Philosophical zombies

[polymath257]

As I see it, consciousness is a phenomenon that automatically happens at a certain level of information processing complexity. Once you get to a certain stage, consciousness arises because you are processing information.

I've heard this but I don't see what information processing has got to do with it. I see it as things being arranged in a certain way, or some other detail we're unsure of. I see no reason to believe that a computer that had enough information processing would become conscious.

I think we don't know precisely what it is about intelligent brains in our case that happen to be conscious, and I think we should stop pretending to know. And I think there may indeed be beings out there that are more intelligent than us that didn't happen to evolve consciousness. Consciousness is utterly useless after all, it's just an epiphenomenon.

So, no, I don't think unconscious space aliens are possible either. If they have enough ability to process the information, they simply will be conscious.

I don't think information processing is relevant at all. You could have a rather unintelligent being that was conscious at some low level, and you could have a highly intelligent being that behaved conscious but wasn't conscious at all.

OK, so how do I determine if I am a zombie?

If you're conscious you know you're not one.

How do I know that what I *think* is feeling and experiencing is actually NOT what everyone else means by the terms?

Consciousness is just the fact that something can seem to be anything to you.

maybe I don't *really* feel and experience, but have instead some sort of vague shadow that is actually not conscious.

See this just makes no sense and demonstrates that you are confused. If you seem to experience something, then the seeming of that experience is an experience that seems a particular way to you.

The very notion of "It doesn't seem like I experience anything it just seems like I seem to experience something" is logically incoherent. Seeming to seem implies seeming.

How would I know?

Because that you are aware of yourself seeming to ask the question is absolute self-evidence to you that it seems that you are aware that you are asking that question.

Consciousness is the the awareness of information, so information processing is ALL of it.

Physics is relevant because in the real world (as opposed to one where, say, pressure is not the result of atoms bouncing off of each other), and in any world similar to ours, consciousness is a product of the physical world.

Whether something is possible 'in theory' is a silly criterion. I can imagine all sorts of possible worlds where the rules are so different that consciousness isn't the result of physical processes. But such worlds are so far away from ours that this possibility isn't relevant to us.

Once again, how would it be possible for something physically identical to NOT be conscious? The first person aspect is produced from the information processing in the brain. So anything physically identical will have that same processing and thereby the same internal experiences.

As for being confused, a supposed zombie would say they have internal feelings and all of that. They would certainly *believe* they are conscious and be quite adamant about that fact. Isn't that quite sufficient evidence that they are, in fact, conscious?

[The Grand Nudger]

@Rob
We certainly don't know that we're conscious "in the traditional sense"...we know that the vast majority of traditional descriptions were..at the very least.......meaningfully inaccurate.  

The traditional sense of consciousness that dennet is responding to is the one based upon animus and spirit and some little man in our heads directing our moves.  That there's some centralized "me" "feeling" in the present..seeing, hearing, experiencing, etc.  If you agree with multiple drafts..you can't think that's any more true than dennet does.  This is why it;s useful to understand what dennet was responding to in his comments...and that's why theres a footnote in his book on the thing that has you hung up.


As a point of interest...why is it that you think science "can't touch it".....touch what, clarity on that?

Illusoryness and unreality are not directly exchangeable for each other. Illusions do, in fact..exist in reality. It's dennets position that some aspects of consciousness are an illusion grounded in a biological reality.

[Edwardo Piet]

Consciousness is the the awareness of information, so information processing is ALL of it.

That's like saying that because all dogs are animals all animals are dogs.

Yes, consciousness is the awareness of information... but that does NOT imply that all information is aware any more than all dogs being animals implies that all animals are dogs.

Physics is relevant because in the real world (as opposed to one where, say, pressure is not the result of atoms bouncing off of each other), and in any world similar to ours, consciousness is a product of the physical world.

Everything is the product of the physical world..... you have done the equivalent of saying "love is just a word". So is cheeseburger.

Physics is no more relevant to consciousness than it is to anything else. How is physics especially relevant? How does the subject of physics address consciousness? Physics doesn't say anything about consciousness any more than it does about cheeseburgers. The fact that the physical world produces both cheeseburgers and consciousness is irrelevant. If you call that relevant just because everything is physical, then that's a laughably tenuous use of the word "relevant".

