Subjective Morality?

[DLJ]

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So I'd like an example of a moral fact.  
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So would I.  That would be very helpful to get to grips with the arguments.

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 There's nothing intrinsically wrong with driving on this or that side of the road.  
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Indeed.  It's about principles and policies... consensus and compliance to achieve goals.

And the rule is simple... left is right and right is wrong.  

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Subjectivism contends that moral facts are an expression of states of belief, which are sometimes true, that are constituted by human opinion.  Every true statement about a personally held opinion is the relevant fact to a moral subjectivist - ergo the moral fact, or moral fact of the matter.  There probably are a gazillion of them.  

Realism contends that moral facts are an expression of states of belief, which are sometimes true, that are not constituted by human opinion.   Every true statement that is mind independent is the relevant fact to a moral realist - ergo the moral fact, or moral fact of the matter.  There are decidedly fewer of these than the former..regardless of what they are.
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Thanks for that clarification.  It's useful to see the contrast.

Does this mean that 'Objectivism' and 'Realism' can be used synonymously and if not, what's the difference?

Cheers.

[The Grand Nudger]

Thanks for that clarification.  It's useful to see the contrast.

Does this mean that 'Objectivism' and 'Realism' can be used synonymously and if not, what's the difference?

Cheers.

In context of moral theory, yes..just as in so many other contexts. Calling something "objectively real" is a bit redundant, eh?

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Subjectivism contends that moral facts are an expression of states of belief, which are sometimes true, that are constituted by human opinion.  Every true statement about a personally held opinion is the relevant fact to a moral subjectivist - ergo the moral fact, or moral fact of the matter.  There probably are a gazillion of them. 

If you don't mind, I'd like to start with one objective moral fact, and move on from there.  I don't need a gazillion, just one.  I'm still pretty cozy with my view of morality-- that it is predicated mainly on our feelings about things, and that feelings about things are highly subjective.

 
Why is that wrong?

It's not intrinsically wrong.  It's one of the emotional positions people take.  People don't like it when they follow rules, and other people disregard them.  So they say, "Not following the rules of the road is wrong."

Is that a fact?

In any case...I don't think you've really plumbed the depths of deontology with that statement about the nature of rules as you see them. In point of fact, I think it's ridiculously ignorant.

Are you objecting in good faith? Is that really why people say that not following the rules of the road is wrong..because people don't like it when folks don't follow them? Just last post you mumbled something about endangering the public.........

[DLJ]

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The cat subjectivist says no.  The cat is a mind dependent. 
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The cat realist says yes.  The cat is mind independent. 
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Is this not a conflation of 'ownership' (which was the claim) and 'existence'?

The cat can exist independent of the human mind but the ownership (relationship) is not independent of the human mind.

And every cat 'owner' knows that cats own humans, not the other way around.

Thanks for that clarification.  It's useful to see the contrast.

Does this mean that 'Objectivism' and 'Realism' can be used synonymously and if not, what's the difference?

Cheers.

In context of moral theory, yes.  

I am disappoint.

Moral Theorists could learn a lot from Best Practivists.

[bennyboy]

If you don't mind, I'd like to start with one objective moral fact, and move on from there.  I don't need a gazillion, just one.  I'm still pretty cozy with my view of morality-- that it is predicated mainly on our feelings about things, and that feelings about things are highly subjective.


It's not intrinsically wrong.  It's one of the emotional positions people take.  People don't like it when they follow rules, and other people disregard them.  So they say, "Not following the rules of the road is wrong."

Is that a fact?

In any case...I don't think you've really plumbed the depths of deontology with that statement about the nature of rules as you see them.  In point of fact, I think it's ridiculously ignorant.

Are you objecting in good faith?  Is that really why people say that not following the rules of the road is wrong..because people don't like it when folks don't follow them?  Just last post you mumbled something about endangering the public.........

Wow, we're at already. Classy.

I've asked for an example of an objective moral fact. Are you saying that my claim that something isn't intrinsically wrong is referencing a moral fact? If yes, then that's weak. If no. . . I'd still like an example of an objective moral fact.

[The Grand Nudger]

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The cat subjectivist says no.  The cat is a mind dependent. 
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The cat realist says yes.  The cat is mind independent. 
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Is this not a conflation of 'ownership' (which was the claim) and 'existence'?

The claim "I have a cat" carries an implicit claim to the existence of the possessed cat.  Both the subjectivist and the objectivist agree that the statement could be true, ergo the cat could exist....and both agree that the cat does have a factual existence, they disagree on the nature of that existence.  

The cat can exist independent of the human mind but the ownership (relationship) is not independent of the human mind.

That's a cat realists position, the cat subjectivist denies the mind independent existence of the cat.

[DLJ]

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The cat can exist independent of the human mind but the ownership (relationship) is not independent of the human mind.

That's a cat realists position, the cat subjectivist denies the mind independent existence of the cat.

Fair enough. No problem with that... "That cat exists" is a claim that can be validated or invalidated at the physical and empirical information layers and only needs consensus regarding the semantic layer (regarding the meaning of 'cat' and 'existence').

What would be a similarly useful example of a 'moral fact'?

Cheers.

[bennyboy]

There's a pretty important difference. A cat, presumably, is more than an idea. Whether or not there's really (really really) a cat there, I can see something, and can call it cat.

What I can't see is liberty, or ownership, or the sanctity of sexuality, or any of the other ideas which morality is about. Those are ideas-- for example, "This is MY cat. It belongs to me, and I have special rights to its enjoyment that other people should not be allowed."

Ideas about feelings and labels for annoying, selfish animals aren't really in the same semantic category.

