The universe is just one enormous 'Soul Filtering machine'

[Crossless2.0]

So, as long as somebody is convinced, it validates the argument?!

The arguments are successful pieces of reasoning. Jorm's comment was that we need additional reasons because inferring God into existence is not compelling.

The arguments are successful pieces of reasoning if the assumptions that underlie them are valid. I don't recall you or anyone else demonstrating they are.

Garbage in, garbage out.

[JackRussell]

The arguments are successful pieces of reasoning. Jorm's comment was that we need additional reasons because inferring God into existence is not compelling.

The arguments are successful pieces of reasoning if the assumptions that underlie them are valid. I don't recall you or anyone else demonstrating they are.

Garbage in, garbage out.

Yep, soundness and validity baby.

Steve should ask what goes to those that shows why atheists aren't convinced.

[Angrboda]

You seem poorly read on the concept of free will.  Libertarian free will implies that a person can choose to do any alternative available to it, regardless of past events.  Your objection that the persons in heaven share a certain past is irrelevant.  Your objection is moot.

You missed the point of the answer. Simon asked (at least I understood his question to be) if there are people in heaven who do not sin while there, then why couldn't God have created a world with those people. My answer was "those people" are the way they are because of the way the world was, their experiences there, and the conditions they now find themselves in.

If they do not sin because of "the way they are" then you are no longer arguing that they have free will but rather that their behavior is in some sense determined. You've undermined your argument for one. For two, your answer is so vague that it basically reduces to "they would not sin for some unspecified reason." That's hardly adequate as an explanation for why they would not sin. It's little more than a bare assertion of your conclusion. Christians have said that we are "slaves to sin." Even those who accept Jesus as Lord and Savior continue to sin. That is "the way they are." You need to do more than just handwave at some unspecified reason to explain why they will sin no more once in heaven.

What you assert as being the "best" explanation has few of the hallmarks that make even a good explanation.  In terms of the quality of these explanations, they are basically on a par with the explanations of "it just happened" or "it just is."  There are no properties of your god which are constrained by anything but the human imagination.  In order for any of your natural theology arguments to be remotely compelling, you'd need to show that your hypothetical god exists anywhere but in the imagination of its proponents.  This you cannot do, which is why you resort to characterizing your imaginary but poor solutions to these questions as "the best explanation."  It's nothing but spin.  Mere propaganda.  Your explanations suck as explanations and there is no rationally compelling reason to accept them, any more than it makes rational sense to accept, "it just happened" as an explanation..

But, "it just happened" or "it just is" are not possible answers. There are no successful defeaters to the arguments. While they do not prove anything, they are rational options of explanations which Christians for millennium have used in a cumulative case for their belief. 

That there are no successful defeaters to "it just happened" and "it just is" in no way implies that they are not possible explanations. They could be true explanations having no successful defeater. Regardless, the fact that you are dissatisfied with them as an explanation should tell you something about the value of your natural theology arguments, because they do indeed share the same qualitative profile as explanations. Your criticisms of them are also criticisms of your natural theology arguments.

You state: "In order for any of your natural theology arguments to be remotely compelling, you'd need to show that your hypothetical god exists anywhere but in the imagination of its proponents. This you cannot do..." You completely ignored the first two paragraphs of my post. These factors, while not convincing to you, are clearly convincing to others. Problem solved: Natural Theology arguments support the cumulative case.

People are convinced by both rational justifications and irrational justifications. Whether something is "convincing" to someone is irrelevant to the question of whether that something is rational justification for belief. Your argument was [implied] that the conclusion of natural theology arguments should be accepted because they are "the best explanation" for a variety of phenomena. I've shown that this does not meet the bar for rational justification of belief in their conclusions. And your response is to whine that "some people are convinced by them." That's not an adequate defense. Whether the arguments are compelling aside from their basic incompleteness as explanations is a separate question. But that need not be considered because the inadequacy of them on qualitative grounds is sufficient to deny them as rationally compelling.

---

So, as long as somebody is convinced, it validates the argument?!

The arguments are successful pieces of reasoning. Jorm's comment was that we need additional reasons because inferring God into existence is not compelling.

No, that was not my argument. I argued that the explanations for various phenomena provided by natural theology arguments are inadequate as explanations on qualitative grounds. The explanation that "Goddidit" is not an explanation for the phenomena in question because it doesn't really offer an explanation. It's just vague handwaving. "It's magic" is not a rationally compelling explanation for anything.

[Crossless2.0]

But, "it just happened" or "it just is" are not possible answers. There are no successful defeaters to the arguments. While they do not prove anything, they are rational options of explanations which Christians for millennium have used in a cumulative case for their belief. 

That there are no successful defeaters to "it just happened" and "it just is" in no way implies that they are not possible explanations.  They could be true explanations having no successful defeater.  Regardless, the fact that you are dissatisfied with them as an explanation should tell you something about the value of your natural theology arguments, because they do indeed share the same qualitative profile as explanations.  Your criticisms of them are also criticisms of your natural theology arguments.

