I don't accept that morality is subjective, and that good and evil are arbitrary distinctions made on the whims of each individual's preferred object of gratification.

I very much agree that morality isn't a matter of individual whim, for reasons given in this thread a while back:

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid935583

I think there are things that actually are good and evil, regardless if everyone wakes up tomorrow and decides otherwise.

Although I can sympathize with feeling that way, do you have any reason to suppose that that is correct?  Or is it just that you have a very strong feeling, a feeling that is deeply ingrained in you?  If the latter of these, that fits very well with Hume, going back even further in the thread:

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid934918

Although I presently feel as you do, if everyone really did change tomorrow (which is implausible in reality; or, rather, impossible, as not everyone's brain can physically change like that magically), then both you and I would feel differently about it tomorrow.

In fact, it is so deep in human nature, it, like many other traits, are shared with other animals.  See, for a start on this:

http://www.livescience.com/24802-animals...-book.html

[bennyboy]

Okay, about Manson.  He was right in that he had the capability of establishing a moral system for himself (or more amoral, it seems).  He was even persuasive enough to convince a few people to accept him as god of THEIR worlds, as well.  And this is not that different than how Nazi morality allowed the branding of gypseys as baby-eaters, or Jews as shifty, subhuman non-humans.

Whether there are others who have a better grip on morality is irrelevant if we accept that morality is subjective.  I'm free to arbitrarily establish whatever ideas I like about good and evil.  HOWEVER, and this is the big caveat, so is everyone else.  Being god of my own existence won't be much use to me if I have a bullet hole through my head, or if I'm trapped in prison.

I don't accept that morality is subjective, and that good and evil are arbitrary distinctions made on the whims of each individual's preferred object of gratification. I think there are things that actually are good and evil, regardless if everyone wakes up tomorrow and decides otherwise.

Really?  Are they at least good and evil in context?  Someone gave the example of antibiotics.  A course of antibiotics will kill more organisms (like trillions I guess) than it will save.  So are antibiotics good or evil?

By what standard, goal or principle would good and evil be decided, if not at the whim of a subjective agent?

[Hatshepsut]

So, is that electron a particle or a wave? Is ethics subjective or objective? I think it has both aspects.

[Mudhammam]

I very much agree that morality isn't a matter of individual whim, for reasons given in this thread a while back:

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid935583

Thanks, I hadn't read that post. You make really excellent points with regards to Harris' position. One of my biggest issues with Harris, and why I think many consider him a philosophical lightweight, is that he doesn't seem interested in seriously engaging arguments that have been made in opposition to his views, and that's not limited to his ethics, but pretty much every topic I've seen him broach. 

Although I can sympathize with feeling that way, do you have any reason to suppose that that is correct?  Or is it just that you have a very strong feeling, a feeling that is deeply ingrained in you?  If the latter of these, that fits very well with Hume, going back even further in the thread:

http://atheistforums.org/thread-33164-po...#pid934918

Although I presently feel as you do, if everyone really did change tomorrow (which is implausible in reality; or, rather, impossible, as not everyone's brain can physically change like that magically), then both you and I would feel differently about it tomorrow.

In fact, it is so deep in human nature, it, like many other traits, are shared with other animals.  See, for a start on this:

http://www.livescience.com/24802-animals...-book.html

The issue to me is whether "the Good" is something that really exists as a part of this experience that we, as rational animals, understand to be the world. Are there things that are really better, for their own sake, i.e. because they do exist, as opposed to a world without them? Now, I wouldn't want to put human beings on an artificial pedestal and make the claim that we are special because we possess a superb faculty of logical reasoning, but I do think we could start by asking something like the following: Is any experience of life, however brief and whatever quality, better than none at all? Or perhaps, are some types of experiences, as opposed to others, better than none at all? Or is it incorrect to even try to make a value judgment between existence and nonexistence? On the one hand, it seems absurd at face value to say nonexistence can be anything, such as better or worse; and that’s probably valid. On the other hand, if we grant that everything that exists has a physical substratum, whether or not it’s imbued with some abstract quality, such as mind, or goodness, or none at all, then while mind may exist for a very short duration (understanding duration in the sense of Newtonian time since we have no other grasp of what it actually means in relation to everything), the physical parts that it is derived from are, for all intensive purposes, eternal. So then, there are these minute components that exist (one could add "period" but I won't as it leads to my next thought), that perpetually form and dissolve spatially separated bodies, and the question is, is it possible that these, on account of some feature that forms the basis of their nature, can intrinsically contain more of this vague notion of goodness than others? Is not the very opportunity of a physical body which possesses the power to contemplate whether something that it calls "the Good" exists delineate a quality of being that is, on account of being part of that body, actually good in some sense? Are there things that are more worth preserving in a definite state than others because they possess this quality we identify as goodness? It’s difficult to translate this idea into terms that don’t seem too vague or contrived and yet in experience it seems like an obvious aspect of the world, and moreover, one that transcends feeling and is a necessary fact in that it informs virtually every decision beings with some notion of goodness make.

