(December 12, 2015 at 1:37 pm)athrock Wrote: I have never seen this argument before, so I'm interested in some discussion of it. A philosopher by the name of Alvin Plantinga states it this way:

The Ontological Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
   
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
   

Thoughts?

That actually makes sense.

But now replace 'maximally great being' with 'thing that makes maximally great being's existence impossible'.

There you go. You just proved God exists and I killed him for you. Do I get cookies?

It's so easy to forget that the term 'maximally great' means something specific within the context of the argument, as in, the most fully expressed actuality. Outside Scholasticism the term has no meaning.

If, in it's most accurate and well composed form it need not be accepted.....what does it matter what the term means?  The form is not enough, it doesn't matter what you plug in.

(December 15, 2015 at 10:19 am)ChadWooters Wrote: It's so easy to forget that the term 'maximally great' means something specific within the context of the argument, as in, the most fully expressed actuality. Outside Scholasticism the term has no meaning.

I think "the most fully expresed actuallity" is a term in need of definition.  And yes to be an actuallity of any kind a thing must exist, but the argument falls apart with the notion that if we can imagine something that must exist to meet it's definition, it must therefore exist. We conceive of things that do not and even cannot exist all the time.

A maximally great being is incompatible with many type of worlds/universes. It is not possible in every possible world unless you define "possible" world as only what is compatible with God. But if it's not defined circularly, there is infinite possible universes in which a maximally great being is incompatible with just as there are infinite possible universes he is compatible with.

(December 14, 2015 at 2:14 pm)RobbyPants Wrote: Now, actually looking at the points to break down the problems of the argument:

• P1 is technically true, but you're dealing with nonfalsifiable things here, so take anything that follows with a grain of salt. Lots of grains of salt.
  
• P2 is not given at all. You'd have to prove that there are multiple "possible worlds".
  
• P3 is a non sequitur and cannot be inferred from any of the previous points.
  
• P4 is building off of P3, which is already not logically valid.
  
• P5 is logically valid, but is based off of P3 and P4, so it is not reasonable to infer, despite being logically correct in itself.
  
• The conclusion would also be valid, if not built off of P3 and P4.
  

So, that's where it all falls apart. I mean, once you take out the formal sounding syllogism, you're basically saying "if something could be real, it is real". I shouldn't have to explain why that's dumb. Again, leprechauns could be real.

(December 14, 2015 at 11:11 pm)IATIA Wrote: Yeah!     Finally, someone else sees it.

Well, actually no. I've already said that I think this argument is toast, but Premise (3) is not the problem.

Any being which is MAXIMALLY GREAT cannot be limited in the number of worlds in which it exists. Otherwise, another being which is NOT limited in that way is conceivable thereby making the limited being sub-maximal.

So, no...if a maximally great being exists at all, it must exist in all worlds.

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(December 15, 2015 at 8:04 am)excitedpenguin Wrote:

(December 12, 2015 at 1:37 pm)athrock Wrote: I have never seen this argument before, so I'm interested in some discussion of it. A philosopher by the name of Alvin Plantinga states it this way:

The Ontological Argument

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
   
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists is some possible world.
   
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
   
4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
   
5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
   
6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
   

Thoughts?

That actually makes sense.

But now replace 'maximally great being' with 'thing that makes maximally great being's existence impossible'.

There you go. You just proved God exists and I killed him for you. Do I get cookies?

Not really. 

A "maximally great being" is not merely a superhuman being with characteristics that are a lot like ours only bigger and better. God is not merely Superman.



One of the properties of a "maximally great being" is that it does not "come into existence". It has always existed.

So, if it is your conclusion that the Ontological Argument proves that God exists, and you have failed to kill him, then you are left with an existent God.

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(December 15, 2015 at 11:50 am)MysticKnight Wrote: A maximally great being is incompatible with many type of worlds/universes. It is not possible in every possible world unless you define "possible" world as only what is compatible with God.  But if it's not defined circularly, there is infinite possible universes in which a maximally great being is incompatible with just as there are infinite possible universes he is compatible with.

Since all worlds are material/natural, how would any of them be incompatible with a god who is not material and supernatural?

Your multi-verse can be whatever you want it to be...and a supreme, supernatural, non-material being would still be outside of them all.

How would you know what god is or is not...lol?  How is it we go about listing what attributes god has or does not have before we even demonstrate that god is? Why is it that a maximally great X cannot have come into existence in the first place? Sounds like yet another personal value assignment to me. The great majority of gods that people have ever believed in have begun to exist, both in the narratives told and of course in reality, why should I prefer your god description to theirs....why should you?

(December 15, 2015 at 12:05 pm)athrock Wrote: Well, actually no. I've already said that I think this argument is toast, but Premise (3) is not the problem.

Any being which is MAXIMALLY GREAT cannot be limited in the number of worlds in which it exists. Otherwise, another being which is NOT limited in that way is conceivable thereby making the limited being sub-maximal.

So, no...if a maximally great being exists at all, it must exist in all worlds.

I didn't say P3 was the only problem. P2 is simply asserted without proof.

Also, without actually defining "maximally great", there is no reason to assume it would exist in all possible worlds. Wouldn't saying it has to exist in all possible worlds be just as limiting as it not existing in them?

Really, when you look at this, "maximally great" is just a hand wave to say "omnipotent", and both concepts are self defeating.

(December 15, 2015 at 12:05 pm)athrock Wrote:

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(December 15, 2015 at 8:04 am)excitedpenguin Wrote: That actually makes sense.

But now replace 'maximally great being' with 'thing that makes maximally great being's existence impossible'.

There you go. You just proved God exists and I killed him for you. Do I get cookies?

Not really. 

A "maximally great being" is not merely a superhuman being with characteristics that are a lot like ours only bigger and better. God is not merely Superman.



One of the properties of a "maximally great being" is that it does not "come into existence". It has always existed.

So, if it is your conclusion that the Ontological Argument proves that God exists, and you have failed to kill him, then you are left with an existent God.

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I'm sorry, but it doesn't work that way and you're strawmanning me.

It's pretty simple, actually. If you can prove God in that way, I can prove an anti-God in a similar manner. The two entities cancel each other out and you're left with nothing but bad philosophy.

I can give my anti-God the exact same attributes your God has, plus the fact that it makes your God's existence impossible. Now you can make up an anti-anti-God to take care of my Anti-God and cancel him out in turn, but then I could make up an anti-anti-anti-God myself, and so it goes, and we have an infinite regress on our hands. Either way, you can't prove God's existence this way.