Whether something is possible 'in theory' is a silly criterion. I can imagine all sorts of possible worlds where the rules are so different that consciousness isn't the result of physical processes. But such worlds are so far away from ours that this possibility isn't relevant to us.

When we're talking about logical possibility, logic is relevant. Which type of possibility are you talking about?

There's no reason to believe that we can't just apply the anthropic principle to our own consciousness and consciousness might actually be incredibly rare for intelligent creatures just as life might be incredibly rare for the universe, and the fact we're here/conscious doesn't make it common.

Once again, how would it be possible for something physically identical to NOT be conscious?

Because we're not talking about physically identical. We're talking about the brain being identical in every way as far as the intelligence and every other part of the brain goes, apart from the parts that produce the epiphenomenon of consciousness... which may be irrelevant and a useless by product of evolution just like a moth that suicides itself on a lightbulb is a useless by product of evolution.

The first person aspect is produced from the information processing in the brain. So anything physically identical will have that same processing and thereby the same internal experiences.

If the parts of the brain that produced consciousness didn't exist they wouldn't exist to produce consciousness. Bravo, duh, clap clap. That's not the point. The point is that the parts that evolved that produce consciousness may be utterly useless by products that have nothing to do with all the useful parts of the brain including intelligence. In this case, intelligence and the rest of the brain lead to the useless side effect of consciousness.... but given enough evolutionary path it might not have. And when applying the anthropic principle it may be very rare just like life is and the fact we're here and conscious and know it doesn't make consciousness any more common than the fact we're alive makes life any more common.

As for being confused, a supposed zombie would say they have internal feelings and all of that. They would certainly *believe* they are conscious and be quite adamant about that fact. Isn't that quite sufficient evidence that they are, in fact, conscious?

I'm the one saying that we know we're conscious and we're definitely not zombies. You're the one asking how we know we're conscious. The fact that we can experience ourselves asking the question means we know we're conscious.

You think it's possible that it can seem that things seem to us but they don't really seem to us... but that is confused and logically incoherent.... because seeming to seem implies seeming.

[The Grand Nudger]

Wouldn't a p zombie also think that it experienced itself asking the question if it was our doppelganger? Just downright convinced of it. Wouldn't seeming to seem imply seeming in their case?

[Edwardo Piet]

We certainly don't know that we're conscious "in the traditional sense"...we know that the vast majority of traditional descriptions were..at the very least.......meaningfully inaccurate.  

[You appear to be replying to me as if I'm Rob or something... which is odd. Lol.]

See, this just shows how confused you are. OF COURSE we know that we're conscious in the tradtional sense. It's the ONLY thing we know. We can't even talk about knowledge without talking about awareness/consciousness.

You don't know what you're talking about if you think consciousness in the traditional sense isn't known. It's all science even studies: phenomena.

I think I'm done with this convo if you can't even accept that you know that seeming to you is seeming to you. You may as well be another one of those guys arguing that 2+2=5 in another universe. Those morons who thinks Science is above all including the very axioms that science is fucking based on.

[polymath257]

When we're talking about logical possibility, logic is relevant. Which type of possibility are you talking about?

There's no reason to believe that we can't just apply the anthropic principle to our own consciousness and consciousness might actually be incredibly rare for intelligent creatures just as life might be incredibly rare for the universe, and the fact we're here/conscious doesn't make it common.

Once again, how would it be possible for something physically identical to NOT be conscious?

Because we're not talking about physically identical. We're talking about the brain being identical in every way as far as the intelligence and every other part of the brain goes, apart from the parts that produce the epiphenomenon of consciousness... which may be irrelevant and a useless by product of evolution just like a moth that suicides itself on a lightbulb is a useless by product of evolution.

The first person aspect is produced from the information processing in the brain. So anything physically identical will have that same processing and thereby the same internal experiences.

