Subjective Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

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We both accept that our beliefs are..at least sometimes...  true.

My beliefs, as I see them, are only true-in-context.  Given X, then it may sometimes be said that Y is true.

............then we both...accept...that our beliefs...are at least sometimes....true.

This agreement is all that is required for either of us to suspect that there are any facts, including moral facts..which we both propose.

[Angrboda]

Nobody needs to provide you a damn thing, benny.  You keep going on about this when even if we aren't able to provide an example that meets with your approval, it doesn't prove a damn thing one way or the other.  You're just being a disingenuous twat and trying to deflect from your inability to demonstrate that morality is subjective.  I provided an example, that rape is wrong.  You in all your cluelessness simply didn't understand the point I was making.  That rape is objectively wrong may be true, unless and until you show that it is not.  I'm not the one claiming something, you are.  So get to work and demonstrate that morality is predicated upon feelings and not predicated upon an objective truth.  So far you haven't done squat but piss and moan about irrelevant shit and deflect.

And this is why I compare this position to theism.  You claim it's objectively wrong, then put the burden of proof on me to prove it's not.  If it's objectively wrong, show that this is so.

Wrong. I do not claim that it's objectively wrong. I claim that it may have an objective basis. That incurs no burden of proof. You do, however, claim that it is not objective. That does incur a burden of proof.

I can easily demonstrate that at least some mores are based on feelings or individual ideas-- moral values have differed vastly over history, among cultures and individuals.  There are very few opinions about whether 2 + 2 = 4, or whether apples are red (or green).  That's because those are ACTUALLY objective facts.

Opinions about the nature of reality have varied over time, too. Opinions about the nature of reality are still the most variable of facts in existence. Ask a Muslim, a Buddhist, and an atheist about where we go after we die and you'll get three different answers. Are you suggesting that therefore there is no objective reality? Opinions about mathematical truths have varied over time as well. Not about 2+ 2, but about the axiom of choice, the question of whether math and logic are explicable in terms of the one or the other, and so on. In morality, some basic facts like fairness is good haven't varied at all over time, so you're simply cherry picking your facts in order to support your conclusion. Even if that were not the case, at best this argument would show that moral facts are not like mathematical facts or facts about apples. That's a proof by analogy which only follows if we have reason to expect morals to be analogous to mathematical facts or cat facts in the way you suggest. Ultimately it's a very weak and inconclusive argument. Additionally, there are explanations for why morals have varied over time. Your ignorance of them is just that. Ultimately this is an argument that because certain epistemological facts hold, then certain ontological facts follow, and that's simply a non sequitur.

If you are claiming there's a Truth™, and that some people are sage enough to get it right, and some not, then I'd argue that Christians hold this exact same position.  Why should faith be a requirement for an understanding of a supposed objective truth?

My opinion doesn't depend on anybody getting anything right. What makes you think that physical realist facts, or mathematical realist facts, or any other type of fact you can name are not in the same boat? I don't know exactly what you mean by faith here. It seems like you're simply trying to make an analogy between moral realism and something that you consider bad. That doesn't lead to the conclusion that moral realism is wrong, so what's the point?

[The Grand Nudger]

I can easily demonstrate that at least some mores are based on feelings or individual ideas-- moral values have differed vastly over history, among cultures and individuals.

This..is not the position of subjectivism.  The position of subjectivism states that -all- moral propositions are based on facts of things which are mind dependent.  If you accept that even some propositions are based upon facts of things which are not mind dependent, this is an acceptance of moral realism. Both subjectivists and realists think that moral propositions express ideas. Both subjectivists and realists reject that moral propositions are expressions of emotion. Both subjectivists and realists think that those ideas are sometimes facts of something mind dependent.

-Only- moral realists think that they are also..at least sometimes..facts of something mind independent.



That moral propositions differ over history, between cultures, and between individuals..is not the position of moral subjectivism, either.... nor does it demonstrate that position, nor does it in any way threaten moral realism or moral subjectivism.

[bennyboy]

And this is why I compare this position to theism.  You claim it's objectively wrong, then put the burden of proof on me to prove it's not.  If it's objectively wrong, show that this is so.

Wrong.  I do not claim that it's objectively wrong.  I claim that it may have an objective basis.  That incurs no burden of proof.  You do, however, claim that it is not objective.  That does incur a burden of proof.

You are free to prove or not bother to prove anything you want. If you believe there are objective moral facts, and you can see that I do not, then you can go ahead and show one for consideration, and explain why any moral idea might be said to be correct (rather than, say, very popular in a given culture).

If you don't want to do that, then I will happily go along my way still holding the opinion that all value judgments are necessarily subjective, including judgments about what metrics to consider when forming ideas about how to behave.

Opinions about the nature of reality have varied over time, too.  Opinions about the nature of reality are still the most variable of facts in existence.  Ask a Muslim, a Buddhist, and an atheist about where we go after we die and you'll get three different answers. Are you suggesting that therefore there is no objective reality?  Opinions about mathematical truths have varied over time as well.  Not about 2+ 2, but about the axiom of choice, the question of whether math and logic are explicable in terms of the one or the other, and so on.  In morality, some basic facts like fairness is good haven't varied at all over time, so you're simply cherry picking your facts in order to support your conclusion.  Even if that were not the case, at best this argument would show that moral facts are not like mathematical facts or facts about apples.  That's a proof by analogy which only follows if we have reason to expect morals to be analogous to mathematical facts or cat facts in the way you suggest.  Ultimately it's a very weak and inconclusive argument.  Additionally, there are explanations for why morals have varied over time.  Your ignorance of them is just that.  Ultimately this is an argument that because certain epistemological facts hold, then certain ontological facts follow, and that's simply a non sequitur.

