(November 14, 2015 at 3:57 am)Thumpalumpacus Wrote: The Brits and French had at least three or four hundred more tanks, and in the S-35 a better tank than anything the Wehrmacht fielded -- but they split them up into brigade and regimental assignments. So the Germans hit with a solid armored spearhead, while the Allies defended with a soft, uncoordinated design.

That wasn't even the probllem. The French tanks still communicated with flag signals, whereas the Germans already had radio in every tank, so that they coulld communicate in the thick of battle. Also, there tactical and logistic differences between the allies and the Germans back then. The Germans had spent the last decade to form independent tank units, acting as a formidable strike force, whereas the allies still viewed them as infantery support units. They hadn't moved on since 1918. As far as logistics are concerned, the Germans developed a system to fuel up their tanks on the fly, whith mobile units, whereas the allies sticked to supply points.

All in all, the secret to the so called Blitzkrieg, lies in commbining infantery, tanks and air force, to strike as one, while acting independently. A lesson, the allies had yet to learn.

(November 14, 2015 at 12:57 pm)abaris Wrote:

(November 14, 2015 at 3:57 am)Thumpalumpacus Wrote: The Brits and French had at least three or four hundred more tanks, and in the S-35 a better tank than anything the Wehrmacht fielded -- but they split them up into brigade and regimental assignments. So the Germans hit with a solid armored spearhead, while the Allies defended with a soft, uncoordinated design.

That wasn't even the probllem. The French tanks still communicated with flag signals, whereas the Germans already had radio in every tank, so that they coulld communicate in the thick of battle. Also, there tactical and logistic differences between the allies and the Germans back then. The Germans had spent the last decade to form independent tank units, acting as a formidable strike force, whereas the allies still viewed them as infantery support units. They hadn't moved on since 1918. As far as logistics are concerned, the Germans developed a system to fuel up their tanks on the fly, whith mobile units, whereas the allies sticked to supply points.

All in all, the secret to the so called Blitzkrieg, lies in commbining infantery, tanks and air force, to strike as one, while acting independently. A lesson, the allies had yet to learn.

The Germans gained some technical advantages during 1939 -1940 with both tank and aircraft simply because of the fact that they embarked on the main bulk of their buildup about 2 years after the French. The situation reversed later in the war in many ways because the Germans had to confront British, American, and Russian aircraft that were of a technical vintage 1-2 years more recent than the bulk of German equipment.

The combined arms tactics of blitzkrieg only works during the exploitation stage of the battle.   Germans only achieved the decisive breakthrough extremely quickly over the British and the French because of extremely fortuitous circumstances that was no part of their long standing plan.  As event showed, the French army was able to improvise quickly and tactically counter German maneuvers in the later stages of the battle.  It was impressively quick, just not quick enough to reverse the situation in light of the scope and speed of the Initial German breakthrough.

Had the Germans followed through with their original plan, the battle in Belgium would certainly have dragged on, and the French would have had the 2-3 weeks which they needed to adapt, and the Germans would likely have been halted on the Belgian French border, blitzkrieg doctrinal superiority not withstanding.

To focus too much on the importance of doctrinal superiority of the Germans is to focus too much ex post on the particular course of events, and neglect all the other possible courses which events might have taken.

If the major was not captured with German plans, history could easily show the Germans put too much faith in their superior doctrine, and the doctrinal superiority was unable to overcome the tenacity of Anglo-French defense, rather like in 1914.

(November 10, 2015 at 2:03 pm)Laika Wrote: No. I don't think I would be able to bring myself to murder an innocent baby, for crimes it did not commit.

This. It's never ok to directly kill a baby.

It's never right to say it is never right.

What about indirectly killing babies? Can you knowingly indirectly kill a baby?

(November 14, 2015 at 6:01 pm)mh.brewer Wrote: What about indirectly killing babies? Can you knowingly indirectly kill a baby?

If a woman is pregnant but has cancer and undergoes chemo even though her baby may die as an unintended side effect of chemo... I'd say that's one example of a grey area/indirectly killing a baby. Totally different from the nature/context of this question though, which insinuates a direct killing.

Quote:It was by pure chance that the Germany army did not oblige the French and British by fighting precisely the last war for which the French and the British were prepared.

Everything I've ever read about Fall Gelb was that Hitler thought Halder's plan was shit from the get-go.  And why not?  He had actually served in the trenches.  IIRC Hitler was so unimpressed with Fall Gelb 1 that he considered attacking then and there before the Allies could get ready.  When Manstein's plan was outlined for him, he was quite impressed.
The Sitzkrieg might have never happened if the old war horses of the Wehrmacht were not calling the shots at the outset.

He may have been unimpressed, but that was the plan, and it was rolling towards implementation, backed by the general staff, until the fact that the plan fell into Belgian hands threw a monkey wrench into its execution at almost literally the last moment.

You know the saying, "no plan of battle survives contact with the enemy."  I have to go look this stuff up.  It's been too long since I read Collapse of the Third Republic.