I read Steve's post as saying there are no successful defeaters to the natural theology arguments. Perhaps he can clarify.

[JackRussell]

That there are no successful defeaters to "it just happened" and "it just is" in no way implies that they are not possible explanations.  They could be true explanations having no successful defeater.  Regardless, the fact that you are dissatisfied with them as an explanation should tell you something about the value of your natural theology arguments, because they do indeed share the same qualitative profile as explanations.  Your criticisms of them are also criticisms of your natural theology arguments.

I read Steve's post as saying there are no successful defeaters to the natural theology arguments. Perhaps he can clarify.

Hard to clarify word salad. It's an attempt to justify special pleading yet again.

[SteveII]

That there are no successful defeaters to "it just happened" and "it just is" in no way implies that they are not possible explanations.  They could be true explanations having no successful defeater.  Regardless, the fact that you are dissatisfied with them as an explanation should tell you something about the value of your natural theology arguments, because they do indeed share the same qualitative profile as explanations.  Your criticisms of them are also criticisms of your natural theology arguments.

I read Steve's post as saying there are no successful defeaters to the natural theology arguments. Perhaps he can clarify.

That is what I meant.

[Angrboda]

I read Steve's post as saying there are no successful defeaters to the natural theology arguments. Perhaps he can clarify.

That is what I meant.

Fine.

a. Your belief that there are no successful defeaters to natural theology arguments is just not so.





b. "It just happened" and "it just is" are both possible explanations. The first by virtue of QM, the second being simply the case that something is a brute fact, such as the fine tuning of the universe -- "it just happened that way" is most certainly a possible candidate for explanation of the phenomenon.

[SteveII]

You missed the point of the answer. Simon asked (at least I understood his question to be) if there are people in heaven who do not sin while there, then why couldn't God have created a world with those people. My answer was "those people" are the way they are because of the way the world was, their experiences there, and the conditions they now find themselves in.

If they do not sin because of "the way they are" then you are no longer arguing that they have free will but rather that their behavior is in some sense determined.  You've undermined your argument for one.  For two, your answer is so vague that it basically reduces to "they would not sin for some unspecified reason."  That's hardly adequate as an explanation for why they would not sin.  It's little more than a bare assertion of your conclusion.  Christians have said that we are "slaves to sin."  Even those who accept Jesus as Lord and Savior continue to sin.  That is "the way they are." You need to do more than just handwave at some unspecified reason to explain why they will sin no more once in heaven.

I was not getting into why they did not sin--only countering an argument that God could create people in a "dimension" where they would not have chosen sin.
There are several possibilities. The doctrine of Sanctification is where a Christian is perfected in love, meaning that the heart is undivided in its love for God or that it loves nothing that conflicts with its love for God. It is reasonable to assume that being in the actual presence of God (or having access to the actual presence of God) has the effect of preventing a divided heart. In addition, whatever additional knowledge (promised in scattered versed throughout the NT) becomes known to us in heaven would likely have the effect of illuminating the consequence of sin and therefore eliminating the desire for it. Anyway, there are no logical problems with free will existing in heaven.

[Minimalist]

Stevie is fairly desperate to save his fairy tales from the trash bin they so richly deserve.

[Angrboda]

If they do not sin because of "the way they are" then you are no longer arguing that they have free will but rather that their behavior is in some sense determined.  You've undermined your argument for one.  For two, your answer is so vague that it basically reduces to "they would not sin for some unspecified reason."  That's hardly adequate as an explanation for why they would not sin.  It's little more than a bare assertion of your conclusion.  Christians have said that we are "slaves to sin."  Even those who accept Jesus as Lord and Savior continue to sin.  That is "the way they are." You need to do more than just handwave at some unspecified reason to explain why they will sin no more once in heaven.

I was not getting into why they did not sin--only countering an argument that God could create people in a "dimension" where they would not have chosen sin.
There are several possibilities. The doctrine of Sanctification is where a Christian is perfected in love, meaning that the heart is undivided in its love for God or that it loves nothing that conflicts with its love for God. It is reasonable to assume that being in the actual presence of God (or having access to the actual presence of God) has the effect of preventing a divided heart.

It didn't stop the Morning Star from having a divided heart. What makes you think it will for the average human.

In addition, whatever additional knowledge (promised in scattered versed throughout the NT) becomes known to us in heaven would likely have the effect of illuminating the consequence of sin and therefore eliminating the desire for it. Anyway, there are no logical problems with free will existing in heaven.

Knowledge has never been a palliative for sin. And why couldn't God create these beings already imbued with this knowledge, or for that matter already in the presence of God. Neither explanation offers a reason why God could not create beings who do not sin without going through the test. Both can be applied at creation, if indeed they are the reason people in heaven do not sin.