Good Morning, All,

Happy weekend!

(January 27, 2024 at 11:15 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote: It doesn't make any difference no matter how we concieve of it.  If, for example, we propose that god is not a thing..then every thing still popped into existence from...not a thing.

I’d like to respond to this. Mostly for the digital archeologists who will find this in the far, far future. (like in five years :-)

I would agree that we (theists and philosophers who think about this stuff) say that every thing pops into existence from not a thing. I have no problem with that. I am not saying stuff pops into existence from nothing, though.

If we call “thing” as something from this universe, e.g. quantum foam, rocks, lizards, gravitational fields, then no, God is not a thing. God is spirit. We can think of our own spirit since we know it best. Spirit is that in us by which we know and love. Our body knows nothing. It loves nothing. Bodily pleasures are not even enjoyed by the body. It does react physically to them, but it is the knowing mind that enjoys the reactions or doesn’t.

So, yes. All things in the universe popped into existence from an eternal spirit. They have to come from somewhere. The universe can’t come from itself. Further, this source from outside the universe has to be eternal, that is has no beginning (or end). As before, if it has a beginning, then what created it?

That does not mean the eternal spirit is the Christian God. I am not making that leap here.

(January 27, 2024 at 11:15 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote: That's why this argument fails.  Not on any item of disputable fact - it's worse, the form of the argument (natch) is faulty.  You could plug in nothing but absolute facts and it still wouldn't be informative....but that's christianity for you.  

I concur. Without the concept of spirit, the argument falls apart.

TGN,

(January 27, 2024 at 11:15 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote: Which is not, in point of fact, anything to do with the god of classical theology.  

I’m missing something. Why does this (the argument?) not have anything to do with the god of classical theology? What am I missing in what you’re saying?

(January 27, 2024 at 8:37 am)Belacqua Wrote:

(January 26, 2024 at 4:53 pm)SimpleCaveman Wrote: And then we have to ask if thing is a defining quality of A (we don’t have to call it god), what does it mean to be a thing? Keeping in the same line as before, I take thing to mean something of this universe whether it’s quantum foam or latte foam. If that’s not what TGN meant, then I may need to adjust my statements. 

This is always a surprisingly tricky question when we're talking about the God of classical theology. "Thing" turns out to be a pretty fuzzy concept. Certainly God, in that tradition, is not said to be a thing in the same way that rocks and lizards are things. Nor is he a thing in the same way that heat waves or gravitational fields are things. 

I think we get nearer the mark when we start to ask whether goodness or justice are things. Or, as you say, whether being is a thing. 

My guess is that a lot of people get mislead by the idea of God being a thing -- they may assume this means he's one of the things we could list if we listed up all the other things in the universe. But I think this would be an error. As they say, "God and the universe do not make two." 

Quote:There is truth in theists not being able to adequately define god. Though I am a theist, I am trying to not come at this from that perspective but keeping it philosophical. (Or, at best, pop-philosophical)

It seems to me that this issue was pretty much dealt with by Plato. 

He makes it clear that the Forms are ideal and therefore not definable by the human mind. His whole schtick is that he challenges someone to define something we all know about -- like justice -- and demonstrating that no definition we can come up with is satisfactory. We know about things like goodness and justice, but no single definition is available for any of them. Some of the most important things in life are not definable. And of course this thinking is imported into Christian theology early on. No definition which the human mind can conceive of will adequately define a thing which exists only in the ideal. 

But Plato also teaches us how to do dialectic, as a way (I think) of talking in enough different ways about the indefinable thing that we can in fact improve our knowledge of it. This is partly by forcing ourselves to articulate our pre-conceptions -- a practice which often shows how inadequate those are. And of course being challenged by others forces us to rethink.

Good job...going back to remove the snarky remark.  Bel you are such a fraud...and so damned predictable.

(January 27, 2024 at 12:28 pm)SimpleCaveman Wrote: Good Morning, All,

Happy weekend!

