Quantum consciousness...

[ignoramus]

Guys, where do those smart plants get their smarts from? I mean if you cut the head off a snake, it's game over, you cut a head off a venus flytrap, the other heads keep chomping like nothing happened. Is it in their dna? Where else can it be? Everything else is just dumb molecules, isn't it? (I suppose our brain is in itself no different). As evolved mobile meatbags, is our consciousness an inevitable product of our programmed dna? Or does it automagically appear because our human brain has critical mass and this phenomenon occurs for no particular reason? A quirky byproduct of evolution.

[The Grand Nudger]

Plants appear to "get their smarts" via a sophisticated sensory apparatus, networks of cells with action potential, distributed chemical computing, swarm behavior, and an unfathomably large amount of direct mechanical stimulus and response structures.  Many mindless things both within the organisms and in colonies of the organisms amount to what we call, in animals with nervous systems and brains, behavior.

Sure, it's "in their genes", at least insomuch as their genes determine that they are organisms bestowed with all of the structures necessary to support the above.

The contention of reductivists is that our brains are no different in that regard, yes. The interaction of many mindless things both within ourselves and between ourselves that are expressed as behaviors. We call these behaviors (and their underlying mechanisms) consciousness in our case..but rarely extend the designation far beyond our own closest genetic relatives or organisms that seem to be "like us" in ways taken to be meaningful. It's easy to see why we do this, even from a reductivists POV, in that the report of how something feels is inherently authoritative to the subject. The mistake, they contend...is interpreting that as equivalent to an authoritative report about how something -is-. In their view, "consciousness" doesn't arise at all. It's a non-entity. A mistaken description of something else or of alot of something else's. From that POV, questions about it's evolutionary origin or advantage are incoherent. They're questions about something else, at best...and nothing, at worst.

[bennyboy]

The function of consciousness is to allow matter to subjectively experience what itself and its surroundings are like.

No that is what it does, that isn't the reason that consciousness developed.

Did I miss something? Function means "what something does."

Anyway, the evolutionary perspective is clearly the wrong tack to take here. At best, you end up with an unprovable (and yet not disprovable) narrative that you think feels right.

How are you going to collect evidence about what organisms have or haven't been conscious of?

---

You sometimes seem to forget that I don;t think that we -are- conscious.  

Do you have experience of redness?

[Whateverist]

You sometimes seem to forget that I don;t think that we -are- conscious.  

---

You ask questions that sound like superstitious gibberish to me, and when I answer them from the POV you ask (my own)...you insist that some other superstitious gibberish is more likely, or true.  When I agree, you disagree with my agreeing, and when I disagree, you disagree with my disagreement.  

Honestly, after all the times we've had this convo, how can you still not know what I think?

---

I could use some elaboration here.  What about consciousness do you think we lack and what is it you think everyone who says consciousness is undeniable are actually talking about?

---

Plants appear to "get their smarts" via a sophisticated sensory apparatus, networks of cells with action potential, distributed chemical computing, swarm behavior, and an unfathomably large amount of direct mechanical stimulus and response structures.  Many mindless things both within the organisms and in colonies of the organisms amount to what we call, in animals with nervous systems and brains, behavior.

Sure, it's "in their genes", at least insomuch as their genes determine that they are organisms bestowed with all of the structures necessary to support the above.  

The contention of reductivists is that our brains are no different in that regard, yes.  The interaction of many mindless things both within ourselves and between ourselves that are expressed as behaviors.  We call these behaviors (and their underlying mechanisms) consciousness in our case..but rarely extend the designation far beyond our own closest genetic relatives or organisms that seem to be "like us" in ways taken to be meaningful.  It's easy to see why we do this, even from a reductivists POV, in that the report of how something feels is inherently authoritative to the subject.   The mistake, they contend...is interpreting that as equivalent to an authoritative report about how something -is-.  In their view, "consciousness" doesn't arise at all.  It's a non-entity.  A mistaken description of something else or of alot of something else's.  From that POV, questions about it's evolutionary origin or advantage are incoherent.  They're questions about something else, at best...and nothing, at worst.

But what strikes me as the most glaring mistake is the glib assumption that our conscious capacity to carry on an internal narrative is the owner or ruler of our consciousness.  But even if consciousness arises from a multitude of innocuous bits in the end we are aware of feeling states and perceptions and ideas, all of which contribute to the first person subjective experience which I think is central to what we mean by consciousness.  If you don't agree with that, again, what do you think is the real subject of discussion where consciousness is concerned?

[I_am_not_mafia]

Anyway, the evolutionary perspective is clearly the wrong tack to take here.  At best, you end up with an unprovable (and yet not disprovable) narrative that you think feels right.

Yet using terms like qualia and armchair philosophy no one has made any progress for a couple of thousand years.

[Angrboda]

I would define consciousness in terms of its functionality.

The function of consciousness is to allow matter to subjectively experience what itself and its surroundings are like.  If you want it not to mean that, then you should choose a word that doesn't mean that.  Redefining an idea out of existence isn't a good way to deal with whatever it was the word used to talk about.