If the parts of the brain that produced consciousness didn't exist they wouldn't exist to produce consciousness. Bravo, duh, clap clap. That's not the point. The point is that the parts that evolved that produce consciousness may be utterly useless by products that have nothing to do with all the useful parts of the brain including intelligence. In this case, intelligence and the rest of the brain lead to the useless side effect of consciousness.... but given enough evolutionary path it might not have. And when applying the anthropic principle it may be very rare just like life is and the fact we're here and conscious and know it doesn't make consciousness any more common than the fact we're alive makes life any more common.

No, this is NOT the argument! The claim is that a *physically identical* zombie is possible. That is what is claimed shows that physicalism is wrong.

There are two aspects: if something physically identical (including the consciousness producing centers of the brain) is automatically conscious, then the p-zombies are impossible.

Second: the claim that the *possibility* of p-zombies shows physicalism is false. I disagree here also. What is physical in some 'possible world' is irrelevant to what happens in *this* one. And in *this* one, consciousness is a physical phenomenon.

[The Grand Nudger]

Conveniently, dennet goes to great lengths to address that sort of subtle, counterfactual, argument...regarding p-zombies and mary the color scientist specifically....if you read his book.....

---

[You appear to be replying to me as if I'm Rob or something... which is odd. Lol.]

My bad Ham, it happens.  Where though? Oh, now I see... I @Rob....but did I address your comments or no?

In any case, why do you think that seeming is some issue of mine that I can;t accept? It;s more of a problem for your possible p zombie than me or dennet. Dennet and I both accept that things oftenb seem some way..what he doubts, and what I doubt, is that things actually are the way they seem when it comes to consciousness.

It would be kind of silly for him to attempt to explain why things seemed some way x..if he didn't think that they seemed that way...don't you think?

[polymath257]

We certainly don't know that we're conscious "in the traditional sense"...we know that the vast majority of traditional descriptions were..at the very least.......meaningfully inaccurate.  

[You appear to be replying to me as if I'm Rob or something... which is odd. Lol.]

See, this just shows how confused you are. OF COURSE we know that we're conscious in the tradtional sense. It's the ONLY thing we know. We can't even talk about knowledge without talking about awareness/consciousness.

You don't know what you're talking about if you think consciousness in the traditional sense isn't known. It's all science even studies: phenomena.

I think I'm done with this convo if you can't even accept that you know that seeming to you is seeming to you. You may as well be another one of those guys arguing that 2+2=5 in another universe. Those morons who thinks Science is above all including the very axioms that science is fucking based on.

Would a p-zombie be able to talk meaningfully about consciousness? Wouldn't the fact that they *think* they are conscious mean, by your reasoning, that they are? And doesn't that show the impossibility of p-zombies?

[Edwardo Piet]

No, this is NOT the argument! The claim is that a *physically identical* zombie is possible. That is what is claimed shows that physicalism is wrong.

I'm not arguing for nonphysical zombies.

I'm saying that it's possible for highly intelligent beings to evolve and not be conscious, and that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. I'm a physicalist, but not an epiphenomenon.

A philosophical zombie is not necessarily a person with a physically identical brain that is nevertheless unconscious.

It's a person who acts and thinks like a person, and seems on the outside identical to us. But on the inside isn't conscious. Their brain may be very slightly different, but the only difference is the part/parts that gives them qualia, and there is no way science can possibly tell.

There are two aspects: if something physically identical (including the consciousness producing centers of the brain) is automatically conscious, then the p-zombies are impossible.

No, because a p-zed is just a person who seems conscious from the outside but on the inside isn't. Having a physically identical brain isn't part of the definition of p-zed.

Second: the claim that the *possibility* of p-zombies shows physicalism is false.

Nope. That's only the argument in the OP. It seems you are very new to this P-zed thing. It's possible to be a P-zed without having a physically identical brain to a non-P-zed. The point is that you act and behave identically and there is no way for science to possibly say whether you are or aren't conscious and yet you aren't. Like, it's physically possible for P-zeds to be among us. They wouldn't have physically identical brains, but we wouldn't be able to tell via science that they weren't conscious. Because, after all, everyone's brains are slightly different. And consciousness can't be located in the brain. It's spread throughout. So if someone is missing consciousness, we can't necessarily know it.

[The Grand Nudger]

Are we insisting that self deception would be impossible for a p-zed..as a silent premise?