Why did Jesus suffer for sinners and not victims

[Belacqua]

no significance whatsoever 

Significance doesn't exist in nature. It exists in the minds of the people doing the interpreting. What's significant for you, or me, or the law, may differ. 

As far as the debate goes, the signs and semiotics of the abortion debate are probably more important than the objective biology. Emotional and ideological reasons run on signs.

For biology, though, meeting in a bar isn't the creation of a new discrete object with the necessary genetic material. Fertilization is. Meeting in a bar may or may not lead to fertilization, but it isn't fertilization.

[The Architect Of Fate]

Significance doesn't exist in nature. It exists in the minds of the people doing the interpreting. What's significant for you, or me, or the law, may differ. 

My point exactly 

As far as the debate goes, the signs and semiotics of the abortion debate are probably more important than the objective biology. Emotional and ideological reasons run on signs.

Yup

For biology, though, meeting in a bar isn't the creation of a new discrete object with the necessary genetic material. Fertilization is. Meeting in a bar may or may not lead to fertilization, but it isn't fertilization.

Whether fucking results in fertilization any particular time is irrelevant to the fact fucking is how it generally happens and is again no more or less important and it resolves nothing in the abortion debate.

[John 6IX Breezy]

For biology, though, meeting in a bar isn't the creation of a new discrete object with the necessary genetic material. Fertilization is. Meeting in a bar may or may not lead to fertilization, but it isn't fertilization.

Right; and meeting at a bar is only relevant to reproduction insofar as it results, or fails to result, in fertilizations. In other words, fertilization is the central lens through which all previous causes (or dominos) gain coherence. Meeting at a bar and locking eyes could instead be the cause of a divorce when seen through a marital lens.

[The Architect Of Fate]

Right; and meeting at a bar is only relevant to reproduction insofar as it results, or fails to result, in fertilizations. In other words, fertilization is the central lens through which all previous causes (or dominos) gain coherence. Meeting at a bar and locking eyes could instead be the cause of a divorce when seen through a marital lens, for example.

Nope, the domino of fertilization is no more important or central than sex whether it results in fertilization or not or whether it develops toes. It's not the central lens it's just one process in a million.

[vulcanlogician]

no significance whatsoever 

Significance doesn't exist in nature. It exists in the minds of the people doing the interpreting. What's significant for you, or me, or the law, may differ. 

But doesn't that speak to the opposite point (our point)? I think what Helios and I are questioning is the unjustified placing of such significance upon a single event. There are a series of events involved and a wholeness exists between them.

As far as the debate goes, the signs and semiotics of the abortion debate are probably more important than the objective biology. Emotional and ideological reasons run on signs.

For biology, though, meeting in a bar isn't the creation of a new discrete object with the necessary genetic material. Fertilization is. Meeting in a bar may or may not lead to fertilization, but it isn't fertilization.

I think personhood is the issue here. When can we say that what exists (whether it be a collection of cells or a zygote) is a person and has what moral rights may be granted by personhood? That's the ultimate question.

And a person isn't defined as "that which follows naturally from one discrete object." Of what does "personhood" consist? My example with totipotent cells showed that instead of one, two or more people may come to exist from the state of those cells existing, and that potential individuals will either come to exist or NOT come to exist based on what happens to those cells in that state. Nothing before or after that process can create THOSE specific persons.

@John 6IX Breezy

Read up on totipotent cells. In humans, they are formed after fertilization, but BEFORE any one individual person becomes inevitable from the gestation process.

 I think they say something important about the issue. Whether you agree or disagree, I'd like to hear your thoughts on the matter.

[The Architect Of Fate]

Significance doesn't exist in nature. It exists in the minds of the people doing the interpreting. What's significant for you, or me, or the law, may differ. 

But doesn't that speak to the opposite point (our point)? I think what Helios and I are questioning is the unjustified placing of such (unjustified?) significance upon a single event. There are a series of events involved and a wholeness exists between them.

As far as the debate goes, the signs and semiotics of the abortion debate are probably more important than the objective biology. Emotional and ideological reasons run on signs.

For biology, though, meeting in a bar isn't the creation of a new discrete object with the necessary genetic material. Fertilization is. Meeting in a bar may or may not lead to fertilization, but it isn't fertilization.

I think personhood is the issue here. When can we say that what exists (whether it be a collection of cells or a zygote) is a person and has what moral rights may be granted by personhood? That's the ultimate question.

And a person isn't defined as "that which follows naturally from one discrete object." Of what does "personhood" consist? My example with totipotent cells showed that instead of one, two or more people may come to exist from the state of those cells existing, and that potential individuals will either come to exist or NOT come to exist based on what happens to those cells in that state. Nothing before or after that process can create THOSE specific persons.

