Is it true that there is no absolute morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

I wouldn't call moral opportunism objective morality, nor call it that methinks.  Selective advantage fails to possible cross effects over time.  For example, we can maximize the growth of the species, end up with 30 billion people, and then explode in WWIV.  So as I said, there still needs to be a kind of "god" idea, but not one of Sky Daddy-- one in which different outcomes may affect something universal, like the ability of the cosmos to sustain life rather than not to.

I'll readily concede it's not a very useful system of thought.  More pragmatic would be an intent to look for the best overall decision in all cases, rather than the most emotionally appealing one.  So we can hope to approximate the moral fact though we can't really know how close we are/aren't.

I would aim even lower.  There's no need for a best decision on anything.  Just avoid harming people, and try to help them.  

Yeah, probably.  It's pretty hard to get legit bad guys without ending up with a dead kid or something, though, at least in today's world.

LOL, yeah...soft cover.  

It's very hard to say, though I'd still say that whatever morality IS, there may be said to be a hypothetical best action for every agent at every moment.  That we can't define it, or can't cog it's proper definition, doesn't affect that too much.  It just means that it's very hard to know whether you're getting it right or not.

I think best decision scenarios have more to do with degrees of morality than anything else.  Many moral theorists do define their secular objective moralities.  It's not hard for them to get it right, in principal.  

Another example would be supporting starving people in Africa.  Is it moral to do so?  Immoral?  Amoral?  It's impossible to say.  

Wait...whaaa?  I think that one's cut and dry.  Moral.   

A country filled with healthy, multiplying muslims might very well lead to war like we've never seen.  On the other hand-- babies with AIDS or malaria are a sad thing to know about.  But if you COULD know whether a stronger African continent would benefit or hurt the species, you'd know the moral fact, and could act accordingly.

I don't think that the benefit of the species is a moral standard to begin with, so, to me, no amount of knowledge as to what benefits the species would be sufficient as a moral fact.  If I possessed full knowledge of the benefit of our species...I may still know nothing with regards to morality.

[bennyboy]

I would aim even lower.  There's no need for a best decision on anything.  Just avoid harming people, and try to help them.  

That's fine, but there's the chance that due to lack of information, you are doing harm in the long run.

I don't think that the benefit of the species is a moral standard to begin with, so, to me, no amount of knowledge as to what benefits the species would be sufficient as a moral fact.  If I possessed full knowledge of the benefit of our species...I may still know nothing with regards to morality.

Morality is one of those funny things-- we all think we have a sense of what it is, but when you examine it under a microscope, it starts getting a lot more squirrely. That's why I'm almost ignostic on objective morality-- I'm pretty sure that for any moral view or goal, we each have a maximally "right" behavior available. So if it's not genetic fitness, and is instead maintaining the most positive hedonic balance or whatever, it's still "out there" somewhere perhaps.

[The Grand Nudger]

That's fine, but there's the chance that due to lack of information, you are doing harm in the long run.

There's the chance that a harmful thing may happen, but I don't know whether or not it makes sense to say that -you- did that thing, especially when we're discussing unforseeable consequences "in the long run".  Maybe some timecops stop you from killing a baby, and a baby hitler.  Does that man that they gassed the jews?  If you feed them today, and they become dependent tomorrow, does that mean that -you- did that to them?  I don't think so.  

Personally, I can say without handwringing that killing a baby is a bad thing - even if that baby might grow up to a Real Bad Guy™, and that feeding starving people is a good thing, even if they turn into useless moochers.  

Morality is one of those funny things-- we all think we have a sense of what it is, but when you examine it under a microscope, it starts getting a lot more squirrely.  That's why I'm almost ignostic on objective morality-- I'm pretty sure that for any moral view or goal, we each have a maximally "right" behavior available.  So if it's not genetic fitness, and is instead maintaining the most positive hedonic balance or whatever, it's still "out there" somewhere perhaps.

Selective advantage to hedonism, lol?  In any case...  the whole point of objectivity is that those things aren't "squirrely".  It would be like calling a pound of apples a "squirrely quantity of apples".   If there are moral facts, our moral opinions either correlate to them, or they don't. Having a moral microscope would be fantastic, just as having a scale to weigh apples is fantastic.   Perhaps our senses (or perhaps something else that we possess) are that microscope, and more than that...at least in some cases, sufficient?  They provide us with moral opinions that correlate to moral facts. Maybe not all the time, maybe not compellingly, maybe bad things might happen someday in the future, maybe there are things we don't know...but the moral opinion that murder is bad correlates to a moral fact of the matter - even though we may have evolved the opinion for reasons unrelated to -why- it's bad by reference to the fact.  What do you think?

[bennyboy]

Personally, I can say without handwringing that killing a baby is a bad thing - even if that baby might grow up to a Real Bad Guy™, and that feeding starving people is a good thing, even if they turn into useless moochers.  

Yeah, but what if you knew ahead of time? What if you could see all those people with the foreknowledge that they'd be gassed or whatever?

