The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[athrock]

You're absolutely right.  I've got you completely wrong and/or confused...continue -not- defending your arguments, and -not- abandoning them, lol.  In fact, you can show me up right now...do the one thing necessarry to make the ontological argument stick..and to hell with form or structure, just to make it easier.  Demonstrate the veracity of it's propositions.

Well, okay...I'll try. But let me clear: I don't know whether this argument holds water or not. Like I said in the OP, I just heard about it. And I'm just repeating what I've read because you asked me to...not because I'm an expert on this. So, you'll have to do more than simply dice me up; my inability to articulate or defend something I'm barely familiar with is not proof that the argument itself fails. Failure in this situation may be due entirely to shortcomings of the one making the argument!

Let's start with the first premise. It seems intuitive that a maximally great being might possibly exist. In order for its existence to be impossible, it must be logically incoherent...like the idea of a married bachelor. But proponents claim that there is nothing logically incoherent about the idea of a maximally great being. Are they right? If not, I don't see why they're wrong.

As a side note, it just occurred to me that we might argue that there is no such thing as a cat that glows in the dark. However, scientists are experimenting with genetic manipulation that will introduce the "glowing" ability of other species (fish?) into the DNA of cats. So, the possibility of glowing cats is real, even though until recently we would have said that we'd never seen one or that there is no experiential evidence that one exists. Bottom line? What is possible and what actually exists are two different things. Similarly, we not have seen a maximally great being (yet), but that is not the same as saying that it is impossible for one to exist.

Moving on, it seems to follow that a being which is not merely "great" but is "maximally great" must be one which has certain characteristics, and these would be the "omni's" that are commonly referenced by theists when speaking of God: omnipresent, omniscient, etc.

To repeat, even though we don't know of an actual maximally great being, it does not follow from what may simply be our ignorance that one does not exist...or at least there is no reason for us to conclude that one cannot possibly exist. IOW, in the absence of logical incoherence, we must say that it is at least possible that a maximally great being exists. Which is all that premise (1) says.

Your thoughts so far?

---

The link took me to "FreeSpace a blog by Timothy Sandefur" who was talking about his adopted brother being killed by the terrorists in San Bernadino...

What did I miss?

Not speaking for Cato but try this:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontolo...#ObjOntArg

Thanks. I will start working through that tonight. (It runs 22 pages hard-copy.)

[The Grand Nudger]

Well, okay...I'll try. But let me clear: I don't know whether this argument holds water or not. Like I said in the OP, I just heard about it. And I'm just repeating what I've read because you asked me to...not because I'm an expert on this. So, you'll have to do more than simply dice me up; my inability to articulate or defend something I'm barely familiar with is not proof that the argument itself fails. Failure in this situation may be due entirely to shortcomings of the one making the argument!

Granted...but hopefully, by doing our best we can become more knowledgeable.  

Let's start with the first premise. It seems intuitive that a maximally great being might possibly exist. In order for its existence to be impossible, it must be logically incoherent...like the idea of a married bachelor. But proponents claim that there is nothing logically incoherent about the idea of a maximally great being. Are they right? If not, I don't see why they're wrong.

What you're discussing is what's referred to as "the innocence of the premise".  The premise  "A maximally great being might not exist" is equally possible.  The trouble, with this premise and modal logic..is that if you agree, -not- demonstrate, mind you, but simply agree that the form is or could be informative, you must also agree that a precisely opposite claim is also equally informative.  An equally innocent premise.  The premise, though..isn't actually innocent at all, as existence...the conclusion..is already included as an attribute, as has already been mentioned.

As a side note, it just occurred to me that we might argue that there is no such thing as a cat that glows in the dark. However, scientists are experimenting with genetic manipulation that will introduce the "glowing" ability of other species (fish?) into the DNA of cats. So, the possibility of glowing cats is real, even though until recently we would have said that we'd never seen one or that there is no experiential evidence that one exists. Bottom line? What is possible and what actually exists are two different things. Similarly, we not have seen a maximally great being (yet), but that is not the same as saying that it is impossible for one to exist.

-and yet the premise is equally innocent (or not).  

Moving on, it seems to follow that a being which is not merely "great" but is "maximally great" must be one which has certain characteristics, and these would be the "omni's" that are commonly referenced by theists when speaking of God: omnipresent, omniscient, etc.

That's a personal value judgement of attributes relative value or worth.  It seems to you that the maximally great being must posess omnipresence or omniscience..but a maximally great being to me might need to possess the "attribute" of non-existence.  After all..the only thing greater than a god that exists and creates a world, for example..is one that can create a world without even needing to exist. Or, less quixotically, that a being which is not omipotent or omnipresent or omniscient who still manages to do all the "god" stuff is much greater than a being who does the same things with those omni's as a crutch.

To repeat, even though we don't know of an actual maximally great being, it does not follow from may simply be our ignorance that one does not exist...or at least there is no reason for us to conclude that one cannot possibly exist. IOW, in the absence of logical incoherence, we must say that it is at least possible that a maximally great being exists. Which is all that premise (1) says.

Your thoughts so far?

