morality is subjective and people don't have free will

[Aroura]

I'd also like to clarify that just because I think anger isn't a helpful response, I don't agree that no response is correct. That's very binary, black/white, flase dichotomy thinking.

As in the story of the man attacked by wolves, he realized it's pointless to be angry at the wolves. He didn't ignore them. He still dealt with them as wolves, in order to protect himself.

I feel the same about, for instance, Trump voters, racist, bigots of all stripes, etc.
Anger is a natural but useless response. The correct response is to get off your ass and do something to stop them and change things. And that requires recognizing what they are, and trying to get others to recognize it, too.

So if I call someone childish, or racist, or what have you, it isn't in anger. It is in recognition of a flaw or a threat. If I try and change the minds of others, it is because it's best if more people recognize the threat, for all of our survival and peace of mind. If I'm standing in a wood with 50 people, and I'm the only one who sees the wolves because the rest are all reading a fake news article about how there are no wolves, what kind of asshole would I be to save myself and not try and warn the others?

Hope that also makes sense.

[Silver]

I have been in too many situations where simply mentioning one's disagreement in a peaceful manner does absolutely nothing. The problems persists.

In the end, those who explode in anger do it because they are tired of complications being ignored.

[Angrboda]

But I presuppose naturalism without doubting free will.  Given a choice, why would anyone presuppose supernaturalism?  I am fiercely pro natural world, proud to be a natural animal and think everyone with a lofty idea of themselves as a free floating/radically free willing disembodied mind is just off their rocker.

Personally, I find somewhat parochial to maintain a dichotomy between natural and supernatural. Since the distinction is based on what people would consider ordinarily and or possible given what they know at the time. If, as in Newton’s time, someone doesn’t know about nuclear forces the source of the sun’s power would be considered supernatural since no known source of power could keep it burning. Why presuppose supernaturalism? Because every time we think we know all the answers about how the world works something comes along that challenges that paradigm and naturalism gets redefined, as it already has been countless times.

I think you're playing word games. There is the supernatural in the sense of something not being yet explained, and then there is the supernatural in the sense of something that can never be understood naturalistically. You're conflating the former with the latter. Confusing "not understood" with "not understandable". And therein lies the crux of the reason for not presupposing supernaturalism, because most often it is a claim that a phenomena has no naturalistic explanation.

Another reason for not embracing supernaturalism is that you can't explain things with supernaturalism. Steve has given his definition of free will depending upon a mysterious 'Power B'. No matter how much you unfold the rest of his definition, that power B will remain, an unexplained cancerous lump which makes the whole definition useless. Even if supernaturalism were the answer, it would in every case reduce to the explanation "it just happens." Supernaturalism leads to no explanations. If you want to attribute consciousness to a non-physical mind, let that be your starting point. But as we see in things like SteveII's definition of free will, it often becomes the end point of inquiry. If you want to posit the non-physical as an explanation, go out and find me this non-physical. If you just want to use it as a gap filler because you can't get your explanation to work without it, then you're just being useless. A supernatural soul has been postulated for millennia. We're no closer to understanding such a thing for all the talk about it that has transpired.

[Silver]

Personally, I find somewhat parochial to maintain a dichotomy between natural and supernatural. Since the distinction is based on what people would consider ordinarily and or possible given what they know at the time. If, as in Newton’s time, someone doesn’t know about nuclear forces the source of the sun’s power would be considered supernatural since no known source of power could keep it burning. Why presuppose supernaturalism? Because every time we think we know all the answers about how the world works something comes along that challenges that paradigm and naturalism gets redefined, as it already has been countless times.

What I know, not what I think, is that thousands of years of human evolution has been plenty of time to realize that god does not exist.

We can be absolutely certain about the non-existence of unicorns and leprechauns, Santa Clause and the Tooth Fairy, the Easter Bunny and Freddy Krueger, but goodness forbid that theists use their fucking brains to realize that god is not real.

Grow the fuck up, because evolving means that you outgrow the infancy of ridiculous beliefs and join the rest of the logical world.