@John 6IX Breezy

Read up on totipotent cells. In humans, they are formed after fertilization, but BEFORE any one individual person becomes inevitable from the gestation process.

 I think they say something important about the issue. Whether you agree or disagree, I'd like to hear your thoughts on the matter.

[John 6IX Breezy]

[Accidental Post]

[Belacqua]

placing of such significance upon a single event.

I think the desire here is to find an ontological point of change -- something which isn't subjective but scientific. Then, you're right, the significance we give that change may vary. If people want to acknowledge that the ontological change is at that point but it isn't significant for them, that would be a different argument. 

In fact I think that the pro-choice side would do better to acknowledge that scientific issues of ontological change aren't included in their argument, only utilitarian and practical concerns. But I don't think that denying fertilization as a biological change is the best way to justify legal abortion.

It's obviously true that every event, including making a baby, has multiple causes. The question to me is whether, due to all these causes, we can define a point at which an ontological change occurs. 

Sometimes we obviously can't -- as in a Sorites Paradox, some conditions just don't have dividing lines. 

A better example here might be the construction of an airplane. The causes for the plane are many, including the investors saying to go ahead, and the designs, and the construction of parts, and the transportation and then assembly of parts. I acknowledge that there is no single point in the process at which the thing goes from being a non-plane to a plane. 

We could make a checklist of factors which make the plane flyable -- viable as a plane. The wings are necessary, but the seats and toilets aren't. So we could identify a day on which the plane went from flyable to non-flyable. And I think that some people want to apply this type of thinking to humans. They have a checklist of factors (self-consciousness, or the ability to survive outside the womb) which they take to be the difference between non-viability and viability. 

That doesn't, though, mean that the case of the plane and that of people are the same. It doesn't mean that viability and being a human are the same. 

Also, we could say that, for example, the causes of my death are already in place. Telomere shortening due to my age, my extreme espresso addiction, etc. But that doesn't mean that I'm dead already. Or that the moment of my death won't be a single, ontological change. Fertilization is this way, I think. The causes may be many, but there is still a single event of change.

I think personhood is the issue here. When can we say that what exists (whether it be a collection of cells or a zygote) is a person and has what moral rights may be granted by personhood? That's the ultimate question.

And a person isn't defined as "that which follows naturally from one discrete object." Of what does "personhood" consist? My example with totipotent cells showed that instead of one, two or more people may come to exist from the state of those cells existing, and that potential individuals will either come to exist or NOT come to exist based on what happens to those cells in that state. Nothing before or after that process can create THOSE specific persons.

I don't think I said "that which follows naturally from one discrete object." I think I said that a human being is a single discrete object with the necessary genetic material. A person isn't the act of meeting or the act of sex. A person is a thing which is discrete and has the required genetic material. That's what's new at fertilization.

But I agree, the debate over legal abortion is about personhood as a legal definition. Which may be different from biology.

If the discrete existence of an individual object with the required genetic material isn't the definition, then by what standards do we judge? I can see that for practical or even moral reasons we might prefer different boundaries. But there we get into milestones that are every bit as arbitrary as (you claim) fertilization is. Does personhood begin with consciousness? Is an unconscious person not a person? etc. etc. Is a slave a person? Could the government revoke personhood for some reason? 

I stick with my view that biologically, ontologically, the change comes at fertilization, and the rest is development of that thing. The argument that the thing is ontologically different before it's born (a fetus) than it is after it's born (a baby) is nonsense. It doesn't change its state due to location. While it's coming out of the mom it isn't half baby and half fetus. 

Whether people want to grant legal personhood, with rights, to the thing immediately after its ontological existence has begun, or later, is what the debate is really about.

[John 6IX Breezy]

Read up on totipotent cells. In humans, they are formed after fertilization, but BEFORE any one individual person becomes inevitable from the gestation process. I think they say something important about the issue. Whether you agree or disagree, I'd like to hear your thoughts on the matter.

Here are my initial thoughts after a brief reading. I didn't realize that totipotent cells where stem cells, or that stem cells were categorized by potency. So totipotent cells in humans are what we call a zygote—the fertilized egg. (The first 4-8 divisions remain totipotent; which means a zygote can produce more zygotes if I understood correctly.)

Your initial question was: "How is fertilization (ie. the event that creates the collection of totipotent cells) responsible singly for any of these three potential lives?"

I think the simplest response is just to say that fertilization is the creation of a new organism/organisms (singular or plural). If two organisms arise from the same fertilized egg you would be having monozygotic twins. So I think that part of the equation doesn't change, fertilization is just creating more organisms when it comes to twins (I may amend this position later). But I think the issue at the root of your question has more to do with identity. There is a period of time during which there is one organism before there are two. And I think you're asking whether the identity of that organism is lost and replaced, or divided and shared, or perhaps even preserved and added to.

