It’s true that is doesn't make any practical difference how exactly things ended up as they are now, although understanding the science of the past helps us build overall models; but if such-and-such event happened differently in the formation of our current situation, then we wouldn’t even be in this situation. We might not have existed at all. So it made a potential practical difference.

My point is that if there are "moral facts", whatever that means, then things would appear to be exactly the same as if there weren’t; and vice versa. If anyone can point out a practical difference between the two situations, feel free.

Quote:And moral systems, in my opinion, don't take feelings "into account."  They are the verbal representation of feelings.  I don't think you can find a single more which is not at its essence just a verbalization of something that makes people feel bad.

-Recall the above........

(October 28, 2018 at 10:37 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(October 28, 2018 at 9:02 pm)Khemikal Wrote: There are plenty of things I take to be wrong that I don't feel bad about.  I'm sure there are plenty of other things taken to be wrong that are..more or less, just things that make this or that person feel icky.  Those would not be "the preferred set" of moral justifications..to a realist.

I'd like an example of something which is immoral which nobody has negative feelings about.

The contention was that every single more was just a verbalization of something that makes people feel bad.  Regardless of whether we're talking about mores...or morals...I don't think that's the case.  There are things we all take to be wrong in our moral systems, that don't make us feel bad...and there are customs and habits that we get up to.... that we get up to, not because if we didn't we or someone else would feel bad...and often enough for no reason at all, or no reason immediately accessible to the modern observer (driving on the left or right side of the road is a fucking more, lol).  

It's a very strong contention...and it needs to be pointed out.. that a person cannot maintain it to be true and be a subjectivist -or- a realist...because it's a noncog objection.  The notion that moral statements are not, in fact..beliefs about something that we take to be true or which could be true or false (which you agreed to earlier, btw, Benny)..but instead reduce to something more like..."yuck".  It also contradicts those earlier comments about morality being a mediation between x y and z.  

This is why Vulcan posted that flow chart in the first place.  People are getting their streams mixed up when they object to particular moral theories..their objections are coming from contradictory ideological camps.  They can't -all- be valid objections simultaneously and concurrently, and an objection that contradicts ones own stated positions can always be answered with...

-"then we are both wrong"

 ...in this case, because it's coming from a place that contradicts earlier stated positions...it can be followed up with "but why do you think that only one of us is wrong when the objection would implicate us both?" If morality (or mores) were just a bunch of expressivist statements about how we're feeling...then it's not about beliefs, contentions taken to be true, facts specific to the subject, mind independent variables..or a mediation between feelings, ideas, and environment..it's just "yuck!" and "yum". Even more fundamentally, can you provide some explanation for why any other statement that presents itself as purporting to report a fact is any different? Why is "I have a brown dog"..not, more accurately, "yuck", or "yum"?

If you take the above objection to be coming from a place of truth (and hey...how come that's not yuck or yum...while we're at it?), obviously I disagree....but you'll need to contain your conjectures and objections going forward to what is consistent with a non-cognitivist position or else I won't be able to cogently respond..and you wouldn't be able to cogently object or question. A cornell realist, moral non naturalist, moral subjectivist, and error theorist all answer the objection above the same way. That answer -won't- demonstrate objectivity.

I want you to know that I think it's a great conversation - but it would be nice to know if you're looking for an explanation of moral cognitivism, or moral mind independent variables. Are you trying to figure out why realists think that our moral judgements express states of belief, why they think they purport to report facts..........or are you more concerned with the deep subjectivity of the human creature as a moral agent?

@Rob
OFC, in some sense, if there were moral facts..things would be exactly as they are now.  Moral facts, if there are moral facts..derive at least in part from some observation of the way things are.  This is a requirement of objectivity - not a problem for objectivity..or a demonstration of it's lack of practical effect.

If there are scientific facts, things would -also- appear exactly as they are now.   The facts are derived from how things are (or seem to be) in the first place.Does that mean that there is no practical difference between a world with or without scientific facts? Would it matter if there were no practical difference..does that somehow speak to the existence of moral or scientific facts? I'd be willing to wager that, if you were being consistent, you would realize that it doesn't..as well as conclude that the existence of scientific facts has at least -some- practical difference to us juxtaposed against a world in which there were none..and grant the same to hypothetical moral facts..if there were any.

Even a subjectivist considers -their- moral facts important because they have an upstream relationship with so much in our life. From government policy down to deeply personal interactions and decisions. Any change to those things, at all, and the nature of those things.....is profoundly consequential.

Yeah, if it was not possible to derive scientific facts, it wouldn’t be possible to make any of the advances in technology we have made. We'd have no way of building predictive models.

It would appear to have even greater implications. If it’s not possible, for example, to establish the mass of an object as a scientific fact, then the mass must be somehow be indeterminate or constantly changing. It would seem to be some kind of bizarre dream world with no rules.

(Technically we determine scientific facts about our observations of reality and not reality itself; that’s neither here nor there in this regard.)

