The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[downbeatplumb]

The [atheistic] assumption being that none of the arguments ARE quality arguments…. "You theists must be wrong because you've used a lot of fancy words that I can't be bothered with."

Really? This passes for atheist argumentation?

In short, yes. Generally, they uncritically accept the idea that every demonstration and proof of God has been debunked or refuted. Generally, but not always. I used to be an atheist, just not one irrationally committed to a particular worldview.

And your demand [Equilax’s] for "simple evidence"...what's that about, E? What is "simple evidence" that would convince you?

He’s lying. Coming from an ideological atheist like him, the demand for evidence is always disingenuous.

But we aren't specifically discussing Christianity, and that doesn't really explain how you justify not believing in ANY supreme being.

Inside a thread about general revelation, many atheists like Cato, blur the distinction so they can start riding their little hobby horses about ‘bible contradictions’ to distract people from the reasonableness of the general proofs.

You can make an argument for anything.


Lets see lets make an argument that ducks can't fly.

1: Things that rise are less dense than the medium in which they are placed.
2: Ducks are more dense than air.
3: therefore ducks cannot rise into the sky.

4: Therefore Ducks cannot fly. 

Obviously this is false, but you must agree that it is evidence of the non-flying abilities of ducks. After all it is an argument, some of it is even true and arguments, no matter how bad are "evidence" aren't they.

[robvalue]

Did anyone else just hear a massive thud from every direction?

[Cato]

Inside a thread about general revelation, many atheists like Cato, blur the distinction so they can start riding their little hobby horses about ‘bible contradictions’ to distract people from the reasonableness of the general proofs.

You are having to mash together disparate considerations here in order to make a failed point. Contradictions are an appropriate way of demonstrating the absurdity of revelations. If what is revealed contradicts what is known to be true about the world, then either your god is ignorant, lying or doesn't exist.

A discussion of revelation and associated contradictions have absolutely nothing to do with what you call 'general proofs'. I have been quite clear regarding the validity of the proposed arguments, but have also pointed out the unverified premises making the argument unsound; therefore, I disagree with your conclusion that the general proofs are reasonable.

In addition, I have also stated that even if the arguments were to be sound there is no way one could get from there to the particular god described in any text. How then can you conclude that I blur the distinction? It seems you are the one doing the blurring. Forcing a distinction between god and God does not save your arguments.

Besides, the distinction you are attempting to make is disingenuous considering these arguments are proposed by Christian philosophers; these arguments aren't constructed with Zeus in mind. I have also only experienced followers of the God of Abraham employing them.

[God of Mr. Hanky]

I have never seen this argument before, so I'm interested in some discussion of it. A philosopher by the name of Alvin Plantinga states it this way:

The Ontological Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

Yes, however dubious.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists is some possible world

Oh, how so very beautiful - this statement fails in two ways!

I. Anything is a possibility when you don't know the facts. When people believed that the thunder was caused by the god Thor hitting the sky with his hammer, this was a legitimate possibility to them in their culture. The fact that we know better in our culture today does not mean the facts are any different. The possibility based on ignorance has changed, but not the possibility based on fact (e.g., the number of blue(ish) balls orbiting the sun). Possibility based on ignorance is always undefined, while possibility based on fact is a finite number.

II You cannot do math without factual data regarding your possibility. You can do math to calculate the probability that known objects will occur in a random sample (possibility based on fact), but you cannot apply this to an undefined possibility based on ignorance, such as how many, if any blue balls or gods exist in the big, ugly jar (universe or multiverse). Math isn't magic, and the only way to obtain data on unknowns is through observation.

III. This argument presumes to be doing just that, as if Plantinga can and did do a calculation for the probability of an unknown variable (substituting the possibility based on ignorance for the missing possibility based on fact can yield no meaningful result), and this is Failure 1!.

