Sam Harris On Defining Consciousness

[surreptitious57]

We know that consciousness is a physical process because it is a by product of the brain that is a physical
organ. Beyond that we know nothing or nothing which can be subject to potential falsification to determine  
whether it is objectively true or not. But we should not be puzzled as to why we cannot figure it out because
we have been so here many times before. Not all phenomena are immediately understood so consciousness is
just one of many which we either did not or do not understand. So do not expect primate brains to under stand
something as complex as that with out some seriously heavy thinking about it first. But even then do not assume
those primate brains shall have it cracked because they may not. Knowledge acquisition is a work in progress both
for us as individuals and as a species. As we accumulate it over time it is not a given that every thing shall be under
stood and indeed there are things that can never be understood. And consciousness could very easily be one of them

A MIND IS LIKE A PARACHUTE : IT DOES NOT WORK UNLESS IT IS OPEN

[bennyboy]

There's really no problem with describing consciousness as "what lets us run away from the lions" except in that we might wish for it to be more (as you clearly do when you decide that consciousness is the experience of qualia).

In this sense, it's still a "whatever it is." The problem with evolutionary narratives is that the narrative is accepted as a reason: "We are conscious because if we can sense and escape lions, our DNA will have a better chance of propagating" really doesn't explain why there is consciousness, or what it is.

I still don't see a problem, we're still running away from lions - the work is still being accomplished, there is still a demonstrable effect to investigate, and I'll still call that consciousness, even without qualia - which I already do...obviously.

That's fine, but then the "whatever it is" that I experience as I wake up needs a new label, and we're back to another trip around the semantic merry-go-round.

Perhaps, in the case of consciousness, as in the case of this neon purple lion, a little division would go a long way.  After all, if you keep looking for something that may not be there, and using that absence to conclude that some -other- thing is also not present.....you're never going to find that other thing, no matter how many times it's set at your feet.

I'm sufficiently convinced of the reality of my own consciousness, by which I mean my ability to experience qualia, that I'm willing to take that chance. The label means something, and it may not be applicable to robots.

[Rhondazvous]

The problem with the escaping the lion model for defining consciousness is it puts us way down on the evolutionary scale. While we have the audacity to call other mammals on this planet lower life forms, they can detest the lion long before we do. Think of the tsunami that hit India. All those thousands of people died, but among them they did not find the body of one animals. Even the birds “knew” enough to fly backwards to escape the coming water. While the humans were oblivious to it until it was right on them. To save human dignity we could argue that the animals were acting on instinct, not consciousness. Whatever it still proved far superior for escaping the lion.

[The Grand Nudger]

In this sense, it's still a "whatever it is."  The problem with evolutionary narratives is that the narrative is accepted as a reason: "We are conscious because if we can sense and escape lions, our DNA will have a better chance of propagating" really doesn't explain why there is consciousness, or what it is.

It's still more specific.  I think we're going down the rabbit hole because you're intent on leading us there, not because we have to.

That's fine, but then the "whatever it is" that I experience as I wake up needs a new label, and we're back to another trip around the semantic merry-go-round.

Not a problem for me, though.  You can ride the semantic merry go round with qualia all you like..but I don't require it, since I'm looking to explain consciousnous, not qualia - and we obviously aren't talking about the same thing.  If you feel that "whatever it is" is a sufficient description of qualia - that's your business.  I don't, personally, think that awareness of the environment is the same as awareness of ones self -in- the environment, which...to me....seems like an important difference between consciousness as I see it, and qualia as I see it. Many things that are aware are not self aware....so far as I can tell. Specificity.

I'm sufficiently convinced of the reality of my own consciousness, by which I mean my ability to experience qualia, that I'm willing to take that chance.  The label means something, and it may not be applicable to robots.

Why, because you believe that you've observed it..or that this observation of what you percieve to be your own qualia is somehow different from any other observation...somehow more direct or trustworthy?  

