What is 'objective' value?

[Edwardo Piet]

Are we talking about epistemic or ontological objectivity?

More on this point:

From page 25 of The Moral Landscape by Sam Harris:

Many people are also confused about what it means to speak with scientific
“objectivity” about the human condition. As the philosopher John Searle once pointed
out, there are two very different senses of the terms “objective” and “subjective.”
The first sense relates to how we know (i.e., epistemology), the second to what there is to
know (i.e., ontology). When we say that we are reasoning or speaking “objectively,” we
generally mean that we are free of obvious bias, open to counterarguments, cognizant of
the relevant facts, and so on. This is to make a claim about how we are thinking. In this
sense, there is no impediment to our studying subjective (i.e., first-person) facts
“objectively.”

[bennyboy]

That's a really great quote. I think it's probably the conflation between those two kinds of objectivity that leads to so much confusion or disagreement. Hard to disagree with what Sam Harris said.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Some arguments I would use for reasons to reliably believe in objective value:

1. Nearly universally across human cultures, arguably, there exists the same basic standards of morality. In addition, there exists in all cultures truly altruistic acts which lead to no genetic benefit.
   
2. The majority of people who explicitly deny the existence of objective morality still act as if objective morality exists.
   
3. There exists a nearly universal human intuition that certain things are objectively right or wrong.
   
4. The majority of philosophers recognize the existence of objective moral facts.
   

It is most certainly a fact that human beings have a moral sense. That is the substance of the first three items on the list. These strongly suggest that there is a there there but it doesn't identify an actual rational basis for having that sense. Skeptics will attribute our moral sense to evolutionary pressures. They fail to explain how we can rely on amoral processes to supply us with a moral sense that reflects true principles of justice and not what is merely expeditious.

As for item number 4, I very much doubt that a majority of contemporary philosophers see any moral facts at all.

[The Grand Nudger]

Skeptics will attribute our moral sense to evolutionary pressures. They fail to explain how we can rely on amoral processes to supply us with a moral sense that reflects true principles of justice and not what is merely expeditious.

Yeah, real hardball there......as if justice weren't "merely expeditious" - or that for a person who sees morality as subjective, justice would somehow be -other- than subjective? Death row is filled with people who fail to see the justice in their situations, and there are those not currently sharing their cell who agree...while others still maintain that their situations are an example of justice. OFC, there just couldn't possibly -be- people who don't see morality and justice as having anything to do with each other in the first place, either. Boy, those skeptics, they fail sooo hard.

Le sigh.

[Edwardo Piet]

I think it's probably the conflation between those two kinds of objectivity that leads to so much confusion or disagreement.  

I agree. This is why I always try to find that quote for these debates

[Angrboda]

You're getting farther and farther away from the intentionality required of value.  Saying that God is not merely an agent, but something else in addition, doesn't provide any ground for value.  We could go over Euthyphro's dilemma again, but all that will result in is a bunch of metaphysically flavored word salad.  Value requires teleology.  Period.  You can just assert that there is teleology to reality, but without any support, that's a bare assertion that I will simply reject.  So which half of this new dilemma do you care to attack: that value requires an agent, or that God being a special kind of agent doesn't establish value?

---

Because you've always been familiar with and respectful of philosophical inquiry, I'm rather disappointed with your 'word salad' comment. Usually only people confused by or ignorant of the technical nomenclature use the term 'word salad'. I do not know any theologian that takes the Euthyphro's dilemma as a serious objection to the Classical God, particularly since Plato uses the dilemma to argue against polytheism in favor of monotheism.

---

The idea of the Good necessarily entails a goal, that which is (objectively) most to be desired, and a final end, or purpose, for rational agents. Both, goals and purposes, are most definitely directly related to intentionality.

So you've decided to deny that value requires agency by resorting to a form of Platonism.  Despite your attempts to muddy the waters below, such a hypothesis bears some heavy burdens.  The most important being the interaction problem, namely of demonstrating how such things as "The Good" inform the judgement of a rational agent.  Are you planning to duck once again into asserting magical properties to consciousness?  This property of the soul appears to be a nexus to all your defenses.  It's a shame you aren't burdened with providing a defensible account of how value afflicts the rational mind using only material properties.  Anytime you are pressed to explain the how, you can simply reply, "It just does."  

At the very least teleology appears operative in nature, it takes a special effort to show that what is apparently true isn't actually true - the same kind of effort it takes to show that objects that appear solid are actually made of mostly empty space.

I think you're going to need to support this.  What appears operative in nature to you sounds like more magical speculation.

Saying you can reject it as a bare assertion suggests a kind of argument argument from incredulity.

Saying that I can reject it as a bare assertion is simple acknowledgement that your 'teleology in nature' is a minority opinion based on specific philosophical and religious views not accepted by the common man.  If you're going to drive off the road, it's your responsibility to avoid getting stuck.

Or perhaps you're going to again assert that brute facts alone sufficiently account for the appearance of intentionality at more fundamental levels. Or perhaps you're going to go for the 'emergent property' non-explanation in which at an unknown point of development the rabbit of intentionality pops magically out of the hat of undirected physical processes.

Or perhaps that I just don't care that you don't subscribe to naturalism and fully expect that when you depart from it as the null hypothesis, you provide more than mere assertion by way of support.

[Angrboda]

Some arguments I would use for reasons to reliably believe in objective value:

1. Nearly universally across human cultures, arguably, there exists the same basic standards of morality. In addition, there exists in all cultures truly altruistic acts which lead to no genetic benefit.
   
2. The majority of people who explicitly deny the existence of objective morality still act as if objective morality exists.
   
3. There exists a nearly universal human intuition that certain things are objectively right or wrong.
   
4. The majority of philosophers recognize the existence of objective moral facts.
   

. . . . . .

As for item number 4, I very much doubt that a majority of contemporary philosophers see any moral facts at all.

"One study found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other)" ~ Wikipedia, Moral realism.

[*Deidre*]

Objective value is based on facts, not opinions. Food has value. Water has value. We need both to stay alive, we all can objectively agree on that. It's not anyone's opinion that we require water and food to stay alive, it is factually true. Subjective value is based on opinion. My iphone has subjective value...I find it valuable, but another person might not. Things that we think we need are usually based on subjective values, whereas things that we do factually need, are based on objective value. Just my take, anyways.

[Angrboda]

Objective value is based on facts, not opinions. Food has value. Water has value. We need both to stay alive, we all can objectively agree on that. It's not anyone's opinion that we require water and food to stay alive, it is factually true. Subjective value is based on opinion. My iphone has subjective value...I find it valuable, but another person might not. Things that we think we need are usually based on subjective values, whereas things that we do factually need, are based on objective value. Just my take, anyways.

Food and water only have value insofar as they matter to the project of being alive. They acquire their value as a consequence of their utility to a subjective value, namely that of living. Food, water, and living have no value independent of that. They do not have objective value by the route you propose. They are simply aspects of our subjectively valuing being alive.

[robvalue]

If something is "objectively valuable" because it has property X, then all you are saying is it has property X. Calling this objective value adds nothing of any practical use to the description.

I also don't care about gods subjective opinion about what is valuable, especially since I can't talk to him and must rely on others to explain it. His reasoning is what I would care about, not the fact that he is God. Again, if something is valuable simply because God gave it property X, then you're just saying God gave it property X. The additional descriptor adds nothing.

If something has objective value, then I'd like to know what this actually means, why I should remotely care about it, and how it can be measured.