Finally an atheist proper, with views and questions

[no one]

This guy:
Ask them to defend why they don't accept
Quetzalcoatl, Odin, Ra, Zeus, Enki, Itzamná, or any of the other thousands of godibois that have been forgotten over time.

Lucian:
Thanks. My OP clearly wasn’t very well written - I am more intrested in developing my own views, not knocking down their’s. They are just the reason I am where I am right now.

You would not be knocking down anything. Simply just questioning their beliefs using their poorly constructed argument as a foundation. 

Lack of understanding on the part of the hoomans to clearly define why everything is, is not an assertion for the existence of magical entities. And even if it were, it certainty is not a vindication of their particular magical entity.

[Belacqua]

So, it has been a pretty while since posting here but think it may be more regular coming up. Basically last time I was content to be globally agnostic about almost everything I thought I knew so wasn’t too sure that atheism was the right label for me. Since then a christian friend has been pushing me repeatedly to defend atheism, despite knowing it wasn’t a position I held. Long story short, having to repeatedly defend misrepresentations of atheism finally pushed me to accept it as my current position. Comical own goal by my christian friend there, but I have finally found a passion for reading on these issues again and willing to adopt positions again. 

Currently I seem to be stuck in the weeds of moral error theory. I have a hundred or so journal articles downloaded to work through, a load of books, a bunch of phd theses and am just getting going. Reading and listening to a bunch of Graham Oppy right now as well, and very interested in getting more into philosophical works on naturalism after reading his book on it.

One thing I would appreciate is the ability to grill folk here on various potential formulations of arguments and for sources. My other christian friends have been amazingly patient with my constant questions, but I don’t want to grind them down and lose them as friends. I pretty much don’t have anyone around who shares my current interests… finally remembered this board.

So. Just an initial post, not sure whether I should just load all my questions onto this post as they come up, or do one per theme e.g. moral error theory. Thoughts would be appreciated. These aren’t going to be questions about how to deal with my friend, more just about how to think about things through the new atheist worldview

It's a huge and fascinating subject! 

I wonder if it would help us get things rolling if you would write a short sample of the kind of dialogue you've been having with your friend. Just to show us examples of the kind of issues you've been discussing. 

Does he assert that morals have some permanent grounding in the world? That seems to be the case among Christians. And you hold that moral statements are not true facts? Then I guess you'd have to work out where these morals (or the appearance of morals) come from. 

It's a pretty basic disagreement, and I see how Christians and atheists would take different positions. Probably several people around here have worked on the problem before. 

Can you give us a more specific hook or issue so that we can respond more easily? If we're lucky the conversation can expand from there.

[The Grand Nudger]

Welcome back.  What kinds of thoughts about moral error theory are you looking to elicit?  What do you see as the relationship between atheism and moral error theory?

Hey Grand Nudger, thanks for the nudge. I don’t see any direct link between atheism and moral error theory, merely that is is a view that is consistent with it and makes a lot of sense to me. I recognise there are a bunch of moral realist positions by atheist - something I have had to constantly point out to my friend.

Not sure of exact questions just yet, just an opening post to see what the deal is here

Sure, atheism is consistent with any metaethical position.  When you say error theory makes sense to you are we talking passive "we could get things wrong" or the more comprehensive abolitionist view that we do get everything wrong?  

If you thought about arson and gift giving is it that you think we may be too hard on arson and too soft on gift giving, or that there's truly nothing indecent about arson or decent about gift giving?

[Lucian]

Hey Grand Nudger, thanks for the nudge. I don’t see any direct link between atheism and moral error theory, merely that is is a view that is consistent with it and makes a lot of sense to me. I recognise there are a bunch of moral realist positions by atheist - something I have had to constantly point out to my friend.

Not sure of exact questions just yet, just an opening post to see what the deal is here

Sure, atheism is consistent with any metaethical position.  When you say error theory makes sense to you are we talking passive "we could get things wrong" or the more comprehensive abolitionist view that we do get everything wrong?  

If you thought about arson and gift giving is it that you think we may be too hard on arson and too soft on gift giving, or that there's truly nothing indecent about arson or decent about gift giving?

