Subjective Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

When I say rape is wrong (and I do), I recognize it as a shorthand: I don't like rape due to my feelings, and I know that the majority of people in my social environment don't like rape due to their feelings, and so we say it's wrong.  We have a social contract to stand against it, and to punish those caught doing it.

Another subjective appraisal.  You don't like rpe due to your feelings, and other people don't like rape..so, wrong.  I'm still wondering, though..if there's anything about rape that makes it wrong, in your opinion?  Not you and your feels.  Rape.  

But what's the difference between sex, which most people consider good, and rape, which most people do not?  It's a complex history of ideas about rights, freedoms, responsibilities, and so on.  Essentially, it's a narrative.  It's much more about the sense of identity, of personal power, and so on than about anything that I'd call objective.

What would happen if a man raped his dog?  The dog would squirm around, might be kind of confused.  He might be sore for a couple of days.  But I doubt he'd live out a life of insecurity, PTSD, etc.  That's because he's not capable of establishing a narrative in which sex is related to self esteem, and where the wrong kind of sex will disillusion him forever.  In essence, you'd have to argue that one's entire world view is objective, which to me is a broken semantic.

Well, we do try to make our worldviews objective..but, no, moral realism satisfies itself with a tiny slice.  In any case, "what would happen to the victim" is the beginning of an objective attempt through consequentialism.

[bennyboy]

When I say rape is wrong (and I do), I recognize it as a shorthand: I don't like rape due to my feelings, and I know that the majority of people in my social environment don't like rape due to their feelings, and so we say it's wrong.  We have a social contract to stand against it, and to punish those caught doing it.

Another subjective appraisal.  You don't like rpe due to your feelings, and other people don't like rape..so, wrong.  I'm still wondering, though..if there's anything about rape that makes it wrong, in your opinion?  Not you and your feels.  Rape.  

As I said, I call it wrong in coordination with others, but I don't think that anything, including rape, is intrinsically wrong. Or, to generalize, there's nothing in particular about causing any type of pain or harm which is intrinsically wrong, unless a feeling agent decides to care about that harm.

I can prove this pretty easily. Hands up vegetarians.

[Haipule]

I say, "No harm no foul". Sin is the lame cunt imagination of someone whom wants to know what I did. Non of your bees-wax! I don't care what anyone think of me. Or, what I do!

I do know that I will make an answer for my life to God someday. And only Him! I will refuse to be embarrassed for loving the Valkyrie!

"Bill, what is it like to love and be loved by the Valkyrie?

Well...you don't believe in heaven. I LIVE IT!

[The Grand Nudger]

Another subjective appraisal.  You don't like rpe due to your feelings, and other people don't like rape..so, wrong.  I'm still wondering, though..if there's anything about rape that makes it wrong, in your opinion?  Not you and your feels.  Rape.  

As I said, I call it wrong in coordination with others, but I don't think that anything, including rape, is intrinsically wrong.  Or, to generalize, there's nothing in particular about causing any type of pain or harm which is intrinsically wrong, unless a feeling agent decides to care about that harm.

I can prove this pretty easily.  Hands up vegetarians.

A realist would tell you that some thing x is wrong regardless of whether a (or any) feeling agent gave a shit about it. That, for example..even if you're a happy rapist, that won't make rape less than or other than wrong. Similarly, if eating meat were wrong, it would be wrong regardless of whether or not most people do it with a clear conscience (or a bib and a smile). There's an equivalent proposition that might help to shed some light.

Suppose you don't know that some bad thing x is happening. Does that make it not bad? You don't know about it so you can't give a shit. Does it matter whether the bad™ is intrinsic or extrinsically assigned? Well..not really. If you think that x is intrinsically bad, and you don't know about it, it's still bad..you just don't know about it..and if you think that x is extrinsically bad.......it's still bad...you just don't know about it.

As we can see, those are comments on the agent - not the moral status of x..so no amount of showing agents doing something (or not giving a shit about something) proves anything about the moral status of x. If there are intrinsically wrong things - people still do them. If there aren't..people still do the extrinsically wrong.

We can see the same relationship between any other fact and it's possession. It's true...for example, that not everyone realizes that evolutionary biology is a fact, and that not everyone cares about the facts of evolutionary biology. Many people do many things without taking evolutionary biology into account, and some people downright reject it. None of those things make evolutionary biology less-than factual. Moral realism, being a non-novel position of the nature of moral statements as purporting to report facts, has no requirement that anyone give a shit, or that no one get those facts wrong, or that all agree on the same facts or conclusions. Those would be additional claims unrelated to the primary conjecture.

Moral statements purport to report facts, and insomuch as they get those facts right, they are true (or false).

Not.

Moral statements purport to report facts, and insomuch as they get those facts right, they are true (or false) and everyone agrees.

or

Moral statements purport to report facts, and insomuch as they get those facts right, they are true (or false) and everyone gets them right.

or

Moral statements purport to report facts, and insomuch as they get those facts right, they are true (or false) and people will give a shit.

or

Moral statements purport to report facts, and insomuch as they get those facts right, they are true (or false) and no one will do the bad shit™.

We do bad things. We're almost never fully informed, we disagree, and we don't always give a shit even when we are informed. All of this is true -about us- regardless of what is true about the ontological or epistemic status of morality.

[bennyboy]

You are arguing for God.