If there are moral facts, our moral opinions either correlate to them, or they don't. Having a moral microscope would be fantastic, just as having a scale to weigh apples is fantastic.   Perhaps our senses (or perhaps something else that we possess) are that microscope, and more than that...at least in some cases, sufficient?  They provide us with moral opinions that correlate to moral facts.

Morality is still a word, and we still get to define it. If you called zebras "wiggles," you could then say there are no zebras after all. But I'm fairly confident asserting that for any definition of morality, so long as it relates to behavior and a sense of right and wrong, there is probably a hypothetical best action for each agent at each moment in time.

Maybe not all the time, maybe not compellingly, maybe bad things might happen someday in the future, maybe there are things we don't know...but the moral opinion that murder is bad correlates to a moral fact of the matter - even though we may have evolved the opinion for reasons unrelated to -why- it's bad by reference to the fact.  What do you think?

"Murder" is a loaded word, and normally carries bad connotations-- it's almost like saying "a killing which is bad."

This is hard for me to argue, because it goes back to an earlier kind of objective morality I mentioned, and I don't want to be accused of equivocating on it. I've already argued that any species-wide social instinct based on a sense of balance among individuals must be called objective, since it must have evolved before the birth of any individual person, and is therefore a product of the environment and not of human agency.

I'm not so sure, for example, that it would be morally wrong for members of an oppressed population to come to the conclusion that they must escape their chains by murdering their oppressors; people must have some instinct to do so, as liberty affects their genetic fitness. Please do note this is an aside to our current discussion.

[The Grand Nudger]

Yeah, but what if you knew ahead of time?  What if you could see all those people with the foreknowledge that they'd be gassed or whatever?

Me, personally?  I'd kill the kid and not bullshit anyone about how gloriously moral my actions were because I saved teh joos, if i saved teh joos.  Doing a bad thing for an intended outcome has a long and glorious utilitarian history, and we're not uniformly moral creatures.  We make compromised decisions.  

Morality is still a word, and we still get to define it.  If you called zebras "wiggles," you could then say there are no zebras after all.  But I'm fairly confident asserting that for any definition of morality, so long as it relates to behavior and a sense of right and wrong, there is probably a hypothetical best action for each agent at each moment in time.

Maybe, but does that mean that the hypothetical best action is available to us, or, that even if we knew what it was we would be capable of actualizing it?  I don't think we have to do the best thing we could do to satisfy a moral imperative in any case.   

"Murder" is a loaded word, and normally carries bad connotations-- it's almost like saying "a killing which is bad."

This is hard for me to argue, because it goes back to an earlier kind of objective morality I mentioned, and I don't want to be accused of equivocating on it.  I've already argued that any species-wide social instinct based on a sense of balance among individuals must be called objective, since it must have evolved before the birth of any individual person, and is therefore a product of the environment and not of human agency.

That's not what objective morality means. A species wide social instinct is a shared moral opinion. Broken record, but.... a moral fact is not the possession of an evolved moral opinion.  

I'm not so sure, for example, that it would be morally wrong for members of an oppressed population to come to the conclusion that they must escape their chains by murdering their oppressors; people must have some instinct to do so, as liberty affects their genetic fitness.  Please do note this is an aside to our current discussion.

It's not, at all.  The things you call objective moralities often are...but this actually isn't, even if it might not have anything to do with genetic fitness.  Do we murder our oppressors or do we kill them?  What are the moral facts of the matter, if any, that make one killing, and another murder?  We obviously possess such opinions.  They probably find, to some degree or another, their origin in evolved social instincts.......but do they correlate to any moral facts?

[bennyboy]

Maybe, but does that mean that the hypothetical best action is available to us, or, that even if we knew what it was we would be capable of actualizing it?  I don't think we have to do the best thing we could do to satisfy a moral imperative in any case.

No, I don't think so either. "Don't be a dick" is usually good enough-- if 100% of people did that, we'd have a pretty

That's not what objective morality means. A species wide social instinct is a shared moral opinion. Broken record, but.... a moral fact is not the possession of an evolved moral opinion.

I wouldn't count instinct as "opinion," personally, but I don't want to get into this as I mentioned, because it's not what we're talking about currently anyway.

It's not, at all.  The things you call objective moralities often are...but this actually isn't, even if it might not have anything to do with genetic fitness.  Do we murder our oppressors or do we kill them?  What are the moral facts of the matter, if any, that make one killing, and another murder?  We obviously possess such opinions.  They probably find, to some degree or another, their origin in evolved social instincts.......but do they correlate to any moral facts?

I'm going to get in dangerous water with this line, but maybe just for hoots, we can take a little diversion. I consider our genetic makeup, individually and as a species, a collection of facts-- a record of a gazillion interactions among mates, among prey and predators, between individuals and weather, and so on. In that sense, any instincts related to a sense of right or wrong, of social justice, and so on, are moral facts-- not in the sense that they determine what ideas represent moral truth, but in that they inform the way we are capable of thinking about right and wrong. In a sense, you could say that "morality" is really a word for a collection of social feelings, and that all the ideas about morality are moral facts-- records of the interactions between the social feelings and the specific details of the environment at a given time and geography.

