Does anyone own "The Moral Landscape"?

[robvalue]

Edit: I think I’m going to have to give up here actually. I feel it’s going in circles. Thanks so much for everyone’s involvement though! It’s been very interesting. I did check out the article but I’m afraid it didn’t do anything for me.

[DLJ]

Edit: I think I’m going to have to give up here actually. I feel it’s going in circles. Thanks so much for everyone’s involvement though! It’s been very interesting. I did check out the article but I’m afraid it didn’t do anything for me.

I did something for me.

It helped me understand where objectivists/realists are going wrong.

[The Grand Nudger]

Well, that's helpful knowledge too!  Expressing that observation in a cogent fashion would be some position on the moral skepticism spectrum.

[Angrboda]

Not a particularly good example, VL, as the facts can be reconciled with both the view that the sun circles the earth and that the earth circles the sun. Thank you for the Enoch essay, I'll have to read it later. You also recommended another essay on the topic, but I seem to have lost that reference. Do you have it?

[vulcanlogician]

Not a particularly good example, VL, as the facts can be reconciled with both the view that the sun circles the earth and that the earth circles the sun.  Thank you for the Enoch essay, I'll have to read it later.  You also recommended another essay on the topic, but I seem to have lost that reference.  Do you have it?

The essay was The Challenge of Cultural Relativism by James Rachels.

I thought my example worked because "objectivity" by it's very nature tends not to assume that any one apparent perspective is the correct one (that would be "subjectivity" right?). Although one may be able to account for differences in perception from different perspectives using an objective model, objectivity concerns itself with what is actually there regardless of perspective. If you assume the patch of earth you are standing on is "fixed" then the sun does appear to circle around you. But that doesn't mean that it actually does. Do not forget that Galileo proved the heliocentric model while standing upon a small patch of dirt in Italy.

[Angrboda]

Not a particularly good example, VL, as the facts can be reconciled with both the view that the sun circles the earth and that the earth circles the sun.  Thank you for the Enoch essay, I'll have to read it later.  You also recommended another essay on the topic, but I seem to have lost that reference.  Do you have it?

The essay was The Challenge of Cultural Relativism by James Rachels.

I thought my example worked because "objectivity" by it's very nature tends not to assume that any one apparent perspective is the correct one (that would be "subjectivity" right?). Although one may be able to account for differences in perception from different perspectives using an objective model, objectivity concerns itself with what is actually there regardless of perspective. If you assume the patch of earth you are standing on is "fixed" then the sun does appear to circle around you. But that doesn't mean that it actually does. Do not forget that Galileo proved the heliocentric model while standing upon a small patch of dirt in Italy.

Oddly enough, despite my evening's discussion supposedly intending to focus on devils, demons, and manifest evil, we actually took a detour into a short discussion of geocentrism. One participant claimed that the eclipses of... certain planets as well as Foucault's pendulum were incompatible with geocentrism. My point is that you can re-orient your frame of reference from a heliocentric one to a geocentric one without any loss of generality, as, with the possible exceptions noted above, there are no preferred frames of reference. So things work out just fine if you assume that the earth is fixed, aside from the proviso above, it just results in solar objects with rather strange and eccentric orbits. I don't know about Foucault's pendulum, but I suspect the eclipses would be the same regardless of which viewpoint you assume.

(Oh, and thank you for the reference. That was the essay I recall.)

[DLJ]

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"objectivity" by [its] very nature tends not to assume that any one apparent perspective is the correct one (that would be "subjectivity" right?). 
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Not right.

Subjectivity is not about "the correct one" it's about a correct one for each individual.

[vulcanlogician]

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"objectivity" by [its] very nature tends not to assume that any one apparent perspective is the correct one (that would be "subjectivity" right?). 
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Not right.

Subjectivity is not about "the correct one" it's about a correct one for each individual.

Sure, and concerning subjective matters, you are "right" to say this or that looks a certain way. But if you posit that the earth is motionless relative to the sun, then you are wrong.  The opposite is true. You'd have to come up with a set of physical laws that explain how the sun is able to circle so fast around the earth. Concerning such hypothetical laws, none of them conform to the observations of physicists.



FWIW, I like the Ptolemaic model. It got some things correct: the moon is the closest orbiting body, and does directly orbit the earth. Mercury and Venus are between the Earth and the sun.

But let's talk about the errors. It's not just a matter of irregular orbits and retrograde motion. The biggest error with this model is which body is in the center. Once you fix that, you've done most of the work. And not only that, if you've been diligent and accounted for the Earth's rotation, you've also explained why a person standing on the Earth has a perception that the sun circles him/her. That's what the James Rachels essay attempts to do concerning ethics. Rachels posits that the various subjective takes on morality have more to do with where specific cultures stand in relation to the objective moral truth.

Keep in mind, as this debate continues, my approach to these matters is Socratic. I'm not "attached to" objective morality in the way a theist might be attached to God beliefs. I think the moral skeptics have a point (and have done good work in drawing attention to weaknesses in moral realism). Inasmuch as moral skeptics are correct on certain matters, they can help us get closer to understanding what ethics really is, even if they are ultimately wrong.

As Socrates famously said: "The only thing I know is that I know nothing." After examining the arguments from all sides, I have found myself defending moral objectivism. When an argument comes along that forces me from this position, my position will change. Not to mention the fact that, periodically, I intentionally place myself back in a position of "Socratic ignorance" to reassess my positions again.

[vulcanlogician]

As far as things in the parallel thread about mathematics goes, Polymath's clarifications have done little to dispute my position that:

A) Ethics is an objective venture. Despite the broadly held perception that it does, ethics has nothing to do with subjectivity, cultural or otherwise. Polymath attributes the success of mathematics to the fact that the underlying axioms of a given system are "accurate." I too, would postulate the same of ethics. There is still no room for the view that ethics is subjective in all of this.