Perhaps robots don't have qualia...but are they conscious?  I'd say that any robot which satisfies the metrics we use to determine consciousness in ourselves or some other x is conscious, regardless of it's status on the "whatever it is" front that concerns you. I don't think that plants experience qualia either....and yet I consider them conscious - because they fit the metrics I use for "conscious", even though they don't fit the metrics I'd use for "qualia". -reasons-, or no reasons at all.

@Rhonda, why is that a problem......and whats this up and down business anyway? Perhaps we could stop -audaciously, as you've put it, calling other animals "lower life forms"......eh? I don't have any problem recognizing situations in which a sunflower (or a lion) is my "better"...do you? I don't see that as affecting my human dignity..such as it is, lol.

[ErGingerbreadMandude]

Survival instincts.

That's my definition

[bennyboy]

It's still more specific.  I think we're going down the rabbit hole because you're intent on leading us there, not because we have to.

I don't know why you are equating "I don't know and I refuse to pretend to" with woo. Consciousness IS mysterious. We don't really know what it is or why it's there. We have no method of detecting it, and not even the beginning of a plausible explanation of why it exists. That's not woo. In fact, I'd say the position of acknowledging a lack of understanding is more scientific than forcibly redefining terms in order to get results that conform to a world view that's jealous of anything it can't measure.

Not a problem for me, though.  You can ride the semantic merry go round with qualia all you like..but I don't require it, since I'm looking to explain consciousnous, not qualia - and we obviously aren't talking about the same thing.  If you feel that "whatever it is" is a sufficient description of qualia - that's your business.

I've specifically said I don't think it's a description (read: definition). But the fact is that when I, and most people, talk about consciousness, we are talking about the experience of awareness, not simply the ability of a physical structure to interact with its environment. That mysterious process, whatever it is, is associated with that particular word, and if you want to talk about something else, then you must acknowledge that you are using a unique definition-- a redefinition which I think has the function of avoiding the real philosophical issues of consciousness through question-begging.

I'm sufficiently convinced of the reality of my own consciousness, by which I mean my ability to experience qualia, that I'm willing to take that chance.  The label means something, and it may not be applicable to robots.

Why, because you believe that you've observed it..or that this observation of what you percieve to be your own qualia is somehow different from any other observation...somehow more direct or trustworthy?

These observations aren't peers. There is the content of experience, and the capacity to experience, which is consciousness.

Perhaps robots don't have qualia...but are they conscious?  I'd say that any robot which satisfies the metrics we use to determine consciousness in ourselves or some other x is conscious, regardless of it's status on the "whatever it is" front that concerns you.  I don't think that plants experience qualia either....and yet I consider them conscious - because they fit the metrics I use for "conscious", even though they don't fit the metrics I'd use for "qualia".  -reasons-, or no reasons at all.  

What you are talking about is fine. It's even fine to use the word consciousness to talk about robots, as in "This robot exhibits a high level of consciousness of its environment, and this one is just a vacuum cleaner." But that's why my label matters. However you physicalize your version of the word, there is still that mysterious "whatever it is" that any interested person would want to try to understand-- and that search for understanding, so far, is little benefited by changing the definition of the word. It doesn't explain why I wake up in the morning and see the apple on my desk as red.

[The Grand Nudger]

I don't know why you are equating "I don't know and I refuse to pretend to" with woo.  Consciousness IS mysterious.  We don't really know what it is or why it's there.  We have no method of detecting it, and not even the beginning of a plausible explanation of why it exists.  That's not woo.  In fact, I'd say the position of acknowledging a lack of understanding is more scientific than forcibly redefining terms in order to get results that conform to a world view that's jealous of anything it can't measure.

Here again (as we get to below), the mystery is not in consciousness, at least not for me.  We see an effect, we see how that effect is achieved.  We understand it well enough -to manipulate that effect-.  We have more than just a plausible explanation of why consciousness, as I'm using the word, exists.  We have a robust understanding of -various- mechanisms for it..... and how they work, how they developed, why they work the way they do, and why they developed the way they did.  This isn't to say we know it all, or enough, or even as much as we'd like..or that understanding how a structure can achieve awareness explains some -other- thing you might be wondering about.