[Catholic_Lady]

I don't think evolution means becoming atheist....

[Whateverist]

Of course not. And the solution to simplistic thinking isn't more of the same.

[Ravenshire]

God knows without error what we will freely choose to do because he knows every fact and factor up to that point

If gawd knows without error what you will freely choose, then you are helpless to make a different choice.

If gawd knows without error you're going to wear a red shirt tomorrow, you cannot wear the blue one. What you're left with, under the auspices of an omnipotent, omniscient gawd, is merely the illusion of free will.

[Edwardo Piet]

Your conclusions are true, HAH.

Yes, they are.

True in what sense within the confines of free will?

True in the sense of true. Do I have to quote the dictionary?

Incompatabilist, Libertarian Contra-causal free will isn't even a logically coherent concept. It's basically magic. But good luck with believing in magic. Oh wait... you already do.

 That only means that they are true to you.

Bullshit.

To quote Richard Dawkins "You mean true for you is different from true for anybody else? It’s got to be either true or not true."

Just because they exist as a philosophy position does not make them true.

Right back at you. Although you may have noticed that no serious philosopher believes in the kind of free will you believe in and the kind of free will most people believe in: i.e contra-causal, magical, libertarian free will. And the ones that do are also almost all religious and believe in souls.

And of course... having a soul is not going to defeat the argument.

From what I've read fatalism can be a part of determinism.

So? Holy crap you're bad at arguing. Just because it can be doesn't mean it always is. Dogs can be animals but not all animals are dogs. Fatalists are determinists but not all determinists are fatalists.

How many times have I heard you say I can't or I'm not responsible or it's not my fault or I can't help it or some one/thing else is to blame. You are every bit the fatalist.

Come back when you understand the difference between fatalism and determinism. I already said that legal, social and practical moral responsibility exists. But that's merely holding people responsible as if they're responsible because it's better for everyone that way. It doesn't make the retarded magical notion of humans having motives that are outside of the causal stream any more true.

Libertarian Incompatabilism=Our motives are not part of the causal stream. They supervene it (as if by magic).

Fatalism=Our motives don't exist or if they do they have no real power over us so why not just give up? (X will either happen or not happen and what you do has no bearing over it).

Hard Incompatabilism=If our motives are determined they are part of the causal stream but they still exist and they have full power in motivating us (hence why they're called out motives).

Compatabilism=If our motives are determined they are part of the causal stream but they still exist and they have full power in motivating us (hence why they're called our motives)... but despite the fact that our motives are determined and part of the causal stream let's just redefine ordinary willpower, call it "free will" and behave as if the legal definition of free will (i.e. "Did you sign that contract of your own free will?") has anything to with the classic philosophical problem of free will even though it doesn't. Let's take the approach a theologian does with God. Let's just behave as if free will not existing but it being useful to behave as if it does is the same thing as it actually existing even though it isn't. Thereby misleading many laypeople into thinking that the Libertarian free will they believe in is justified even though it's not even logically coherent and it's basically akin to believing in magic.

Hard Incompatabilism is the only reasonable position.

Explain "my motives are part of the causal stream". What motives?

All my motives.

In case you missed it the first time here is Galen Strawson's knockdown argument against free will:

In the free will debate, Strawson holds that there is a fundamental sense in which free will is impossible, whether determinism is true or not. He argues for this position with what he calls his "basic argument", which aims to show that no-one is ever ultimately morally responsible for their actions, and hence that no one has free will in the sense that usually concerns us. In its simplest form, the Basic Argument runs thus:

1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.
2. To be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are — at least in certain crucial mental respects.
3. But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
4. So you cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do.

This argument resembles Arthur Schopenhauer's position in On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, summarised by E. F. J. Payne as the "law of motivation, which states that a definite course of action inevitably ensues on a given character and motive"

And here's his response in video form, from a documentary about Free Will. This video also includes the interviewer's failed attempts to defeat Strawson's argument.