---

PS: you seem to have admitted that the existence of "moral facts" is an unfalsifiable hypothesis, if there is no way to tell the difference between it being true or false.

(October 29, 2018 at 7:11 am)robvalue Wrote: Yeah, if it was not possible to derive scientific facts, it wouldn’t be possible to make any of the advances in technology we have made. We'd have no way of building predictive models.

Well, I mean we might have blundered into a few even though we had our facts wrong..but in the general I agree.  Moral realism contends that we have knowledge like that, that moral facts are like those facts.  

They would expect roughly the same effect.  In the absence of a commitment to realism, we would not have made advances that we have.  We would have poor predictive models of the consequences of our systems.  

Quote:It would appear to have even greater implications. If it’s not possible, for example, to establish the mass of an object as a scientific fact, then the mass must be somehow be indeterminate or constantly changing. It would seem to be some kind of bizarre dream world with no rules.

-and if it's not possible to know the moral status of x then it must somehow be indeterminate or constantly changing. 

Quote:(Technically we determine scientific facts about our observations of reality and not reality itself; that’s neither here nor there in this regard.)

Moral facts would be determined in the same way.  

Quote:

---

PS: you seem to have admitted that the existence of "moral facts" is an unfalsifiable hypothesis, if there is no way to tell the difference between it being true or false.

[/quote]
As unfalsifiable as the hypothesis of scientific realism, at least.

(October 28, 2018 at 10:46 pm)Belaqua Wrote:

(October 28, 2018 at 10:37 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I'd like an example of something which is immoral which nobody has negative feelings about.

How about this, as a thought experiment:

A person with no family or friends has died. He was a loner, with no connections. 

I have been on a shoplifting spree. I am about to get caught. Instead, I plant evidence that the friendless dead man did all the stealing. He gets the blame, and the police close the case.

My family is happy, because I don't go to jail. I am happy, because I escaped punishment. The dead guy isn't sad, because he's dead. There are no negative feelings. 

Have I done a moral thing?

No, you have not. Because deep down, you know what you did was wrong. You failed to take ownership of your own actions, instead blaming them on a dead guy.

(October 29, 2018 at 7:03 am)Khemikal Wrote: The contention was that every single more was just a verbalization of something that makes people feel bad.  Regardless of whether we're talking about mores...or morals...I don't think that's the case.  There are things we all take to be wrong in our moral systems, that don't make us feel bad...and there are customs and habits that we get up to.... that we get up to, not because if we didn't we or someone else would feel bad...and often enough for no reason at all, or no reason immediately accessible to the modern observer (driving on the left or right side of the road is a fucking more, lol).  

It's a very strong contention...and it needs to be pointed out.. that a person cannot maintain it to be true and be a subjectivist -or- a realist...because it's a noncog objection.  The notion that moral statements are not, in fact..beliefs about something that we take to be true or which could be true or false (which you agreed to earlier, btw, Benny)..but instead reduce to something more like..."yuck".  It also contradicts those earlier comments about morality being a mediation between x y and z.  

Sure I can. I just have to disagree with the semantics on a flow chart. It's easy.

My position is super-simple, and not to be confounded by a lot of philosophical gobbledygook-- either mores have an independent existence, or a dependent one. They have a dependent one-- without people to establish and maintain them, there would be no mores at all so far as I can tell.

You talk about "moral facts." If there are moral facts, then they can be interpreted only rightly or wrongly. If there are no moral facts, then people will use non-moral facts in support of their own feelings.

So I'd like an example of a moral fact. Surely, since objective morality is dependent on moral facts, there must be gazillions of them which might be cited as evidence of the objectivity of morality in general, or this or that more specifically.

I wouldn't say driving on one or the other side of the road is a good example of a moral fact. There's nothing intrinsically wrong with driving on this or that side of the road. What's wrong is willfully disregarding perfectly arbitrary rules that have been AGREED UPON, because it represents an insult to the collective will of the society-- a willingness to endanger other citizens, and so on. And people don't like that.

(October 29, 2018 at 6:45 pm)bennyboy Wrote:

(October 29, 2018 at 7:03 am)Khemikal Wrote: The contention was that every single more was just a verbalization of something that makes people feel bad.  Regardless of whether we're talking about mores...or morals...I don't think that's the case.  There are things we all take to be wrong in our moral systems, that don't make us feel bad...and there are customs and habits that we get up to.... that we get up to, not because if we didn't we or someone else would feel bad...and often enough for no reason at all, or no reason immediately accessible to the modern observer (driving on the left or right side of the road is a fucking more, lol).  

It's a very strong contention...and it needs to be pointed out.. that a person cannot maintain it to be true and be a subjectivist -or- a realist...because it's a noncog objection.  The notion that moral statements are not, in fact..beliefs about something that we take to be true or which could be true or false (which you agreed to earlier, btw, Benny)..but instead reduce to something more like..."yuck".  It also contradicts those earlier comments about morality being a mediation between x y and z.  

