The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[SofaKingHigh]

 Oh goody! 

Seriously, if there is a better formulation, let see it.  Please provide definitions for any words not used in a colloquial way.

Actually it is a little technical because it relies on modal logic concepts like possibility and necessity, as well as the S5 axiom.

Here are the two definitions Plantinga starts with

[*]A being is maximally excellent in a world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in W; and
[*]A being is maximally great in a world W if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world.

Given these two definitions, the argument is constructed:

1. The concept of a maximally great being is self-consistent.
2. If 1, then there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.
3. Therefore, there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.
4. If a maximally great being exists in one logically possible world, it exists in every logically possible world.
5. Therefore, a maximally great being (that is, God) exists in every logically possible world.

From a formal-logical analysis, everything is consistent. There aren't any "holes" in the argument.

Instead, most atheists who have a problem with it question P4 because it reliexs on the S5 modal axiom. Which, oddly enough, is something atheist philosophers are quite comfortable with outside this context.

[*]

I've seen some mental gymnastics and word spastics in my time, but this takes some beating.

Try scrabble.

[Delicate]

Actually it is a little technical because it relies on modal logic concepts like possibility and necessity, as well as the S5 axiom.

Here are the two definitions Plantinga starts with

[*]A being is maximally excellent in a world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in W; and
[*]A being is maximally great in a world W if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world.

Given these two definitions, the argument is constructed:

1. The concept of a maximally great being is self-consistent.
2. If 1, then there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.
3. Therefore, there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.
4. If a maximally great being exists in one logically possible world, it exists in every logically possible world.
5. Therefore, a maximally great being (that is, God) exists in every logically possible world.

From a formal-logical analysis, everything is consistent. There aren't any "holes" in the argument.

Instead, most atheists who have a problem with it question P4 because it reliexs on the S5 modal axiom. Which, oddly enough, is something atheist philosophers are quite comfortable with outside this context.

[*]

I've seen some mental gymnastics and word spastics in my time, but this takes some beating.

Try scrabble.

[*]

^ This is the typical response you'll see from atheists who are uneducated and uninformed on issues like this. 

There's a fear of anything that might discredit their religion, and even if they can't find anything wrong with it, they must repudiate it. They are not intellectually competent enough to refute it with reason or evidence, and thus, out of their fear and paranoia, resort to name-calling, emotional appeals, and empty rhetoric.

This is why atheism is intellectually bankrupt.

[ApeNotKillApe]

So when you act like an insufferable dipshit, is it for general amusement or is it some kind of creepy sex thing?

[Cyberman]

Well, it's all shits 'n' giggles, until someone giggles 'n' shits - all over an atheist forum.

[Delicate]

So when you act like an insufferable dipshit, is it for general amusement or is it some kind of creepy sex thing?

Creepy sex thing.

[Crossless2.0]

So when you act like an insufferable dipshit, is it for general amusement or is it some kind of creepy sex thing?

Creepy sex thing.

I knew it! 

[Delicate]

Creepy sex thing.

I knew it! 

Ehrmahgerd you did.

[Jenny A]

 Oh goody! 

Seriously, if there is a better formulation, let see it.  Please provide definitions for any words not used in a colloquial way.

Actually it is a little technical because it relies on modal logic concepts like possibility and necessity, as well as the S5 axiom.

Here are the two definitions Plantinga starts with

[*]A being is maximally excellent in a world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in W; and
[*]A being is maximally great in a world W if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world.

[*]

That's just where I see the problem.  Omnipotent contains an internal set of contradictions.  Could an omnipotent being create something larger than it can lift or conceive of something more complicated than it could grasp?  Given the lack of objective standards for morality other than what such a being decrees, what would perfect morality be?  It's easy to imagine societies (let alone worlds) in which something is morally perfect which we would not consider morally perfect in this western society that you and I live in.

Nothing is maximally excellent in every world I can imagine (maybe you have a lessor imagination?) and I cannot begin to claim to imagine every  possible world.  Do you think anyone can?