I've specifically said I don't think it's a description (read: definition).  But the fact is that when I, and most people, talk about consciousness, we are talking about the experience of awareness, not simply the ability of a physical structure to interact with its environment.  That mysterious process, whatever it is, is associated with that particular word, and if you want to talk about something else, then you must acknowledge that you are using a unique definition-- a redefinition which I think has the function of avoiding the real philosophical issues of consciousness through question-begging.

I'm using a fairly standard definition....in fact...I'm tempted to hit you with a lmgtfy link.   Conscious and qualia are not, as we understand it........interchangeable terms.  You don't think that the awareness of a structure and the experience of that awareness, qualia, are interchangeable any more than I do, do you?   You don't think that because we can demonstrate that a structure is aware of it's surroundings, is conscious...this demonstrates qualia....do you?  Because if you do, tell me now so I can declare qualia thoroughly demonstrated amigo, lol.  

Seems to me that you both understand and leverage the very distinction you're objecting to.......

What you are talking about is fine.  It's even fine to use the word consciousness to talk about robots, as in "This robot exhibits a high level of consciousness of its environment, and this one is just a vacuum cleaner."  But that's why my label matters.  However you physicalize your version of the word, there is still that mysterious "whatever it is" that any interested person would want to try to understand-- and that search for understanding, so far, is little benefited by changing the definition of the word.  It doesn't explain why I wake up in the morning and see the apple on my desk as red.

Again, I'm not redefining anything, nor is there any reason for me to acknowledge some unique definition - because I'm not using one.  What you're calling "consciousness" seems, to me, to be more like consciousness and self consciousness and sentience and sapience and qualia all lumped together.....in short, the human experience.  Since when did something have to share the human experience in-toto in order to be deemed conscious?

That I don't see the mystery in qualia that you do might be tied up in what I -don't- demand of that "whatever it is".  If you'll recall our previous conversations, I don't require it to be anything more than the operation of a machine, which we can demonstrate.  I don't demand that it be anything other than processing, which we do have an explanation for.  This isn't to say that I consider it explained, I simply consider the mystery you see to be manufactured by your disatisfaction with what means we -do- have to explain it.

[bennyboy]

Here again, as we get to below, the mystery is not, for me, in consciousness.  We see an effect, we see how that effect is achieved.  We understand it well enough -to manipulate that effect-.  We have more than just a plausible explanation of why consciousness, as I'm using the word, exists.  We have a robust understanding of -various- mechanisms for it..... and how they work, how they developed, why they work the way they do, and why they developed the way they did.  This isn't to say we know it all, or enough, or even as much as we'd like..or that understanding how a structure can achieve awareness explains some -other- thing you might be wondering about.

That's fine. You use your definition, I'll use mine. But I'm pretty sure Sam Harris isn't using your definition either. I'll tell you why my label is better than your definition: it serves to differentiate. Your version of "consciousness" is equivalent to "function," to "phsyical interaction," etc. I think it's only been used as you use it in very recent terms, and I see it as an attempt to rob a non-physicalist word of its real meaning.

When in doubt, go to the etymology: it comes from the root "to know." I do not think a machine performing a function "knows," because knowing is. . . wait for it. . . an experience.

Again, I'm not redefining anything, nor is there any reason for me to acknowledge some unique definition - because I'm not using one.  What you're calling "consciousness" seems, to me, to be more like consciousness and self consciousness and sentience and sapience and qualia all lumped together.....in short, the human experience.  Since when did something have to share the human experience in-toto in order to be deemed conscious?

The things I was talking about are definitely the human experience. . . specifically, knowing what it's like to experience things (aka qualia). It is this kind of knowledge that I trace back to the "sci" in "conscious."

I presume that a worm knows what it's like to be a worm. I do not believe that a computer knows what it's like to be a computer.

That I don't see the mystery in qualia that you do might be tied up in what I -don't- demand of that "whatever it is".  If you'll recall our previous conversations, I don't require it to be anything more than the operation of a machine, which we can demonstrate.  I don't demand that it be anything other than processing, which we do have an explanation for.