Sure I can.  I just have to disagree with the semantics on a flow chart.  It's easy.

Pointless, ofc you can say anything - but I'm extending you the courtesy of imagining that we are having a lucid and cogent conversation.

Quote:My position is super-simple, and not to be confounded by a lot of philosophical gobbledygook-- either mores have an independent existence, or a dependent one.  They have a dependent one-- without people to establish and maintain them, there would be no mores at all so far as I can tell.

-that's actually a third objection, at odds with previous objections and statements.  It's also the easiest to clear up.  Realists aren't stating that our moral statements don't come from people.  That would be absurd.  It's certainly true that if there were no people to believe that x was true..then no people would believe that x was true.

Quote:You talk about "moral facts."  If there are moral facts, then they can be interpreted only rightly or wrongly.  If there are no moral facts, then people will use non-moral facts in support of their own feelings.  

Realists would agree(ish). 

Quote:So I'd like an example of a moral fact.  Surely, since objective morality is dependent on moral facts, there must be gazillions of them which might be cited as evidence of the objectivity of morality in general, or this or that more specifically.

It depends on who you ask. 

Subjectivism contends that moral facts are an expression of states of belief, which are sometimes true, that are constituted by human opinion.  Every true statement about a personally held opinion is the relevant fact to a moral subjectivist - ergo the moral fact, or moral fact of the matter. There probably are a gazillion of them.  

Realism contends that moral facts are an expression of states of belief, which are sometimes true, that are not constituted by human opinion.   Every true statement that is mind independent is the relevant fact to a moral realist - ergo the moral fact, or moral fact of the matter. There are decidedly fewer of these than the former..regardless of what they are.

Quote:I wouldn't say driving on one or the other side of the road is a good example of a moral fact.

It's a textbook example of a more, though.  

Quote:There's nothing intrinsically wrong with driving on this or that side of the road.

I know, right?  The whole right side of the road thing is just a cultural habit enshrined by law due to the convenience of sitting on the rear left horse in a wagon team.  Hell, the british came up with it.....but they drive on the left!  Silly bastards.  While I don't use the terms more and moral interchangeably, and neither do ethicists (as you've been informed previously)..I just found it amusing that we happened to be talking about one way in which the two were similar.  

Quote:What's wrong is willfully disregarding perfectly arbitrary rules that have been AGREED UPON, because it represents an insult to the collective will of the society-- a willingness to endanger other citizens, and so on.  And people don't like that.

Why is that wrong?

(October 29, 2018 at 8:12 am)Joods Wrote:

(October 28, 2018 at 10:46 pm)Belaqua Wrote: [...] 

Have I done a moral thing?

No, you have not. Because deep down, you know what you did was wrong.

I think I wouldn't go along with this sentence as written. It comes across as meaning that because deep down the shoplifter knows he's wrong, therefore what he did was immoral. And that's troubling because it follows from there that if he didn't know it was bad, it wouldn't be immoral.

Quote:You failed to take ownership of your own actions, instead blaming them on a dead guy.

This seems more persuasive. I read it to mean that a person should take ownership of his actions and not evade responsibility. So it seems to me like a statement that a moral realist would make -- that taking responsibility in this way is axiomatic.

Another fun little setup.  Cat subjectivism, and cat realism.

A man walks up and claims to have a cat.  Is he expressing a state of belief?  Do we think that this person believes the statement "I have a cat" is true?  

The cat subjectivist and cat realist think that he is, and does..and I think that most of us would agree.

Do we live in a world where, sometimes, our beliefs are true?  The cat subjectivist and the cat realist both think so.  I think that most of us would agree.

Are those true beliefs, cat facts, constituted of mind independent variables?

The cat subjectivist says no.  The cat is a mind dependent.  It is produced by our minds and exists only in our minds.  This is a cat fact.  All cat facts are true beliefs about minds that see cats.  

The cat realist says yes.  The cat is mind independent.    It is not produced by our minds, and does not exist within our minds.  This is a cat fact.  All cat facts are true beliefs about cats that exist apart from our perception of them.

(October 29, 2018 at 8:30 pm)Khemikal Wrote: Subjectivism contends that moral facts are an expression of states of belief, which are sometimes true, that are constituted by human opinion.  Every true statement about a personally held opinion is the relevant fact to a moral subjectivist - ergo the moral fact, or moral fact of the matter.  There probably are a gazillion of them. 

If you don't mind, I'd like to start with one objective moral fact, and move on from there. I don't need a gazillion, just one. I'm still pretty cozy with my view of morality-- that it is predicated mainly on our feelings about things, and that feelings about things are highly subjective.

Quote: 

Quote:What's wrong is willfully disregarding perfectly arbitrary rules that have been AGREED UPON, because it represents an insult to the collective will of the society-- a willingness to endanger other citizens, and so on.  And people don't like that.

Why is that wrong?

It's not intrinsically wrong. It's one of the emotional positions people take. People don't like it when they follow rules, and other people disregard them. So they say, "Not following the rules of the road is wrong."