For me, if this can be grounded in some way (and perhaps it cannot, but I lean more towards the possibility that it can), then duties to the Good naturally follow. Now, I’m not suggesting that this at all touches on what the Good (or the True or the Beautiful) in fact is, but at least it’s a start from which we can reason further. And if the Good as defined as, well, let's just say whatever you please at this point, cannot be grounded, is it any worse off than anything else? Didn’t Aristotle rightly realize that all demonstration must assume first principles, i.e. definitions? Does logic justify itself? Does science? Does truth? Or do we---must we---start from self-evident facts about the world, which are derived from the intellect and the senses (which, of course, are highly prone to error), and work our way from there (basically what Harris says when posed with the question of ontological grounding for his moral theory, that in everything we must pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps), with not only morality but essentially all else that is not indivisible (and have we established indivisibility with... anything?)

[Pyrrho]

Nestor, you ask a lot of questions there, and it would be very time-consuming to attempt to answer them all.  But I will address one that pertains to the main topic of this thread, and maybe a couple of the others.

...
The issue to me is whether "the Good" is something that really exists as a part of this experience that we, as rational animals, understand to be the world.

I don't think there is anything that is discovered by reason out in the world, that can serve as the foundation of ethics, or that is "the Good," like some Platonic Form.  I rather like what Hume had to say about this in Appendix I of his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, though I will only quote a bit of it here:


But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means. It is requisite a sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. This sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. Here therefore reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial.

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_585


I. It is easy for a false hypothesis to maintain some appearance of truth, while it keeps wholly in generals, makes use of undefined terms, and employs comparisons, instead of instances. This is particularly remarkable in that philosophy, which ascribes the discernment of all moral distinctions to reason alone, without the concurrence of sentiment. It is impossible that, in any particular instance, this hypothesis can so much as be rendered intelligible, whatever specious figure it may make in general declamations and discourses. Examine the crime of ingratitude, for instance; which has place, wherever we observe good-will, expressed and known, together with good-offices performed, on the one side, and a return of ill-will or indifference, with ill-offices or neglect on the other: anatomize all these circumstances, and examine, by your reason alone, in what consists the demerit or blame. You never will come to any issue or conclusion.

Reason judges either of matter of fact or of relations. Enquire then, first, where is that matter of fact which we here call crime; point it out; determine the time of its existence; describe its essence or nature; explain the sense or faculty to which it discovers itself. It resides in the mind of the person who is ungrateful. He must, therefore, feel it, and be conscious of it. But nothing is there, except the passion of ill-will or absolute indifference. You cannot say that these, of themselves, always, and in all circumstances, are crimes. No, they are only crimes when directed towards persons who have before expressed and displayed good-will towards us. Consequently, we may infer, that the crime of ingratitude is not any particular individual fact; but arises from a complication of circumstances, which, being presented to the [288] spectator, excites the sentiment of blame, by the particular structure and fabric of his mind.

This representation, you say, is false. Crime, indeed, consists not in a particular fact, of whose reality we are assured by reason; but it consists in certain moral relations,discovered by reason, in the same manner as we discover by reason the truths of geometry or algebra. But what are the relations, I ask, of which you here talk? In the case stated above, I see first good-will and good-offices in one person; then ill-will and ill-offices in the other. Between these, there is a relation of contrariety. Does the crime consist in that relation? But suppose a person bore me ill-will or did me ill-offices; and I, in return, were indifferent towards him, or did him good-offices. Here is the same relation of contrariety; and yet my conduct is often highly laudable. Twist and turn this matter as much as you will, you can never rest the morality on relation; but must have recourse to the decisions of sentiment.