Amendment: I now think its better to say that fertilization creates a new organism (singular) but that cleavage can produce more (plural). This does not mean the act of cleavage cancels out fertilization. In other words, fertilization always produces a new organism, but with an asterisk that cleavage can then produce more.

[The Architect Of Fate]

I think the desire here is to find an ontological point of change -- something which isn't subjective but scientific. Then, you're right, the significance we give that change may vary. If people want to acknowledge that the ontological change is at that point but it isn't significant for them, that would be a different argument. 

A desire that will fail. Because there is no starting point and the change is only one of a million with no particular change mattering.

In fact I think that the pro-choice side would do better to acknowledge that scientific issues of ontological change aren't included in their argument, only utilitarian and practical concerns. But I don't think that denying fertilization as a biological change is the best way to justify legal abortion.

They are not as such arguments are a waste of time. Fertilization is no more distinct than another process before or after.

It's obviously true that every event, including making a baby, has multiple causes. The question to me is whether, due to all these causes, we can define a point at which an ontological change occurs. 

We can't.

Sometimes we obviously can't -- as in a Sorites Paradox, some conditions just don't have dividing lines. 

Yup

A better example here might be the construction of an airplane. The causes for the plane are many, including the investors saying to go ahead, and the designs, and the construction of parts, and the transportation and then assembly of parts. I acknowledge that there is no single point in the process at which the thing goes from being a non-plane to a plane. 

Yup

We could make a checklist of factors which make the plane flyable -- viable as a plane. The wings are necessary, but the seats and toilets aren't. So we could identify a day on which the plane went from flyable to non-flyable. And I think that some people want to apply this type of thinking to humans. They have a checklist of factors (self-consciousness, or the ability to survive outside the womb) which they take to be the difference between non-viability and viability. 

Yup

That doesn't, though, mean that the case of the plane and that of people are the same. It doesn't mean that viability and being a human are the same.

It sure does.

Also, we could say that, for example, the causes of my death are already in place. Telomere shortening due to my age, my extreme espresso addiction, etc. But that doesn't mean that I'm dead already. Or that the moment of my death won't be a single, ontological change. Fertilization is this way, I think. The causes may be many, but there is still a single event of change.

You are slowly dying from the moment you're born. Death single event it's the slow decay from start to finish. Fertilization is simply one process in a million with it being a single event of change but millions of tiny changes.

I don't think I said "that which follows naturally from one discrete object." I think I said that a human being is a single discrete object with the necessary genetic material. A person isn't the act of meeting or the act of sex. A person is a thing which is discrete and has the required genetic material. That's what's new at fertilization

A person is all the things that lead to them and all the things that happen over their life. The "New"(which is just a variation of the old) is irrelevant frankly it's no more stands out than anything else that's "new".

But I agree, the debate over legal abortion is about personhood as a legal definition. Which may be different from biology.

Yes and no

If the discrete existence of an individual object with the required genetic material isn't the definition, then by what standards do we judge? I can see that for practical or even moral reasons we might prefer different boundaries. But there we get into milestones that are every bit as arbitrary as (you claim) fertilization is. Does personhood begin with consciousness? Is an unconscious person not a person? etc. etc. Is a slave a person? Could the government revoke personhood for some reason? 

All so-called milestones are arbitrary. This isn't how to solve the abortion debate and is a waste of time.

I stick with my view that biologically, ontologically, the change comes at fertilization, and the rest is development of that thing. The argument that the thing is ontologically different before it's born (a fetus) than it is after it's born (a baby) is nonsense. It doesn't change its state due to location. While it's coming out of the mom it isn't half baby and half fetus. 

Good for you. Too bad fertilization is an unimportant change compared to the millions before and after it , And status does change with location.  

Whether people want to grant legal personhood, with rights, to the thing immediately after its ontological existence has begun, or later, is what the debate is really about.

Too bad its existence doesn't start at fertilization that's just another process. And it's completely divorced from the actual question on abortion.

---

I think the simplest response is just to say that fertilization is the creation of a new organism/organisms (singular or plural). If two organisms arise from the same fertilized egg you would be having monozygotic twins. So I think that part of the equation doesn't change, fertilization is just creating more organisms when it comes to twins (I may amend this position later). But I think the issue at the root of your question has more to do with identity. There is a period of time during which there is one organism before there are two. And I think you're asking whether the identity of that organism is lost and replaced, or divided and shared, or perhaps even preserved and added to.

This response does not deal with the issue with this whole line of reasoning.