IV. The second fallacious presumption in this statement is that anything is known about other universes, much less how many others exist, if there really are any others. There is a finite number of stars in our universe, and there is no good reason to believe that their number is infinite. If this can be proven so, then it's conceivable that Plantinga may some day be vindicated on Failure 1, but since the fantastical mental construct of infinity is too logically ridiculous to consider, and Failure 1 is already deservedly earned for making presumptions of the unknown, Failure 2!

No need to go any further down this logical rabbit hole!

You would laugh so f***ing hard if you saw how I struggled trying to work my way through math calculations while in school, and I'm not any sharper with that today. Still, this stinking ontological fallacy didn't fool me - so what the hell is wrong with those who go with it?

[Brian37]

Did anyone else just hear a massive thud from every direction?

You lost me at "I have an invisible friend".

[God of Mr. Hanky]

I have never seen this argument before, so I'm interested in some discussion of it. A philosopher by the name of Alvin Plantinga states it this way:

The Ontological Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

Yes, however dubious.

2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists is some possible world

1. Anything is a possibility when you don't know the facts. When people believed that the thunder was caused by the god Thor hitting the sky with his hammer, this was a legitimate possibility to them in their culture. The fact that we know better in our culture today does not mean the facts are any different. The possibility based on ignorance has changed, but not the possibility based on fact (e.g., the number of blue(ish) balls orbiting the sun). Possibility based on ignorance is always undefined, while possibility based on fact is a finite number.

2. You cannot do math without factual data regarding your possibility. You can do math to calculate the probability that known objects will occur in a random sample (possibility based on fact), but you cannot apply this to an undefined possibility based on ignorance, such as how many, if any blue balls or gods exist in the whole big, ugly jar (universe). Math isn't magic, and the only way to obtain data on unknowns is through observation.

3. This argument presumes to be doing just that, as if Plantinga can and did do a calculation for the probability of an unknown variable (substituting the possibility based on ignorance for the missing possibility based on fact), and this is Failure 1!

4. The second fallacious presumption in this statement is that anything is known about other universes, much less how many others exist, if there really are any others. There is a finite number of stars in our universe, and there is no good reason to believe that the number of other universes would be infinite. If so, then it's conceivable that this may vindicate Plantinga on Failure 1, but since he has rightly earned Failure 1 by making presumptions of the unknown, and the construct of infinity is logically too ridiculous to consider, Failure 2!

No need to go any further down this logical rabbit hole!

You would laugh so f***ing hard if you saw how I struggled trying to work my way through math calculations while in school, and I'm not any sharper with that today. Still, this stinking fallacy didn't fool me - so what the hell is wrong with those who go with it?

[Neo-Scholastic]

A discussion of revelation and associated contradictions have absolutely nothing to do with what you call 'general proofs'. I have been quite clear regarding the validity of the proposed arguments, but have also pointed out the unverified premises making the argument unsound; therefore, I disagree with your conclusion that the general proofs are reasonable.

While we may disagree on the soundness of the ontological proof (certainly not my favorite), I agree with you that weighting the significance of contradictions in revealed texts should generally happen apart from theological demonstrations resulting from reflections on general experience. I am truly sorry for attributing to you a position that you do not actually profess. Please forgive me.

...I have also stated that even if the arguments were to be sound there is no way one could get from there to the particular god described in any text. How then can you conclude that I blur the distinction?

Again, I apologize, this time for not being clear. I share this opinion. The best any theologian can do is show that the god of classical theism (from Aristotle's unmoved mover to Plotinus's "the One") as revealed through the study of Nature is consistent with the nature of God as revealed in sacred texts. My criticism was directed toward those who feel it unnecessary to directly address the substance and context implicit in ontological and cosmological demonstrations; but rather, say that if doesn't matter if the proofs are sound or not. Their position is that the proofs should be dismissed because the associated sacred texts seem problematic. For what it is worth, MysticKnight and I seem to share a similar concept of the god of Nature even though we disagree on the relative value of the sacred texts of our respective traditions.