[robvalue]

You can go ahead and test hypotheses about assumed objects, without having to care about how "real" any aspect of the whole thing is. The results are there, and they make a difference. And clearly, you can test whether you can do such tests by... doing tests and getting the results.

You can’t test for morality in the same way; you can test for outcomes, and then assign values to those outcomes. Or you can assign values first, justifying them however you like, and then test for outcomes. You can’t test for the values, because they don’t even represent real objects by assumption. If they did, then the whole business would be entirely different.

[The Grand Nudger]

That's a cat realists position, the cat subjectivist denies the mind independent existence of the cat.

Fair enough.  No problem with that... "That cat exists" is a claim that can be validated or invalidated at the physical and empirical information layers and only needs consensus regarding the semantic layer (regarding the meaning of 'cat' and 'existence').  

What would be a similarly useful example of a 'moral fact'?

Cheers.

The cat realist and cat subjectivist both propose cat facts (and from whence those those facts arise).  Though not all subjectivists or realists agree that the same facts are the proper cat facts.  Cat error theorists think that while there may be cat facts..we always get them wrong.  Cat non-naturalists expect empirical information but not physical evidence.  

You can replace cat with moral in every one of these cat posts I make.  I can give you an example of a cat fact, but I'd need to know what sort of cat fact you were looking for.  Without that, I can only give you a broad description of the category under each position and leave you to meet those criteria with moral propositions known to you.  Each of the statements below is the fundamental and distinguishing moral fact of every matter according to each of the four positions above..describing two different positions on the immediate spectrum of the divide between subjectivism and realism.  

The error theorists facts are hypothetical.  We don't know what they are, but we know that we don't have them.

The subjectivists facts are variable.  They are facts about peoples perceptions or states of belief.  Facts about their opinions and minds.  They may even be intersubjective facts.
-This culture has a strong taboo against waving with their left hand.  They think it causes lethal bad juju.  They think this because.... [insert -long winded observations of cultural development and it's historical context and/or explanation of the relevant areas of the mind that might cause this common belief as an artifact of biology- here]  

The non naturalists facts are mind independent and non-natural.  They can be empirically known but not physically shown because they are not facts about anything...meaningfully speaking...physical or amenable to scientific investigation.  
-These facts are the facts of what's been called "the sensible world", and are those things that we can experience and assess by pure reason.  

The  cornell realists facts are those mind independent facts of some matter or act x that substantiate themselves in the natural world.  They are facts about what we contend to be able to know empirically and are capable of providing both physical evidence and a convincing demonstration of.
-We can establish by scientific process that some act x causes pain or harm by a variety of mind independent metrics.  If causing pain or harm is wrong, this act objectively does that, and so is wrong.  




 


 

There's a pretty important difference.  A cat, presumably, is more than an idea.  Whether or not there's really (really really) a cat there, I can see something, and can call it cat.

-not to a cat subjectivist or non naturalist, it's not.

That does lead us into the question immediately posed by cornell realism, it's commitment to scientific naturalism, and bias toward conservatism. Why don't you extend that common and casual assumption to other cats? If identical axioms and metrics lay beneath the justification for that "presumably" up there......then why are moral x's (or cats) the special case? You're asking for a list of moral facts..they're asking for a complete list of these special cases where we toss out our prior and binding ideological commitments.

What I can't see is liberty, or ownership, or the sanctity of sexuality, or any of the other ideas which morality is about.  Those are ideas-- for example, "This is MY cat.  It belongs to me, and I have special rights to its enjoyment that other people should not be allowed."

Ideas about feelings and labels for annoying, selfish animals aren't really in the same semantic category.

Sure, they're ideas...but that's not a barrier to realism. Moral non naturalists are moral realists. Resurrect your penchant for idealism. In their world, the cat and statements about the cat are ideas, as well.....ideas which we can empirically know to be true(or false). To objectively reflect some form or ideal (or not).

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You can go ahead and test hypotheses about assumed objects, without having to care about how "real" any aspect of the whole thing is. The results are there, and they make a difference. And clearly, you can test whether you can do such tests by... doing tests and getting the results.

You can’t test for morality in the same way;

Why not?

you can test for outcomes, and then assign values to those outcomes. Or you can assign values first, justifying them however you like, and then test for outcomes. You can’t test for the values, because they don’t even represent real objects by assumption. If they did, then the whole business would be entirely different.

That sounds alot like it describes piles and piles of scientific research, to me - how, if you think this...did you end up leading the statement with the claim above?

[Angrboda]

There's a pretty important difference.  A cat, presumably, is more than an idea.  Whether or not there's really (really really) a cat there, I can see something, and can call it cat.

The moral realist would say that morals are more than simply ideas as well, that it's true, our conception of morals is an idea, but that it is an idea that refers to something in the real world. In the same way, physical realism consists of ideas, as that is the only access we have to reality and the world, but the ideas themselves are postulated to refer to something, a cat, which exists in a reality that is independent of the idea itself. There really is no difference between cat realism and physical realism, both depend on ideas which are inferred to represent independently existing realities, but neither actually has access to that reality. The only difference is you're willing to make that inference with regard to physical realism, but not with respect to moral realism. But the fact of the matter is we have no different access to the existence of an independent physical reality than we have to an indepently existing realm of moral facts. You simply have a double standard regarding the two, likely based upon some hypothetical difference between the phenomenology of morals relative to the phenomenology of the physical world within our thoughts (our perceptual experience). There is definitely a difference in the phenomenology of the two, but that fact alone isn't decisive. There is a difference between the phenomenology of numbers and that of physical reality, but we don't on that account conclude that numbers are necessarily subjective.