What makes something bad even if subjective agents don't know it's bad? Badness is a judgment that things are not as they should ideally be. Who/what makes that judgment, if not individual subjective agents, or a collection of agents through some mode of negotiation?

Rape is bad, for the individual being raped, because it is an offense to his/her liberty, health and dignity. Rape is bad, for the collective Western thinker, because we care about people's liberty, health and dignity, and because we care about the social contract which extends that liberty, health and dignity to each of us.

It may be that out there, somewhere in the ether, is some expression of intrinsic badness. But how, as a subjective agent, would you know? How, as a collective of subjective agents, would we ever distinguish those from subjective ones?

[The Grand Nudger]

You are arguing for God.

LOL...................? I suspect that many people connect the two, as if one informs or depends on the other. I can see why, religious folk babble about it like they know shit. Secular moral realism, however, is the predominant view of contemporary moral theorists. That gives me alot of material ( and different versions of moral systems) to play with.

What makes something bad even if subjective agents don't know it's bad?  Badness is a judgment that things are not as they should ideally be.  Who/what makes that judgment, if not individual subjective agents, or a collection of agents through some mode of negotiation?

What makes two and two four when the kid doesn't know how to add?  

OFC we make the judgement (to be fair and general I'll say that moral agents - whatever they may be- make the judgement).  We're not always competent or well informed, though.  Also true regardless of the ontological or epistemic status of morality.

Rape is bad, for the individual being raped, because it is an offense to his/her liberty, health and dignity.  Rape is bad, for the collective Western thinker, because we care about people's liberty, health and dignity, and because we care about the social contract which extends that liberty, health and dignity to each of us.

Can you demonstrate that rape is an offense to liberty, health, and dignity?  If you were of the opinion rape was good...would it -not- be an offense to liberty, health, and dignity?

It may be that out there, somewhere in the ether, is some expression of intrinsic badness.  But how, as a subjective agent, would you know?  How, as a collective of subjective agents, would we ever distinguish those from subjective ones?

How can the kid know that two and two is four?  

The terms objective and subjective..despite all the pointless and inane bickering in thread, do mean something.  We're capable of distinguishing between "opinions make it wrong" and "facts make it wrong". The question above isn't directly related to whether or not there are moral facts, but whether or not we can access them. We don't seem to balk at the accessibility of other facts, subjective agents and all, a moral realist would ask why we would make this a special case.

It's certainly possible for a person to be so ignorant, conflicted, or compromised that they simply couldn't access a moral fact. That's the utility of normative deontology as conditioning. Consider, we begin by telling a child that they have one duty. To follow the rules. Here's the list of rules. Does the kid know why items are on the bad side and the good side? Not always, and for the most part it doesn't matter if they know why. We expect them to come to understand those rules and the consequences of their not being followed (especially by breaking them, lol) as they age......but it's completely mundane to note that there is a point in their lives where they have access to the rules but not the underlying schema, that they are morally ignorant. We understand that children have severe impulse and self control issues - that even if a kid -did- know why the sharing rule was in place, they may not want to..might find it palpably difficult to let go of the item and give someone else a turn. They may be throwing a fit, completely compromised at that point. They may not understand the rule at all, and act out accordingly. The trifecta.

Sometimes...and this is my favorite, the rule is not consistent with what they see as their best interests, so even if they did know, were calm and under control, and could conform..they won't, lol.

All of this can be equally true of adults. All of this is true regardless of whether the list is a description of my opinion....or based upon moral facts.

Lots of words, but I could condense the question and the answer. Can a subjective agent access a fact? Yes. Do all subjective agents have access to all relevant facts? No. Will a subjective agent conform to facts? Meh, spotty. Again, moral realism is a position regarding the ontological or epistemic status of morality, not a series of novel comments on human beings (moral agents). Everything that you see around you that is true of moral agents is still and equally true in a world with or without objective morality.

[Belacqua]

Rape is bad, for the individual being raped, because it is an offense to his/her liberty, health and dignity.

I think that if you intend this statement to be true, you are assuming a kind of moral realism.

[The Grand Nudger]

He is.  We -all- do.  For all of our academic comments on the merits of this or that moral system, we live our lives and have internal experiences consistent with a commitment to moral realism.  We think the things we think are bad or good are really bad or good for reasons, reasons which we can demonstrate, and which are true.

In this, moral realists note that a moral observation is entirely like any other purported observation of fact. We would need a reason to treat them differently from other facts, rationally. Its not clear that there is one.

---

Here's a fun question.  Can anyone tell me whats wrong (if anything) with the following moral proposition?

It is bad to bury your neighbors dog alive because vanilla icecream is the best.

[bennyboy]

Rape is bad, for the individual being raped, because it is an offense to his/her liberty, health and dignity.

I think that if you intend this statement to be true, you are assuming a kind of moral realism.

In the end, it's semantics, isn't it?  "Bad" means so many things.

[robvalue]

The problem is that "wrong" / "immoral" means absolutely nothing at all (scientifically) without a non-circular definition. Once you’ve made that definition, you’ve moved away from morality itself, and into the study of behaviour and consequences under specific goals. You’re then talking about achieving and enacting certain stated ethics, according to the vision of a person or group of people.

It’s the equivocation between the defined "wrong" and the general "wrong" that leads to mistakes I often see.