That you didn't even attempt to demonstrate the veracity of the propositions..instead launching off on a sidebar about what attributes a maximally great being would have - according to you.  That you've abandoned your argument...and are now presenting another...even as you agreed to at least try. That you're aping WLC's "and this we all consider to be god" routine. I doubt that an omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient toaster would be a satisfying god to those inclined to belief, or inclined to swallow such "arguments".

[brewer]

Not speaking for Cato but try this:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontolo...#ObjOntArg

Thanks. I will start working through that tonight. (It runs 22 pages hard-copy.)

You might just want to skip to the objections, section 4. That is probably what you will be hearing from most of us.

[Natachan]

I have never seen this argument before, so I'm interested in some discussion of it. A philosopher by the name of Alvin Plantinga states it this way:

The Ontological Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
   
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
   

Thoughts?

1. What is a "maximally great being"? Without a clear definition of this we can't even accept the first premise.

2. This is fine.

3. No. No no no. That's like saying "if I have the ace of spades in the deck, then I have all the cards in the deck." That's not how it works. This world is a subset in the set of possible worlds. If this maximally great being is in some possible world, then it is in another subset. It's presence in one subset of the set does not necessitate the presence in all the other elements of the set.

Let's put it another way. I am creating a set a call "letter sets."
SubSet 1: [A, C, T, R, Q]
SubSet 2: [B, D, R, E, C]
SubSet 3: [K, L, M, C, Z]

Now, just because K is a member of subset3 of "letter sets" does not mean it shows up in all three subsets. But this is the argument that point three is trying to make. It would be more accurate to say that since C is a member of all subsets of the set "letter sets" it exists in subset 3.

4. This is right, but since the argument failed spectacularly already the point is moot.

5 &6. Still don't know what a maximally great being is.

This argument attempts to define god into existence. But it doesn't work that way. You can make as many definitions as you wish, but no amount of defining can pop anything into existence. I define a plippityploop as a flying toaster that dispenses bagels that dispenses bagels to hungry people and exists necessarily. Where is my bagel?

[IATIA]

1. It is possible that a Leprechaun exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a Leprechaun exists, then a Leprechaun exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a Leprechaun exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a Leprechaun exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a Leprechaun exists in the actual world, then a Leprechaun exists.
   
6. Therefore, a Leprechaun exists.
   

Leprechauns (or any other thing commonly used to parody this argument) are not commonly thought to have the same characteristics that are attributed by definition to a supreme being. These characteristics include omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and so forth. And these are necessary for a being to be "maximally great".

If you do wish to claim that a leprechaun (or  , for that matter) does have ALL of these, then I submit that all you have done is to assign a name of sorts to the supreme being.

Yahweh, Allah, Baha'u'llah, Zeus, Osiris...the name changes, but the being behind the name is the same. Provided that all the "omni" characteristics are present in that being.

Nothing in that argument suggests that a god must exist.  I changed nothing but the entity and it is as 'valid' as the original argument.  One of the tests of logic is whether or not it can maintain the conclusion.  As no properties are assigned to this "maximally great' entity then any entity can be substituted and the failure of the original argument becomes apparent.

[Cecelia]

It's possible the ontological argument is the dumbest argument of all time.
If it's possible that it's the dumbest argument of all time, then it's the dumbest argument of all time in some possible world
If it's the dumbest argument in some worlds, then it's the dumbest argument in all Worlds
If it's the dumbest argument in all worlds, then it's the dumbest argument in the real world
If it's the dumbest argument in the real world, then it being the dumbest argument is true
Therefore, it's the dumbest argument

[GrandizerII]

The ontological argument doesn't really do anything to support God's existence. All it says that if such a being is possible in reality, then such a being exists. But it hasn't been demonstrated that it's possible. And I mean through arguments, and not necessarily evidence. Kalam doesn't do it, the contingency argument doesn't do it, the moral argument doesn't do it, none of the arguments I've seen thus far for God show that such an entity is possible. All they do is propose such a being as the explanation.

[Simon Moon]

I have never seen this argument before, so I'm interested in some discussion of it. A philosopher by the name of Alvin Plantinga states it this way:

The Ontological Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
   
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
   

Thoughts?

Here's a variation of Plantinga's argument, that is just as valid as his, that proves that a god does not exist.

Another objection to the argument is also quite simple: one could change the possibility premise, and flip the argument on its head:

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and
   
   
2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
   
   
3. It is possible that there isn’t a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)
   
   
4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being does not exist.
   
   
5. Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist. (axiom S5)
   
   
6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist.
   

The argument is completely valid, and suffers from the same flaw as Plantinga’s. There really is no reason to accept the formulation of the possibility premise (3), either – without additional arguments, at the very least.

[LostLocke]

What I'm wondering is, where is the rulebook that says what a 'maximally great' being is supposed to be? Maybe omniscience is a flaw. Some people would say it is, and if so a maximally great being wouldn't be omniscient. Maybe I think in order to be maximally great, you must be made out of blueberries.
Ask 1 million different people what they think ultimate greatness is, you'll get 1 million different answers.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

The trouble with a being having 'omnimax' attributes is that some of these are mutually exclusive. For example, for a being to be maximally great, it would need to be omnibenevolent, which implies mercy, while at the same time being omnijust, which negates mercy. That mutually exclusive properties do not exist at the same time in the being is axiomatic.

Boru