Hopefully if you read that argument and watch that video with full attention and without confirmation bias.... you will stop believing people's motives have magical powers that can transcend causality.

[brewer]

Your conclusions are true, HAH.

Yes, they are.

True in what sense within the confines of free will?

True in the sense of true. Do I have to quote the dictionary?

Incompatabilist, Libertarian Contra-causal free will isn't even a logically coherent concept. It's basically magic. But good luck with believing in magic. Oh wait... you already do.

 That only means that they are true to you.

Bullshit.

To quote Richard Dawkins "You mean true for you is different from true for anybody else? It’s got to be either true or not true."

Just because they exist as a philosophy position does not make them true.

Right back at you. Although you may have noticed that no serious philosopher believes in the kind of free will you believe in and the kind of free will most people believe in: i.e contra-causal, magical, libertarian free will. And the ones that do are also almost all religious and believe in souls.

And of course... having a soul is not going to defeat the argument.

From what I've read fatalism can be a part of determinism.

So? Holy crap you're bad at arguing. Just because it can be doesn't mean it always is. Dogs can be animals but not all animals are dogs. Fatalists are determinists but not all determinists are fatalists.

How many times have I heard you say I can't or I'm not responsible or it's not my fault or I can't help it or some one/thing else is to blame. You are every bit the fatalist.

Come back when you understand the difference between fatalism and determinism. I already said that legal, social and practical moral responsibility exists. But that's merely holding people responsible as if they're responsible because it's better for everyone that way. It doesn't make the retarded magical notion of humans having motives that are outside of the causal stream any more true.

Libertarian Incompatabilism=Our motives are not part of the causal stream. They supervene it (as if by magic).

Fatalism=Our motives don't exist or if they do they have no real power over us so why not just give up? (X will either happen or not happen and what you do has no bearing over it).

Hard Incompatabilism=If our motives are determined they are part of the causal stream but they still exist and they have full power in motivating us (hence why they're called out motives).

Compatabilism=If our motives are determined they are part of the causal stream but they still exist and they have full power in motivating us (hence why they're called our motives)... but despite the fact that our motives are determined and part of the causal stream let's just redefine ordinary willpower, call it "free will" and behave as if the legal definition of free will (i.e. "Did you sign that contract of your own free will?") has anything to with the classic philosophical problem of free will even though it doesn't. Let's take the approach a theologian does with God. Let's just behave as if free will not existing but it being useful to behave as if it does is the same thing as it actually existing even though it isn't. Thereby misleading many laypeople into thinking that the Libertarian free will they believe in is justified even though it's not even logically coherent and it's basically akin to believing in magic.

Hard Incompatabilism is the only reasonable position.

Explain "my motives are part of the causal stream". What motives?

All my motives.

In case you missed it the first time here is Galen Strawson's knockdown argument against free will:

In the free will debate, Strawson holds that there is a fundamental sense in which free will is impossible, whether determinism is true or not. He argues for this position with what he calls his "basic argument", which aims to show that no-one is ever ultimately morally responsible for their actions, and hence that no one has free will in the sense that usually concerns us. In its simplest form, the Basic Argument runs thus:

1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.
2. To be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are — at least in certain crucial mental respects.
3. But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
4. So you cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do.

This argument resembles Arthur Schopenhauer's position in On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, summarised by E. F. J. Payne as the "law of motivation, which states that a definite course of action inevitably ensues on a given character and motive"

And here's his response in video form, from a documentary about Free Will. This video also includes the interviewer's failed attempts to defeat Strawson's argument.





Hopefully if you read that argument and watch that video with full attention and without confirmation bias.... you will stop believing people's motives have magical powers that can transcend causality.

Blah, blah, blah. Didn't read a word.

[Neo-Scholastic]

If you want to posit the non-physical as an explanation, go out and find me this non-physical.

This demand begs the question. What we call physical is inferred from intellect and experience. Someone must rely on intellectual objects in order to posit physical objects on which intellectual objects can supervene. Seems circular unless I'm misunderstanding your point about SteveII's appeal.