I don't demand anything. However, I do use "conscious" as a label for something which you do not, and I think my usage is more meaningful than yours. In other words, if I have to debate consciousness using your definition, I will instantly become bored, and leave it to robot engineers to study it. As a living thing, I'm mainly interested in what it's like to be alive, and your definition sheds little light on that, IMO.

[The Grand Nudger]

No, my version is "is aware of it's environment".  We judge this by response, even in our own case.

A worm may or may not know what it's like to be a worm.  I do see that it's aware of it's environment, regardless, though.

Your usage is huge, pregnant, filled to bursting.... and contains things which you claim cannot be or have not been demonstrated.  Mine is specific, and demonstrable.  

My conscious is not my qualia, it is simply awareness - not any experience of that awareness.  There is a difference to me, as there is to you.  You and I can both demonstrate awareness.  You feel that qualia cannot be demonstrated.  Wouldn't qualia be demonstrable by the same means that awareness is demonstrated - if they're the same thing?  Perhaps you should divide a little as well, in fact I'm certain that you do.

You may be bored...but there's alot of this boring stuff going on, and it has some amazing effects and combinations. You can't really demonstrate that your qualia isn't one of them, and all the evidence we have suggests that it is.....as unbelievable or impossible as it may seem to be, to you. It might be more interesting than you think...lol. Personally, that I see qualia as the function of a machine makes it infinitely more interesting than as some ethereal, un-demonstrable property. After all, if something entirely unknown is happening, all bets are off. It might be pretty damned simple for "x" to produce qualia. Whereas squeezing qualia out of a typewriter made of flesh and bone seems to be a little more difficult, no? It's some seriously classy shit, however it was arrived at.

[bennyboy]

No, my version is "is aware of it's environment".  We judge this by response, even in our own case.

If you are trying to judge consciousness in others, then their behavior is your best bet, I guess, though there's that original "pragmatic" assumption always hiding behind the curtain like the Wizard of Oz-- that your observations are at least a reasonable representation of an underlying objective reality. If you are trying to define what consciousness IS and why it exists, then none of that matters, unless you can see others' qualia.

Your usage is huge, pregnant, filled to bursting.... and contains things which you claim cannot be or have not been demonstrated.  Mine is specific, and demonstrable.

Demanding this criterion basically says, "Whatever is a mystery must be redefined so it no longer sounds like a mystery." Redefinition for a science lab is great. You can get your Conscio-matic 3000 to watch things and decide whether they are interacting with the environment. But that has nothing to do with the philosophical point of interest, IMO.

 
My conscious is not my qualia, it is simply awareness - not any experience of that awareness.  There is a difference to me, as there is to you.  You and I can both demonstrate awareness.  You feel that qualia cannot be demonstrated.  Wouldn't qualia be demonstrable by the same means that awareness is demonstrated - if they're the same thing?  Perhaps you should divide a little as well, in fact I'm certain that you do.

It depends what you are aware of, and what you mean by awareness. Is this just adding another word into the mix for the semantic shell-game? I'd say that the awareness you are talking about still has an associate qualia: what it's like to be aware of things.

You may be bored...but there's alot of this boring stuff going on, and it has some amazing effects and combinations.  You can't really demonstrate that your qualia isn't one of them, and all the evidence we have suggests that it is.....as unbelievable or impossible as it may seem to be, to you.

It's only evidence because you operationalize the definitions to allow what you can observe to serve as evidence. That's not evidence of the actual capacity for experience that most people would call consciousness-- it is avoidance.

  It might be more interesting than you think...lol.

Okay, that was really a rhetorical statement. The science of mind, of AI, of robots, etc. is very interesting. And I understand that in that context, the word "conscious" as you define it is pragmatic. But I won't stand by and allow that definition to be conflated with the kind of consciousness that humans (and presumably other living things) have, because while you certainly can watch both living and non-living things to see how they interact with the environment, it seems very likely to me that all non-living things that you say are conscious are philosophical zombies at best.