I expect that if something is objective, it may be observed to be so. If there are facts which are moral in nature, and the morality of which is not dependent on the feelings and ideas of a subjective agent, then bring a few forward, and we can talk about them.

If you can't demonstrate that objective moral facts even exist, then we might as well be talking about magical space monkeys or Zeus' thunderous cock or something.

My opinion doesn't depend on anybody getting anything right.  What makes you think that physical realist facts, or mathematical realist facts, or any other type of fact you can name are not in the same boat?  I don't know exactly what you mean by faith here.  It seems like you're simply trying to make an analogy between moral realism and something that you consider bad.  That doesn't lead to the conclusion that moral realism is wrong, so what's the point?

If there are real moral truths, then we have two choices: demonstrate at least one, and show it to be so, or have faith that somewhere out there is some kind of real truth, even though we have no direct gnostic access to it. In the latter case, this is only a couple sprinkles of holy water from a religious position.

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I can easily demonstrate that at least some mores are based on feelings or individual ideas-- moral values have differed vastly over history, among cultures and individuals.

This..is not the position of subjectivism.  The position of subjectivism states that -all- moral propositions are based on facts of things which are mind dependent.  If you accept that even some propositions are based upon facts of things which are not mind dependent, this is an acceptance of moral realism.  Both subjectivists and realists think that moral propositions express ideas.  Both subjectivists and realists reject that moral propositions are expressions of emotion.  Both subjectivists and realists think that those ideas are sometimes facts of something mind dependent.  

-Only- moral realists think that they are also..at least sometimes..facts of something mind independent.



That moral propositions differ over history, between cultures, and between individuals..is not the position of moral subjectivism, either.... nor does it demonstrate that position, nor does it in any way threaten moral realism or moral subjectivism.

I didn't enter this thread declaring myself to be of a particular school.  You've spent the whole thread trying to Socrates me into a box, but I'm not down with that.

My position is pretty clear, and has been oft stated: Morality is a mediation among feelings, ideas, and the environment, and is predicated mainly on feelings.  If this doesn't fit into your view of subjectivism, you can find a new box if you like.  But since feelings are subjective, I'm perfectly happy saying that morality is small-s subjective.

[The Grand Nudger]

I didn't enter this thread declaring myself to be of a particular school.  You've spent the whole thread trying to Socrates me into a box, but I'm not down with that.

My position is pretty clear, and has been oft stated: Morality is a mediation among feelings, ideas, and the environment, and is predicated mainly on feelings.  If this doesn't fit into your view of subjectivism, you can find a new box if you like.  But since feelings are subjective, I'm perfectly happy saying that morality is small-s subjective.

I can only tell you that it's not subjectivism, and that a moral realist can agree.

[bennyboy]

I didn't enter this thread declaring myself to be of a particular school.  You've spent the whole thread trying to Socrates me into a box, but I'm not down with that.

My position is pretty clear, and has been oft stated: Morality is a mediation among feelings, ideas, and the environment, and is predicated mainly on feelings.  If this doesn't fit into your view of subjectivism, you can find a new box if you like.  But since feelings are subjective, I'm perfectly happy saying that morality is small-s subjective.

I can only tell you that it's not subjectivism, and that a moral realist can agree.

I'm pretty sure a moral realist believe there's an objective truth-- that something IS right or wrong, independent of the opinions and feelings of a subjective agent.

[The Grand Nudger]

Moral realists and subjectivists both think that there is an objective truth, they differ only in what they think that truth is about. Both are cognitivist positions which have rejected error theory.

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-as a suggestion, I think that you could get alot more traction with what you're trying to object to if you went the route of relativism, personally.  

It doesn't fit your description of what morality is, exactly - but it fits your truths in context and the thrust of your objections regarding moral difference. The kicker, there, though, is that relativism and objectivism are the two most widely cited candidates for a pluralist moral description. It's noted that relativism might be more suited for some propositions than others, and that those propositions to which it isn't (at least seemingly) well suited are those propositions to which objectivism is (seemingly) well suited. I don't personally think that relativism provides a compelling case, ultimately..but I will note that it's far more difficult to dismiss out of hand than subjectivism. It would require a shift of focus, on your part, to consideration of evaluative premises over the existence of moral facts...which, fwiw, I'm pretty sure is what you think I'm talking about when I use the term moral fact.

[bennyboy]

Relativism is included under the umbrella of feelings, ideas, and environment. I suppose you could say that other people's feelings and ideas are a PART of the environment, and that you have the (often unpleasant) task of finding ground between your own feelings and ideas and all of that.

I'm starting to think that I'm "moral fluid." Maybe each of these -isms is better thought of as a perspective that can be creatively applied to different scenarios.

[The Grand Nudger]

Welcome to moral pluralism.

[bennyboy]

Welcome to moral pluralism.

You have to refer to me by my moral descriptor of choice.  I just TOLD you, I'm "moral fluid."  Use MY term, or I'm gonna cry and sue.