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_587


If you are going to maintain that something out in the world is discovered that makes things good or bad, you are going to have a very hard time establishing such a claim.  No one has done it thus far in the history of philosophy.


Additionally, what Hume is saying fits in well with modern evolutionary theory, and with the idea that social animals need to get along with each other (or they would not be social).  The feelings or sentiments which form the basis of this are the foundation of ethics.  Ethical behavior has been observed in nonhuman animals, which further supports the idea that morals are not a matter of reasoning, but of feeling.  This also fits with how deeply these feelings are felt, for they are deeply imbedded in what we are.

Are there things that are really better, for their own sake, i.e. because they do exist, as opposed to a world without them?

I don't think so.  If you disagree, I think you will find it a bit difficult to come up with evidence that there is something better for its own sake.  That it might be good for something else is easy enough, but that is an entirely different claim.

Now, I wouldn't want to put human beings on an artificial pedestal and make the claim that we are special because we possess a superb faculty of logical reasoning, but I do think we could start by asking something like the following: Is any experience of life, however brief and whatever quality, better than none at all? Or perhaps, are some types of experiences, as opposed to others, better than none at all? Or is it incorrect to even try to make a value judgment between existence and nonexistence? On the one hand, it seems absurd at face value to say nonexistence can be anything, such as better or worse; and that’s probably valid.

I would think that a good life might be better than no life, but a bad life would be worse than no life.  I certainly would prefer to die than to just have a bad life from now on.

I think you are being too abstract and not coming down to earth, as it were, in your thinking about this.  People often get lost in the clouds, when they keep to abstractions, and do not compare with more concrete things.  Such thinking leads to bad arguments, like the ontological argument for the existence of god, where one imagines one can prove that things exist through pure reason, without actually finding anything in the world.  It is a danger to watch out for, so that one does not build imaginary edifices.

...

For me, if this can be grounded in some way (and perhaps it cannot, but I lean more towards the possibility that it can), then duties to the Good naturally follow. Now, I’m not suggesting that this at all touches on what the Good (or the True or the Beautiful) in fact is, but at least it’s a start from which we can reason further. And if the Good as defined as, well, let's just say whatever you please at this point, cannot be grounded, is it any worse off than anything else? Didn’t Aristotle rightly realize that all demonstration must assume first principles, i.e. definitions? Does logic justify itself? Does science? Does truth? Or do we---must we---start from self-evident facts about the world, which are derived from the intellect and the senses (which, of course, are highly prone to error), and work our way from there (basically what Harris says when posed with the question of ontological grounding for his moral theory, that in everything we must pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps), with not only morality but essentially all else that is not indivisible (and have we established indivisibility with... anything?)

When the first principles are at issue, any assumption of them is simply begging the question.  If that is not enough to convince you to rethink things, consider this:  If you assume some set of "first principles" and build your ethical system on that, upon what basis will you be able to select your system over another system, built on a different set of "first principles" that someone else prefers?

[Mudhammam]

I don't think there is anything that is discovered by reason out in the world, that can serve as the foundation of ethics, or that is "the Good," like some Platonic Form.  I rather like what Hume had to say about this in Appendix I of his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, though I will only quote a bit of it here:

I definitely wouldn't want to take things as far as Plato... but in some sense I think he may have been on to something. Aristotle, however, for as much as he got wrong, seemed fairly spot-on to me with his notions of matter/form, particulars/universals, and how he incorporated them into his ethical theory.

But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference towards the means. It is requisite a sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies. This sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. Here therefore reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial.
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341#Hume_0222_585

Let me just say a few things about this: The end, if we take it to be something like maximum happiness, is not indifferent to us. In fact, it's difficult to see what else could really matter to a sentient being. Therefore, the means are not indifferent either. I agree with Hume that "this sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness" of sentient beings (and not exclusively mankind, as he suggests), but then I don't see how it is really any different than our conception of "truth" or "scientific principles." When he says that "reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial," he could just as easily be talking about the pursuit of truth through the scientific method as he is about the pursuit of the virtues through philosophical inquiry. 

If you are going to maintain that something out in the world is discovered that makes things good or bad, you are going to have a very hard time establishing such a claim.  No one has done it thus far in the history of philosophy.