Given these two definitions, the argument is constructed:

1. The concept of a maximally great being is self-consistent.

[*]

Again, it is not.  Can the maximally great think greater thoughts than it can understand?  Or create heavier objects than it can lift?  Or be greater at creating than it is at destroying?  Maximally great is a contradiction.

2. If 1, then there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.

[*]

But 1 fails.

3. Therefore, there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.

[*]

But there is no such logically possible world.  See above.  A thing cannot be both stronger and weaker than itself.

4. If a maximally great being exists in one logically possible world, it exists in every logically possible world.

[*]

No.  Easy to say, but not true.  An infinite number of logically possible worlds include only one singular type of being in which case none would be maximally great.  Instead all would be equally great and deficient by any standard whatsoever.  Imagine a world of all 1s are all clones.

5. Therefore, a maximally great being (that is, God) exists in every logically possible world.

[*]

See above. The definition of maximally great is logically inconsistent unless it means a finite level that many might achieve in which case it doesn't mean a single god or even a god at all.  Further, what might exist and what does exist are not the same thing.

From a formal-logical analysis, everything is consistent. There aren't any "holes" in the argument.

[*]

see above.

Instead, most atheists who have a problem with it question P4 because it reliexs on the S5 modal axiom. Which, oddly enough, is something atheist philosophers are quite comfortable with outside this context.

[*]


If 4 relies on 5, then a premise or argument relies on the conclusion.  That would be a big logical problem.

[athrock]

We conceive of things that do not and even cannot exist all the time.

The Scholastics also distinguished between what can be imagined and what can be conceived. The nomenclature of the argument, like maximally great, conceive, imagine, possibility and necessity, have highly specific applications. I don't mean to disparage anyone not familiar with that philosophical tradition nor am I saying that the ontological argument is correct. I just think there really isn't much point discussing the merits of this particular argument without a contextual understanding of the terms used.

The way I see it, many of their useful and important distinctions have been lost because of general ignorance and modern misunderstandings about the Scholastic tradition. As far as that goes, I too am ignorant about so much about Medieval philosophy and its hard to hold on to the specific meanings of related terms that in everyday life are generally interchangeable. There is so much to learn and everything I have learned has been profoundly illuminating, if only because it provides important context for much of what gets discussed in contemporary philosophy.

Not exactly glowing praise for contemporary philosophy.

Or contemporary atheism.

It's not enough to simply parody philosophical arguments with leprechauns and flying spaghetti monsters.

---

The Scholastics also distinguished between what can be imagined and what can be conceived. The nomenclature of the argument, like maximally great, conceive, imagine, possibility and necessity, have highly specific applications. I don't mean to disparage anyone not familiar with that philosophical tradition nor am I saying that the ontological argument is correct. I just think there really isn't much point discussing the merits of this particular argument without a contextual understanding of the terms used.

The way I see it, many of their useful and important distinctions have been lost because of general ignorance and modern misunderstandings about the Scholastic tradition. As far as that goes, I too am ignorant about so much about Medieval philosophy and its hard to hold on to the specific meanings of related terms that in everyday life are generally interchangeable. There is so much to learn and everything I have learned has been profoundly illuminating, if only because it provides important context for much of what gets discussed in contemporary philosophy.

I see no sense in announcing that we don't get medieval philosophical definitions, if you don't go further and provide definitions. What do you think the difference between conceive and imagine is in this context?   I think of conceiving as concretely imaging a possible thing.  But maximally great is neither imaginable, nor conceivable.  So, if you wouldn't mind, could we have the definitions of maximally great, conceive, imagine, possibility, and necessity?

It's been 35 years since I read Thomas Aquainus, or Anselm, and I really have no interest in going back to the oringinals, but given your definitions, I'd be happy to discuss the ontological proof.   My 19 year old self was unimpressed.  So, provide definitions and impress my 50 year old self.

No offense intended, but was your 19-year-old self mature enough to be appropriately impressed? If so, you were a rare bird, Jenny! 

[Cyberman]

Why, when the whole point of parody is to highlight the inadequacies in the arguments?