You've got to be joking. There is no set understanding of what the function of consciousness is. It's a subject of great debate in the philosophy of mind, ranging from the position that it has no function -- epiphenominalism -- to views that it is integral to the formation of behaviors. Attempting to argue that there is a standard usage of the term using a definition you pulled from your ass is the height of cheek. And I'm highly skeptical of your thesis that the "function" of consciousness is to allow a subjective experience of "what it's like to be." Under that view, it's function is none; it does no work whatsoever in the economy of the organism. Regardless, your definition leaves out that we have things like "understanding the meaning of words" as experiences of consciousness, and the ability to imagine things, and the ever present awareness of mood (e.g. sadness or happiness) which is an aspect of consciousness. Your so-called "definition" leaves far too much out. It's nothing more than an intuition pump, designed to prime us to imagine a familiar experience, consciousness, and fill in the details on our own from our own experience. As such, it's not so much a definition of function as it is a placeholder for the reader's own subjective experience.

I don't agree that consciousness' function is to allow subjective experience of itself and its surroundings. There is no such sensation as "being what it's like to be the skin that I'm touching." The "being" of a skin cell is no different from the "being" of a muscle cell. We have sensations because our tissues are innervated with nerve cells, and these nerve cells transduce one form of energy into another, an electrical impulse that is then interpreted by the brain to construct an experience. This "what it's like to be" nonsense is founded on the intuition that I am my body. But consciousness is effectively exterior to the body, not synonymous with it. That's merely a feeling we have about the body. It's a construct. In experiments with blind subjects, they have placed a grid of tactile initiators against a patch of the skin, and fed the array of tactile prods with input from a light sensing grid. The associated experience that the subjects had was akin to visual reception, not tactile reception. So which is it, does skin feel itself to be like the sensation of touch, or the sensation of vision? It's neither. There is no such thing as a "what it's like to be." That's just a metaphor and an intuition pump.

[Whateverist]

Ouch. Naive? Unavoidable, we all are or were in relation to something. But overstating your case or misrepresenting your intuitions as well supported? That should be avoided.

[The Grand Nudger]

Do you have experience of redness?

It's safe to assume that I have the same experiences you do, just to answer any and all variations of this question that might come up. 

I could use some elaboration here.  What about consciousness do you think we lack and what is it you think everyone who says consciousness is undeniable are actually talking about?

The very thing that purportedly separates consciousness from cognizance or even simple computational competence.  Awareness or experience -in- rather than awareness or experience -of- a first person.  

But what strikes me as the most glaring mistake is the glib assumption that our conscious capacity to carry on an internal narrative is the owner or ruler of our consciousness.  But even if consciousness arises from a multitude of innocuous bits in the end we are aware of feeling states and perceptions and ideas, all of which contribute to the first person subjective experience which I think is central to what we mean by consciousness.  If you don't agree with that, again, what do you think is the real subject of discussion where consciousness is concerned?

I agree, when people discuss their consciousness all of that is central.

[bennyboy]

Anyway, the evolutionary perspective is clearly the wrong tack to take here.  At best, you end up with an unprovable (and yet not disprovable) narrative that you think feels right.

Yet using terms like qualia and armchair philosophy no one has made any progress for a couple of thousand years.

Nor with begging the question in the name of science that really isn't proper science has anyone succeeded in observing the mind.

---

The "being" of a skin cell is no different from the "being" of a muscle cell.  We have sensations because our tissues are innervated with nerve cells, and these nerve cells transduce one form of energy into another, an electrical impulse that is then interpreted by the brain to construct an experience.  This "what it's like to be" nonsense is founded on the intuition that I am my body.  But consciousness is effectively exterior to the body, not synonymous with it.  That's merely a feeling we have about the body.  It's a construct.  In experiments with blind subjects, they have placed a grid of tactile initiators against a patch of the skin, and fed the array of tactile prods with input from a light sensing grid.  The associated experience that the subjects had was akin to visual reception, not tactile reception.  So which is it, does skin feel itself to be like the sensation of touch, or the sensation of vision?  It's neither.  There is no such thing as a "what it's like to be."  That's just a metaphor and an intuition pump.

I think you may have misread the thing you quoted, so I won't respond just yet. I didn't say that qualia is "what it's like to be." I said qualia is the ability to subjectively experience what the self and its surroundings are like-- to see redness rather than only to respond to red, for example.

If you remap the nerves, fine-- now you're experiencing what it's like to see touch.

---

Your so-called "definition" leaves far too much out.  It's nothing more than an intuition pump, designed to prime us to imagine a familiar experience, consciousness, and fill in the details on our own from our own experience.  As such, it's not so much a definition of function as it is a placeholder for the reader's own subjective experience.

No doubt. Sentience is an amazing and unfathomable thing, and I'm not qualified to give a perfect definition of it. That being said, that whatever-it-is that happens when the lights come on in the morning matters, and if semantics take the discussion to more operational definitions (like how something responds to its environment), pretending that in doing so we've solved any of that mystery is a mistake.

[ignoramus]

Holy fuck!
Guys, either the guy on the right is batshit or I am! Listen to him at 12:30 into the clip...