I just don't see that this is a problem unique to ethics. Consider the idea of truth, or even time. You could also say the following:
"If you are going to maintain that something out in the world is discovered that makes things true or false, you are going to have a very hard time establishing such a claim.  No one has done it thus far in the history of philosophy." Or, "If you are going to maintain that something out in the world is discovered that makes things past or future..." (italics mine). Both of those concepts are dependent of rational animals starting with first principles and utilizing induction and deduction for the purposes of demonstration, but would we want to say that if everyone reverted into an infantile stage tomorrow, or got raptured into heaven, then the things which we have determined to be true or false today would cease to be true or false simply because nobody has the concepts in mind (okay, perhaps some of those notions would change if we were raptured, but that wouldn't actually change the truth or falsehood of propositions themselves... only opinions, or the lack, of them)? I don't think so. After all, everyone can be wrong about something. The earth didn't simply begin revolving around the sun because the ancient Greek astronomer Aristarchus of Samos put forth his heliocentric model. So why should things "become" good simply because Quintus Fabius says so? With time (and unless we slide down into solipsism, one could easily, though absurdly, say everything else), which seems much more apparent as a feature of the world (it is after all assumed to be a fourth dimension like space... which is, to say the least, odd), we can't point to anything "out in the world" that forces things to vaporize into this untraversable past, this gray area that lies behind the moving "arrow of time" which can never be crossed over, and is only known through "records," yet nobody doubts that time exists in some absolute sense and that it "flows" towards the future... well, in fact some do doubt this, but I imagine any metaphysical claim with regards to time is going to be equally difficult to establish! In short, it's more or less an abstract concept that people find convenient to think about in terms of a physical structure inextricably linked to space... but they fail to establish any firm grip of understanding or point to concrete evidence of its existence in this sense too.

Additionally, what Hume is saying fits in well with modern evolutionary theory, and with the idea that social animals need to get along with each other (or they would not be social).  The feelings or sentiments which form the basis of this are the foundation of ethics.  Ethical behavior has been observed in nonhuman animals, which further supports the idea that morals are not a matter of reasoning, but of feeling.  This also fits with how deeply these feelings are felt, for they are deeply imbedded in what we are.

I fully agree with Hume on this. I should reiterate some of my thoughts: 1. Morality cannot be divorced from feeling. Sensation is at least half of the determination of what brings pleasure and pain, and therefore happiness, and therefore our ethical foundation. 2. I don't think animals are totally devoid of reason. They may exercise it differently, and the best problem-solvers in the animal kingdom outside of us may appear rudimentary in comparison to our brightest mathematicians, physicists, etc., but they still are able to recognize patterns and put two and two together. 3. I see modern evolutionary theory as more or less related to the epistemology of moral theories (how we come to think we know what real goods are) rather than saying anything fruitful about the ontological status of "the Good" (that what we think we have come to know as real goods are really good), i.e. due to goodness' sake alone.

I don't think so.  If you disagree, I think you will find it a bit difficult to come up with evidence that there is something better for its own sake.  That it might be good for something else is easy enough, but that is an entirely different claim.

Like I said, it is more than a bit difficult! Maybe it is impossible. But that doesn't make any alternatives better (with regards to what?   ), and I don't think we should abandon concepts that are necessary for our everyday experiences in the actual world simply because they're difficult to think about. Nobody knows what numbers represent (well, except that they represent themselves!), but we wouldn't begin to think that the values they assign are arbitrarily selected (even though the squiggly lines are).

When the first principles are at issue, any assumption of them is simply begging the question.  If that is not enough to convince you to rethink things, consider this:  If you assume some set of "first principles" and build your ethical system on that, upon what basis will you be able to select your system over another system, built on a different set of "first principles" that someone else prefers?

You cannot have an infinite regress of demonstrations. You must always begin with definitions, or first principles. I think the basis for which we select these are the same as everything else---reason and evidence---but yes, we may just have to assume that happiness is better than misery, even if we cannot demonstrate this in any other way but an appeal to our experiences and that of everyone (including sentient animals) else---which nobody has trouble doing when it comes to "the problem of other minds."

[Neo-Scholastic]

The issue to me is whether "the Good" is something that really exists as a part of this experience that we, as rational animals, understand to be the world…is it possible that … on account of some feature that forms the basis of their nature, can [embodied  beings] intrinsically contain more of this vague notion of goodness than others? Is not the very opportunity of a physical body which possesses the power to contemplate whether something that it calls "the Good" exists delineate a quality of being that is, on account of being part of that body, actually good in some sense?

