Does anyone own "The Moral Landscape"?

[robvalue]

To try and make my point... no one would say they are a mathematical realist. It’s taken for granted that within every mathematical system, there are mathematical facts. It can’t be any other way. I’m trying to find out if this is the same, or different, for morality. If it’s the same I don’t see the point; and if it’s supposedly different I think it’s just using equivocation and assertion to try and make it appear that it’s saying more than it actually is.

Of course, one could insist the data "comes from reality", but a theist will insist their bullshit is real, so they will consider themselves to be doing the same thing. They’re not trying to make data up.

[The Grand Nudger]

Google mathematical realism, it's just trivia...but that's a thing.

Coherence within a system produces a trivial sort of fact.  Correspondence is a requirement of objectivity.  The moral statement must be both coherent and correspondent.  

Like math, those moral statements that follow within a system and are true with respect to what they are modeling, would be as factual (and non trivial) as any other statement derived in the same way.  Think about that for a moment.  In contrast, moral statements that only followed within a system but were not accurate with respect to what they were modeling would be both trivial..and false.  Coherent, perhaps...but misinformed.  The third category would be incoherent statements within the system that are simultaneously inaccurate with respect to what they are modeling.

Here, though, I'm describing competing moral statements purported to be objective.  They can be true or false, and they can exist on a scale of triviality.  

Our moral conclusions are consequential. We have every reason to address them in an exhaustive manner.

(more trivia, but there's a fourth possibility. That some incoherent statement accidentally gets it right, lol. It's my favorite - but it's a longshot)

[robvalue]

Okay... well, if that’s what moral realism is saying, then I’m one too. I would expect most people to be, who have given their ideas on morality any decent amount of thought. If it’s this simple, I don’t understand why it’s even a thing or why philosophers would debate it.

Vulcan appears to be saying more than this though, as does Harris. I’m trying to weedle it out!

[The Grand Nudger]

Okay... well, if that’s what moral realism is saying, then I’m one too. I would expect most people to be, who have given their ideas on morality any decent amount of thought. If it’s this simple, I don’t understand why it’s even a thing or why philosophers would debate it.

Most people live their lives as though they accept moral realism.  Folks have had tons of reasons to debate it.  Relativism, subjectivism, and moral skepticism are all competeing positions.  That's not an exhaustive list.

A realist might use these examples and example moral statements as a way to compare moral realism to those other positions.  

Vulcan appears to be saying more than this though, as does Harris. I’m trying to weedle it out!

Ill go back through the thread.  I'm sure he could elaborate.

[robvalue]

I’ve been proposing this solution for much of the discussion but Vulcan has told me it doesn’t count as realism.

As for Harris, he just announces that morality is about wellbeing, so there’s not much to examine there.

[vulcanlogician]

Listen to Khemikal; he's articulating it way better than I am.

I finally watched the video in the OP. It's more a criticism of Harris than of ethical objectivism. For instance, it brings Moore in to sound objections against moral naturalism. But Moore is a moral realist, one whose philosophy I largely agree with.

I do personally think that moral truth is just as real as any empirical reality. I am a Platonist of sorts, and my ideas in that regard were probably shining through. Chalk it up to an eccentricity on my part and don't hold it against ethical objectivism itself.

I laid out four positions of moral skepticism. If you'd adopt one to defend, we can have a debate. If you agree with more than one brand of moral skepticism, that's fine too. But let us treat them one at a time.

[The Grand Nudger]

I’ve been proposing this solution for much of the discussion but Vulcan has told me it doesn’t count as realism.

As for Harris, he just announces that morality is about wellbeing, so there’s not much to examine there.

Well, he doesn't just announce it, but..since he doesn't really draw from the literature available he doesn't lay out the case for that comment as plainly (or robustly) as you can find it in ethical or moral theory.  

I mentioned his hook, earlier, that he goes about it from the other direction.  Positing that for the word "bad" to have any sensible meaning, the greatest possible suffering for the greatest number of beings must be a part of what that means.   It's hard to argue with that, and accepting it carries implications for the antithetical assertion. A more thorough examination would be to go through our various moral systems and demonstrate the prevalence of care for wellbeing in them.

Care for wellbeing for wellbeings own sake. Virtue. Care for wellbeing for the sake of outcomes. Consequentialism. Care for wellbeing for sake of duty. Deontology. An objectivists virtue ethic will be based upon some true fact of the virtuous act. An objectivists consequentialist ethic will be based on demonstrable outcomes. Objectivist deontology is concerned with factual responsibilities to the collective.

It's interesting to note that in almost any moral system, the "goods" are predominantly virtue, the "bads" are predominantly consequentialist. The "right".....deontological.

[DLJ]

...
I laid out four positions of moral skepticism. If you'd adopt one to defend, we can have a debate. If you agree with more than one brand of moral skepticism, that's fine too. But let us treat them one at a time.

Did you mean these?

...
So there are two main branches of moral skepticism: relativism and nihilism. One way to determine if moral facts are real or not is to examine all the types of moral skepticism and see if they are "runaway skepticism" or not. Each branch has two main offshoots:

MORAL RELATIVISM
Cultural relativism: the view that moral values are only a construct of one's overarching culture [James Rachels successfully argued against this IMO, but if it is still a thing with you, we can discuss it.]

Individual relativism: the view that what ever one personally thinks right/wrong is all there is to morality.

MORAL NIHILISM

Error theory: Moral statements are in fact misstatements. They are errors. Just like when someone says "The grace of God carried me through the proceedings" they aren't talking about anything real, when I say "Murder is immoral." I am (similarly) not talking about anything real.

Expressivism: Moral statements are actually emotional expressions. When I say "Murder is wrong." What I'm really saying is "Murder--yuck!" or "Murder--blehhhh!"

So which mode of moral skepticism do you find most compelling? In order for me to defend moral realism, I need to know where you're coming from. You sound a bit like an error theorist, but I figured I'd lay them all out just so we could be clear before proceeding.

What if they are all partially valid and invalid or, as the Catuṣkoṭi would have it: P and not P?

[vulcanlogician]

Then say so.

I can't attack a position I don't understand. So if there's some sort of fifth kind of moral skepticism, then I'd need exposition there.

[DLJ]

Then say so.

I can't attack a position I don't understand. So if there's some sort of fifth kind of moral skepticism, then I'd need exposition there.

Is there a position that claims that the whole subject is so poorly defined that it becomes next to useless?