So for me the strong form of error theory is what I currently hold to whereby a) moral talk makes claims about mind-indendent normative properties, b) no such properties exist, therefore c) all moral claims are in error. I don't think that necessitates abolitionism whereby we aim to jettison all moral talk at the minimum, and all moral thinking at the most. I think that moral thinking has been hugely helpful in the development of societies, so would favour a more conservationism approach.. I am currently working through the book "The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously". It lays out a number of different views to the "what now" question that are fun to tackle with

Re. your arson and gift giving question. Denying that moral properties as described above exist doesn't mean that I don't have strong views one way or the other. I believe arson isn't morally bad, but that doesn't entail that it means I think it is morally good or acceptable either (not suggesting you were saying that, but felt it needed saying). I have the same emotional reaction to people being injured, or property of people being damaged as the next man, and for me that suffices for me to criticise, prevent, punish etc. It would damage people and society if we let that happen, and I happen to not want such damage to society or people to occur.
Error theory to moral properties is often regarded as similar to atheism towards gods. If I say a) claims about god are claims about mind-independent facts b) gods do not exist, therefore, c) all claims are in error it helps to see the analogy. To say that god loves people is in error is not to say that god does not love people. It is to deny that there is anything to do the loving. Similar, to claim that god is good would be in error, but that is not to say that therefore god is bad. Some great discussion of this in the book "A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory"

Questions about companions in guilt arguments are intriguing at the moment. I have Terence Cuneo's "Normative Web" lined up to read, and also Cowie and Rowland's "Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics". Current reading on epistemic error theory isn't a convincing parallel to me, although some do lean into that such as Bart Streumer in his "Unbelievable Errors"

[Lucian]

So, it has been a pretty while since posting here but think it may be more regular coming up. Basically last time I was content to be globally agnostic about almost everything I thought I knew so wasn’t too sure that atheism was the right label for me. Since then a christian friend has been pushing me repeatedly to defend atheism, despite knowing it wasn’t a position I held. Long story short, having to repeatedly defend misrepresentations of atheism finally pushed me to accept it as my current position. Comical own goal by my christian friend there, but I have finally found a passion for reading on these issues again and willing to adopt positions again. 

Currently I seem to be stuck in the weeds of moral error theory. I have a hundred or so journal articles downloaded to work through, a load of books, a bunch of phd theses and am just getting going. Reading and listening to a bunch of Graham Oppy right now as well, and very interested in getting more into philosophical works on naturalism after reading his book on it.

One thing I would appreciate is the ability to grill folk here on various potential formulations of arguments and for sources. My other christian friends have been amazingly patient with my constant questions, but I don’t want to grind them down and lose them as friends. I pretty much don’t have anyone around who shares my current interests… finally remembered this board.

So. Just an initial post, not sure whether I should just load all my questions onto this post as they come up, or do one per theme e.g. moral error theory. Thoughts would be appreciated. These aren’t going to be questions about how to deal with my friend, more just about how to think about things through the new atheist worldview

It's a huge and fascinating subject! 

I wonder if it would help us get things rolling if you would write a short sample of the kind of dialogue you've been having with your friend. Just to show us examples of the kind of issues you've been discussing. 

Does he assert that morals have some permanent grounding in the world? That seems to be the case among Christians. And you hold that moral statements are not true facts? Then I guess you'd have to work out where these morals (or the appearance of morals) come from. 

It's a pretty basic disagreement, and I see how Christians and atheists would take different positions. Probably several people around here have worked on the problem before. 

Can you give us a more specific hook or issue so that we can respond more easily? If we're lucky the conversation can expand from there.

One thing I am interested in pursuing with him at some point is the question of whether theism has more explanatory power than naturalism (using as a rough proxy for atheism here, although I recognise the two are actually distinct). I agree with Oppy in his book "Naturalism and Religion" that both sides will need to appeal to a necessary causal explanation, or a brute fact that is contingent (he has more options, but these seem fine to start). Given that, appeals to a god that just happens to have the properties necessary to create etc is not an improvement on an appeal to a natural state that is unnamed that has the properties to cause the universe / cosmos. That said, claiming that gods created the universe doesn't explain the creation of the universe, it just states it. It doesn't explain how gods interact with the universe, how they bring about anything. Compare that to naturalistic accounts, and at least there is mathematical modelling of how this could occur, although there are many and therefore non fully determinative.
I came across this book by Evan Fales which is in my amazon wishlist due to lack of funds from buying other books "Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles". It seems that it may address some of these questions. Not sure if anyone here has read it / has thoughts?

[The Grand Nudger]

So for me the strong form of error theory is what I currently hold to whereby a) moral talk makes claims about mind-indendent normative properties, b) no such properties exist, therefore c) all moral claims are in error. I don't think that necessitates abolitionism whereby we aim to jettison all moral talk at the minimum, and all moral thinking at the most. I think that moral thinking has been hugely helpful in the development of societies, so would favour a more conservationism approach.. I am currently working through the book "The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously". It lays out a number of different views to the "what now" question that are fun to tackle with

Re. your arson and gift giving question. Denying that moral properties as described above exist doesn't mean that I don't have strong views one way or the other. I believe arson isn't morally bad, but that doesn't entail that it means I think it is morally good or acceptable either (not suggesting you were saying that, but felt it needed saying). I have the same emotional reaction to people being injured, or property of people being damaged as the next man, and for me that suffices for me to criticise, prevent, punish etc. It would damage people and society if we let that happen, and I happen to not want such damage to society or people to occur.