Jor, simply existing throughout eternity does not turn a particular being into a necessary one. In Scholasticism, a temporally series of efficient causes is accidentally, rather than essentially, ordered. As such, a necessary being would be fundamental and logically prior to contingent beings. For example, atoms are 'prior' to things made out of atoms. I think even a physical reductionist can conceive of something or some things that pervades everything and yet cannot itself be reduced to anything more fundamental. Showing that what is fundamental is singular and not many is a separate demonstration.

[robvalue]

@no one in particular

Hey!

This kind of argument is like wrapping up a box with loads of different sparkly paper and bows to deflect attention from the fact that it's fucking empty. Merry Christmas little boy.

[God of Mr. Hanky]

Uh, sorry I repeated a post - maybe the page didn't load correctly in Firefox, but I thought the post without the Roman enumeration had turned to ether and vanished somehow.

---

A discussion of revelation and associated contradictions have absolutely nothing to do with what you call 'general proofs'. I have been quite clear regarding the validity of the proposed arguments, but have also pointed out the unverified premises making the argument unsound; therefore, I disagree with your conclusion that the general proofs are reasonable.

While we may disagree on the soundness of the ontological proof (certainly not my favorite), I agree with you that weighting the significance of contradictions in revealed texts should generally happen apart from theological demonstrations resulting from reflections on general experience. I am truly sorry for attributing to you a position that you do not actually profess. Please forgive me.

...I have also stated that even if the arguments were to be sound there is no way one could get from there to the particular god described in any text. How then can you conclude that I blur the distinction?

Again, I apologize, this time for not being clear. I share this opinion. The best any theologian can do is show that the god of classical theism (from Aristotle's unmoved mover to Plotinus's "the One") as revealed through the study of Nature is consistent with the nature of God as revealed in sacred texts. My criticism was directed toward those who feel it unnecessary to directly address the substance and context implicit in ontological and cosmological demonstrations; but rather, say that if doesn't matter if the proofs are sound or not. Their position is that the proofs should be dismissed because the associated sacred texts seem problematic. For what it is worth, MysticKnight and I seem to share a similar concept of the god of Nature even though we disagree on the relative value of the sacred texts of our respective traditions.

Jor, simply existing throughout eternity does not turn a particular being into a necessary one. In Scholasticism, a temporally series of efficient causes is accidentally, rather than essentially, ordered. As such, a necessary being would be fundamental and logically prior to contingent beings. For example, atoms are 'prior' to things made out of atoms. I think even a physical reductionist can conceive of something or some things that pervades everything and yet cannot itself be reduced to anything more fundamental. Showing that what is fundamental is singular and not many is a separate demonstration.

Chad, the problem with Plantinga's ontology is that it tries to use a non-sequitor mathematical principle of probability. Yes, there is a possibility that a god exists (and also it's possible that numerous gods exist). He argues as if a probability equation has been applied, but this would require a known value for that possibility. It applies only for random samplings, not for an existential determination, which can only be done through direct observation. Then, before he's even finished his second presumption it gets uber-ridiculous with the presumption that anything is known of other universes, much less that they are of infinite quantity!

Do you believe in Thor's Hammer? If not, then is Thor's Hammer a possibility? Why or why not? If you don't consider it possible, then there may be some very good reasons not to consider the proposition, but the ancient Norse had no reasons not to believe it, therefore their field of possibilities was different. I almost said "wider", but they could not have imagined the possibility-changing facts which we are aware of now. Possibilities by default from ignorance are as vast as the hordes which your imagination can conjure up, but for a finite universe or multiverse (if such a thing exists), their probability will necessarily be unknown as well.

[Jackalope]

Uh, sorry I repeated a post - maybe the page didn't load correctly in Firefox, but I thought the post without the Roman enumeration had turned to ether and vanished somehow.

It was mistakenly caught in our spam filter. If that happens again, please PM a moderator or admin to unstick it.