B) Ethics is not based upon personal tastes or emotional misgivings of any kind. It is based on axiomatic truths which (even if you don't want to use the terms true or false) are either accurate or inaccurate. No room for emotion when discussing the precision of an axiom.

So far, I think I have shown that ethics is NOT subjective (as moral relativists would claim). And nor is it based on emotions. If you agree with me thus far, there goes three brands of moral skepticism: cultural relativism, individual relativism, and expressivistic nihilism.

The only claim from the direction of moral skeptics that still stands is error theory, a kind of moral nihilism. Error theory says that there are no such thing as morals; we just made them up. I think that error theorists present the most significant challenge to ethical objectivism, and it's the only brand of moral skepticism that I take seriously.

@DLJ and Rob
If you want to say that all moral theory is wrong because it is founded on "made up" axioms, fine. But (if I have accomplished anything in this thread) I'd like it to be that I convinced you that ethics has nothing to do with subjectivity. You don't have to be moral objectivists. But at least you can say that you aren't because you think all moral theory is WRONG (rather than the mistaken notion that it is subjective).

edit: Also, I might have mischaracterized Polymath who I thought said axioms were accurate at one point. But, rereading over what he wrote, he said "useful"... at least at one point. It is a distinction that could be elaborated upon, but I figured I'd edit this in to my post for due diligence.

[DLJ]

As far as things in the parallel thread about mathematics
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:goes off to read the other thread:  :comes back:

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Polymath's clarifications
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Smart cookie that Polymath fellah.    And Mathilda's music notation analogy works for me too.

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A) Ethics is an objective venture.
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Correct.  

It depends upon one's choice of definition of 'objective', but 'venture' it certainly is.

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Despite the broadly held perception that it does, ethics has nothing to do with subjectivity, cultural or otherwise.
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Incorrect.

From Wikipedia:

Subjectivity is a central philosophical concept, related to consciousness, agency, personhood, reality, and truth, which has been variously defined by sources. Three common definitions include that subjectivity is the quality or condition of:

1. Something being a subject, narrowly meaning an individual who possesses conscious experiences, such as perspectives, feelings, beliefs, and desires.
2. Something being a subject, broadly meaning an entity that has agency, meaning that it acts upon or wields power over some other entity (an object).
3. Some information, idea, situation, or physical thing considered true only from the perspective of a subject or subjects.

In ethics, "consciousness, agency, personhood, reality, and truth" are assumed even though they are arguably emergent/virtual/illusory/relational/axiomatic.

I should not speak for Rob but I suspect that he would agree with me that 1. and 2. are part of the ethics-equation but 'multi-subject' would be perhaps a more relevant term.

The word 'only' in part 3., makes it irrelevant to ethics.  If that is the position for which you think Rob and I have been arguing ... that would be a misreading.

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Polymath attributes the success of mathematics to the fact that the underlying axioms of a given system are "accurate." I too, would postulate the same of ethics.
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Indeed, correction noted... 'useful' not 'accurate'.

I would postulate too that this applies to ethics.  Agreed.

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There is still no room for the view that ethics is subjective in all of this.
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If you are using 'subjective' in the sense of part 3., above, then yes, I agree, ethics is not subjective.

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B) Ethics is not based upon personal tastes or emotional misgivings of any kind. It is based on axiomatic truths which (even if you don't want to use the terms true or false) are either accurate or inaccurate. No room for emotion when discussing the precision of an axiom.
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With the correction to 'useful or not useful' I would largely agree but I would draw a distinction between individual ethics and organisational ethics. The former is emergent via cognition from immune > endocrine > limbic system architecture into the governance realm.

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So far, I think I have shown that ethics is NOT subjective (as moral relativists would claim).
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No, you haven't.  Best to abandon the whole objective/subjective thing altogether.

Everything is relative, man.      

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And nor is it based on emotions.
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Correct.  Its basis is deeper than that.  Probably quantum... probably.

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If you agree with me thus far, there goes three brands of moral skepticism: cultural relativism, individual relativism, and expressivistic nihilism.
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Why the switch to 'moral'?  

Equating ethics to morals is like equating governance with event management... different ends of the spectrum.

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The only claim from the direction of moral skeptics that still stands is error theory, a kind of moral nihilism. Error theory says that there are no such thing as morals; we just made them up. I think that error theorists present the most significant challenge to ethical objectivism, and it's the only brand of moral skepticism that I take seriously.
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Nihilism works for me.  Absurdism would be a better fit.  

Because, Brooklyn is not expanding...




I have a moral-system (whether I like it or not) because of evolution.  Thanks Darwin!!  

However, what I may consider to be a moral event may not be what someone else considers to be a moral event.  

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@DLJ and Rob
If you want to say that all moral theory is wrong because it is founded on "made up" axioms, fine. But (if I have accomplished anything in this thread) I'd like it to be that I convinced you that ethics has nothing to do with subjectivity. You don't have to be moral objectivists. But at least you can say that you aren't because you think all moral theory is WRONG (rather than the mistaken notion that it is subjective).
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Sorry.  No sale.  Ethics does have a subjective (individual) element.  Many subjects (individuals) making a collective/consensus to create 'culture'.

I don't know much (if anything) about moral theory, unencumbered as I am with a formal education.

I am writing my own version of the Evolution of Morality based on what I do know and I'll probably be discussing it with Rob in the near future.    

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edit: Also, I might have mischaracterized Polymath who I thought said axioms were accurate at one point. But, rereading over what he wrote, he said "useful"... at least at one point. It is a distinction that could be elaborated upon, but I figured I'd edit this in to my post for due diligence.

Correction noted.