In short, yes. You have probably noticed in your readings of ancient philosophy, that ‘The Good’ didn’t have the same connotations that it does today. Modern people think about moral principles that if followed make a person virtuous. I think the ancients, started with the idea of virtue and sought to identify conduct required to attain it.

With that idea in mind, I believe the ancient thinkers concerned themselves with the attributes of an exemplary man. In the same way one could think of better or worse examples of triangles, men conform to a greater or lesser degree with the Rational Animal.

Are there things that are more worth preserving in a definite state than others because they possess this quality we identify as goodness? It’s difficult to translate this idea into terms that don’t seem too vague or contrived and yet in experience it seems like an obvious aspect of the world, and moreover, one that transcends feeling and is a necessary fact in that it informs virtually every decision beings with some notion of goodness make.

Again I would say, yes. If you start with Aristotle, saying that people do what they think will make them happy. That raises the question of what ideal standard best informs that decision? Everyone to a greater or lesser extent recognizes the 'is' of specific factual traits in nature. From these traits, they choose to either cultivate those traits in themselves as virtues or avoid doing so.

An objective moral standard would be a universally applicable something, like the Form of Man, to which anyone could point as a guide for an ethical life and allows for rational discussion about how to apply it. One could still reject it, but idealy, if the standard were truly objective, one could not supply a good reason not to follow it. An objective standard like this would function like a ruler. You can try to draw a straight line by yourself or you can use the ruler. Your choice. No one is constrained by any external power (like God) to go either one way or the other.

I side step the is-ought problem by saying that people make choices unconstrained by any 'ought' as to whether they want to go down the path of life or down the path of nihilism. 'Should' is not an obligation but recognizing the moral standard and incorporating it into one's life.

I don't think there is anything that is discovered by reason out in the world, that can serve as the foundation of ethics, or that is "the Good," like some Platonic Form.

Whenever someone brings up the topic of Forms, everyone jumps to the conclusion that all speculation about Forms ended with Plato. He position is called Realism. The opposite is Nominalism / Conceptualism (which most on AF members advocate). These two positions are not the only options. Aristotle and Aquinas developed Moderate Realism. Moderate Realism adequately supports a moral philosophy based on personal virtue.

The feelings or sentiments which form the basis of this are the foundation of ethics.  Ethical behavior has been observed in nonhuman animals, which further supports the idea that morals are not a matter of reasoning, but of feeling.

This gets back to points made in earlier posts by Hats. Post-Enlightenment culture privileges linear left-brain reasoning and discounts right-brain intuition and creativity. Once someone has cultivated virtuous habits then they can act on them based on instinct, but because they took great care earlier to act according to best reason (not always their own) then the fact that they are based on feelings does not make them any less rational.

When the first principles are at issue, any assumption of them is simply begging the question.  If that is not enough to convince you to rethink things, consider this:  If you assume some set of "first principles" and build your ethical system on that, upon what basis will you be able to select your system over another system, built on a different set of "first principles" that someone else prefers?

That simply is not the case. Rational thought and the acquisition of knowledge cannot happen without first principles / foundational beliefs. Axioms are necessarily true because their opposites are self-refuting. As such they can serve as foundational principles. For example, something cannot be both A and not-A.

[bennyboy]

I might not be following, but let that not stop me from adding a comment.

Things can be objectively good, but the context in which things are judged good cannot. Something is good which achieves or contributes to a good goal; and that good goal is judged to be a good goal because it is necessary for a greater, also good, goal. Things obviously required for life might be considered objectively good, since the desire to live is a goal applied to mankind before it even was mankind-- i.e. the nature of evolution itself-- to allow persistent patterns to persist-- may be called an objective morality.

However, even with this, you cannot transcend that context: the context in which humanity, life, and the process of evolution on Earth matter. You cannot really say that existence matters-- of individual entities or even of the universe.

I suspect there is a religious vestige in the idea that ANYTHING is objectively good. There is the assumption that since the universe (maybe deterministically) tended to arrive at the existence of life, then it was an objective process that led to the existence of subjective perspectives, and that ultimately, all morality is therefore object in some sense. However, is it good for the universe to exist rather than not to exist? Yes, we are tempted to answer-- because this was necessary for the existence of life, which we've already established to be good.

But there's a vicious circle here, isn't there?