IDK.  On the one hand, a moral realist might tell you that the properties that make arson...arson..are the same properties that make it bad, and it would be hard to sell the notion that the burning building was mind-dependent.  Then, on another hand - most metaethical theories don't require or claim that normative properties are mind-independent at all, so even if we were willing to say that normative properties were all mind dependent that fails to address quite a bit of the moral field.  Subjective, relative, and even noncognitivist moral theories can't be in error on account of there being no mind-independent normative properties.

Your emotional reactions are noncognitivist, your societal justifications are relativist, your wants are subjectivist.    

Error theory to moral properties is often regarded as similar to atheism towards gods. If I say a) claims about god are claims about mind-independent facts b) gods do not exist, therefore, c) all claims are in error it helps to see the analogy. To say that god loves people is in error is not to say that god does not love people. It is to deny that there is anything to do the loving. Similar, to claim that god is good would be in error, but that is not to say that therefore god is bad. Some great discussion of this in the book "A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory"

Questions about companions in guilt arguments are intriguing at the moment. I have Terence Cuneo's "Normative Web" lined up to read, and also Cowie and Rowland's "Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics". Current reading on epistemic error theory isn't a convincing parallel to me, although some do lean into that such as Bart Streumer in his "Unbelievable Errors"

Sounds like you're nerding out, good stuff.  Considering the above, it looks to me like you're crafting a narrow and open argument against moral realism, but could only mount a semantic argument with respect to noncognitivism, subjectivism, and relativism?  As in, moral realists are actually in error - the others are poor communicators if or when they express such moral properties as though they were realist ones?

[Lucian]

So for me the strong form of error theory is what I currently hold to whereby a) moral talk makes claims about mind-indendent normative properties, b) no such properties exist, therefore c) all moral claims are in error. I don't think that necessitates abolitionism whereby we aim to jettison all moral talk at the minimum, and all moral thinking at the most. I think that moral thinking has been hugely helpful in the development of societies, so would favour a more conservationism approach.. I am currently working through the book "The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously". It lays out a number of different views to the "what now" question that are fun to tackle with

Re. your arson and gift giving question. Denying that moral properties as described above exist doesn't mean that I don't have strong views one way or the other. I believe arson isn't morally bad, but that doesn't entail that it means I think it is morally good or acceptable either (not suggesting you were saying that, but felt it needed saying). I have the same emotional reaction to people being injured, or property of people being damaged as the next man, and for me that suffices for me to criticise, prevent, punish etc. It would damage people and society if we let that happen, and I happen to not want such damage to society or people to occur.

IDK.  On the one hand, a moral realist might tell you that the properties that make arson...arson..are the same properties that make it bad, and it would be hard to sell the notion that the burning building was mind-dependent.  Then, on another hand - most metaethical theories don't require or claim that normative properties are mind-independent at all, so even if we were willing to say that normative properties were all mind dependent that fails to address quite a bit of the moral field.  Subjective, relative, and even noncognitivst moral theories can't be in error on account of there being no mind-independent normative properties.

Your emotional reactions are emotivist, your societal justifications are relativist, your wants are subjectivist.    

I understand where you are coming from. The arguments above are very much for non-natural moral realism, however I think there are also good arguments against natural and natural reductionistic views as well, and the works I am reading do address those.
The error theory is kind of a semantic claim that depends on whether the premise that people are making assertions rather than emotional reactions / expressions of intent etc. I think that that can't be proved regarding everyone, Lance Bush has good stuff on this looking at empircal studies on folk metaethical views https://www.lanceindependent.com/p/the-f...lacy-parts and sees the data as not determinative of one position or another. non-cognitivist views can be in error, if the claim is that moral claims are not in fact making assertions about the world. I like what Joyce has to say re. Mackie and Hume's views on projectivism. Our moral assertions start as affective reactions against something, that are projected onto the thing that caused them and subsequently objectified as a moral property of that thing, and then more abstractly as a moral property.
re. relativism and subjectivism, I see relativism and subjectivism as still making claims about moral properties, and therefore realist in a sense, just not globally applied. So as claims, these can indeed still be in error. Now my justifications for actions and preferences are not moral claims, they are just claims about how I want the world to be and therefore can be somewhat expressionistic, they key is that I don't see these as moral claims

Sounds like you're nerding out, good stuff.  Considering the above, it looks to me like you're crafting a narrow and open argument against moral realism, but could only mount a semantic argument with respect to noncognitivism, subjectivism, and relativism?  As in, moral realists are actually in error - the others  are poor communicators if or when they express such moral properties as though they were realist ones?