The importance of the subjective perspective in determining moral ideas is pretty overrated if the self is not more than the physical expression of the DNA, and if ideas are not more than that physical expression's interactions with the environment, no?

[The Grand Nudger]

@Benny

I'm going to get in dangerous water with this line, but maybe just for hoots, we can take a little diversion.  I consider our genetic makeup, individually and as a species, a collection of facts-- a record of a gazillion interactions among mates, among prey and predators, between individuals and weather, and so on.  In that sense, any instincts related to a sense of right or wrong, of social justice, and so on, are moral facts-- not in the sense that they determine what ideas represent moral truth, but in that they inform the way we are capable of thinking about right and wrong. 

So they aren't moral facts in the only way that anything -could be- a moral fact...which is why we call them moral opinions, and wonder whether or not any of them correlate to moral facts.  

In a sense, you could say that "morality" is really a word for a collection of social feelings, and that all the ideas about morality are moral facts-- records of the interactions between the social feelings and the specific details of the environment at a given time and geography.

A collection of social feelings would be moral opinions, an idea about morality might..also..be a moral opinion, but there might also be moral facts..which would be included in the term "morality".  

The importance of the subjective perspective in determining moral ideas is pretty overrated if the self is not more than the physical expression of the DNA, and if ideas are not more than that physical expression's interactions with the environment, no?

Not to me.  Regardless of what the self is, or if the self is, we're doing all of this moralizing from a limited, subjective perspective.

[bennyboy]

A collection of social feelings would be moral opinions, an idea about morality might..also..be a moral opinion, but there might also be moral facts..which would be included in the term "morality".  

No, because DNA is not a collection of opinions. The opinions are the expression of the objective truths, i.e. the moral facts-- for example that people absolutely hate having their offspring killed. If we didn't have the social instincts and mode of perception that we do, we wouldn't be able to form or act on those opinions.

So, I guess we've officially left the "moral fact as hypothetical best action" idea and we're onto social genetics as moral fact.

[The Grand Nudger]

A collection of social feelings would be moral opinions, an idea about morality might..also..be a moral opinion, but there might also be moral facts..which would be included in the term "morality".  

No, because DNA is not a collection of opinions.

....................?

The opinions are the expression of the objective truths, i.e. the moral facts-- for example that people absolutely hate having their offspring killed.  If we didn't have the social instincts and mode of perception that we do, we wouldn't be able to form or act on those opinions.

Peoples moral opinions -may not be- the expression of any moral fact (some folks hate teh joos), even if it is an expression...of their opinion.  That people hate having their offspring killed isn't even a moral statement (it's missing any moral imperative).  Yes, our evolved behaviors and whatever underlies those behaviors may inform us as to how we think we should act, we possess moral opinions somehow. We've been over all of this..like, five times easily.....

Do any of our moral opinions correlate to moral facts?

So, I guess we've officially left the "moral fact as hypothetical best action" idea and we're onto genetics as moral fact.

-We- have never been on genetics as a moral fact.  Every time you bring it up I tell you the same thing, lol.

[bennyboy]

Maybe not all the time, maybe not compellingly, maybe bad things might happen someday in the future, maybe there are things we don't know...but the moral opinion that murder is bad correlates to a moral fact of the matter - even though we may have evolved the opinion for reasons unrelated to -why- it's bad by reference to the fact.  What do you think?

This is hard for me to argue, because it goes back to an earlier kind of objective morality I mentioned, and I don't want to be accused of equivocating on it.  I've already argued that any species-wide social instinct based on a sense of balance among individuals must be called objective , since it must have evolved before the birth of any individual person, and is therefore a product of the environment and not of human agency.)

I'm not so sure, for example, that it would be morally wrong for members of an oppressed population to come to the conclusion that they must escape their chains by murdering their oppressors; people must have some instinct to do so, as liberty affects their genetic fitness.  Please do note this is an aside to our current discussion.

Yes, our evolved behaviors and whatever underlies those behaviors may inform us as to how we think we should act, we possess moral opinions somehow.  We've been over all of this..like, five times easily.....

Summary:
You: "Let's talk about that other thing more."
Me:  "Okay, but just for a diversion. . . I don't really want to discuss that thing, because I'm now talking about something else."
You: "We've been over all of this. . . like 5 times easily!"

Come on, man.  Don't be like that.  When I'm already acknowledging that a stream of thought is done, don't dig it up again and then crow that I keep going back to it.

What I'm currently talking about is hypothetical best actions as moral facts-- either your opinion (or actions) are in accord with the best way to achieve a moral goal, or they aren't. The next question should be-- is there any utility in viewing morality in this way? I'd argue yes-- that a moral person should attempt to transcend opinion and instinct, and to search for some understanding of the greater good and how to achieve it.