I do need to do a lot more thinking about non-cognitivism. I think that there is a mix of non-cognitivist and cognitivist views depending on the person being spoken to, or the situation involved. Error theory is therefore my preferred default at the moment, but recognising that I would need to accept expressivist views as accurate in others. So, trying to not sit too heavily in just one camp

For anyone interested in free stuff on this, Richard Joyce has a website with loads of his papers https://www.richard-joyce.com/online-papers, and also

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm afraid you've lost me there. Non cognitive utterances are those with no truth-aptness, and thus no way to be in error. Subjective and relative utterances are emphatically not realist utterances. Your listed justifications were not realist claims, but they simply are the justifications for noncognitive, subjective, and relative metaethical claims whether you view them as moral claims or not. This is what I mean about a semantic argument. You're not disagreeing or mounting an argument against the content, just a word.

Maybe we can find common ground again. How should your revulsion be in error? How would your desires or the practical needs of your society be in error? None of these things claim or depend on mind-independence..so..perhaps some other error?

[Lucian]

I'm afraid you've lost me there.  Non cognitive utterances are those with no truth-aptness, and thus no way to be in error.  Subjective and relative utterances are emphatically not realist utterances.  Your listed justifications were not realist claims, but they simply are the justifications for noncognitive, subjective, and relative metaethical claims whether you view them as moral claims or not.  This is what I mean about a semantic argument.  You're not disagreeing or mounting an argument against the content, just a word.

Non-cognitive utterances are indeed not truth apt, but the claim that moral claims are intended to be non-cognitivist can be in error. 
I may misunderstand relativistic and subjectivistic views then, so thanks for pointing that out, still early days in my reading. I guess I was thinking of those as "there can be real moral values, just not globally binding". Will definitely need to do more reading and thinking on that - only been 3 or so weeks reading on this - The Stanford Encylopedia or Philosophy says on one page "Second, it is worth stating explicitly that moral anti-realism is not a form of moral relativism—or, perhaps more usefully noted: that moral relativism is not a form of moral anti-realism."Second, it is worth stating explicitly that moral anti-realism is not a form of moral relativism—or, perhaps more usefully noted: that moral relativism is not a form of moral anti-realism." https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/

re "You're not disagreeing or mounting an argument against the content, just a word.", I agree that error theory is a semantic claim and I certainly didn't think my justifications were actually realist at all. I mean that I have reasons for doing things that I do not consider to be moral reasons in any sense. They are just reasons I want the way to be a certain way and for people to act a certain way. If they don't, I don't view them as immoral, or as bad, just as I don't see people as "good" if they do some things. At this point, I may well be slipping into non-cognitivism if I am not careful, but I am not sure I am.

The amoral view is also partially stemming from a lack of belief in free will (if defined as the ability to do otherwise), partially arising from reading Karofsky's A Case For Necessitarians https://www.routledge.com/A-Case-for-Nec...1032033174

[The Grand Nudger]

Yeah, I see what you mean there - that as a metaethical or descriptive theory noncognitivism can be in error..wrong or incomplete, even if noncognitivst utterances can't be, strictly speaking. Though...it has to be said..that metaethical noncognitivism doesn't depend on the utterances being intended as such....so even if that claim were in error it would not establish that metaethical noncognitivism were. In fact, I think you'd find that it tickles advocates of that theory pink that we very much intend to launder our yucks and yums as moral fiber other-than.

You're certainly on to something about realism. The article you're reading goes on to explain that since there are so many different ideas of realism anti-realism is equally muddy and so..at least in some contexts or frameworks, you could call subjectivism or relativism subjective realism or relativistic realism as opposed to objective realism. All three claim that their is a "real" index for moral claims - but, ofc...the noncognitivists disgust is just as "real" as the individual who has it or the society they live in or the universe that society inhabits while making antithetical claims to any version of realism in the same contexts and frameworks. For my part, I use it to refer to objective realism in those contexts or frameworks. Of the three, only objective realism would require anything mind independent. The "real" things in the other two are very explicitly peoples minds. Metaethically speaking.

I'm not sold on free will myself, though that doesn't lead me to an amoral view.