(January 27, 2024 at 11:15 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote: It doesn't make any difference no matter how we concieve of it.  If, for example, we propose that god is not a thing..then every thing still popped into existence from...not a thing.

I’d like to respond to this. Mostly for the digital archeologists who will find this in the far, far future. (like in five years :-)

I would agree that we (theists and philosophers who think about this stuff) say that every thing pops into existence from not a thing. I have no problem with that. I am not saying stuff pops into existence from nothing, though.

If we call “thing” as something from this universe, e.g. quantum foam, rocks, lizards, gravitational fields, then no, God is not a thing. God is spirit. We can think of our own spirit since we know it best. Spirit is that in us by which we know and love. Our body knows nothing. It loves nothing. Bodily pleasures are not even enjoyed by the body. It does react physically to them, but it is the knowing mind that enjoys the reactions or doesn’t.

So, yes. All things in the universe popped into existence from an eternal spirit. They have to come from somewhere. The universe can’t come from itself. Further, this source from outside the universe has to be eternal, that is has no beginning (or end). As before, if it has a beginning, then what created it?

That does not mean the eternal spirit is the Christian God. I am not making that leap here.

(January 27, 2024 at 11:15 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote: That's why this argument fails.  Not on any item of disputable fact - it's worse, the form of the argument (natch) is faulty.  You could plug in nothing but absolute facts and it still wouldn't be informative....but that's christianity for you.  

I concur. Without the concept of spirit, the argument falls apart.

TGN,

(January 27, 2024 at 11:15 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote: Which is not, in point of fact, anything to do with the god of classical theology.  

I’m missing something. Why does this (the argument?) not have anything to do with the god of classical theology? What am I missing in what you’re saying?

I’m unclear about the difference between ‘nothing’ and ‘not a thing’. Smells an awful lot like special pleading.

Boru

(January 27, 2024 at 10:54 am)emjay Wrote: And does that satisfy you? 

That's an interesting question. I hadn't thought of all this in terms of my personal satisfaction. 

I know from reading lots of things that these are basic themes in theology and philosophy, so it makes sense that anyone interested in those fields would look into them. 

Quote:Even if you or classical theology are not comfortable thinking of God as a material thing it's still presumably to you not-nothing? If so, then for me, they're tantamount to the same thing; why, and how, is there something not nothing, is to me the same core question as why, and how, is there not-nothing not nothing, so to speak. So in whatever über sense you mean God is above and beyond the material world, whether in a Platonic forms sort of way or something else, that's still not a distinction that makes any difference from my point of view, to the core question of how any non-nothing/thing can either arise from nothing or exist eternally.

Yes, I think it would be a mistake to get bogged down on issues of modern English usage. Whether the word "thing" can refer to Platonic Forms or not isn't really the problem. 

If there are such things as Platonic Forms, they are generally not knowable through the senses. But I would have no trouble with a sentence like "You can't know about those things in the way that you know about rocks and lizards." 

I guess my point is just that whatever kind of thing a Platonic Form is -- or what God is -- we have to be careful not to treat it as something that would necessarily be definable, quantifiable, or locatable in space. For millennia, those are not characteristics attributed to them. 

At the moment I'm reading Plato and Dialectic, by Rush Rhees. This guy worked closely with Wittgenstein, so he's not someone who's stuck in the past. So far in the book he hasn't said anything about what a God would be like, but he does accept that there are aspects of the world that cannot be spoken of adequately in human language. He finds Plato's approach to be relevant and useful here.

(January 27, 2024 at 7:26 pm)Belacqua Wrote:

(January 27, 2024 at 10:54 am)emjay Wrote: And does that satisfy you? 

That's an interesting question. I hadn't thought of all this in terms of my personal satisfaction. 

I know from reading lots of things that these are basic themes in theology and philosophy, so it makes sense that anyone interested in those fields would look into them. 

Quote:Even if you or classical theology are not comfortable thinking of God as a material thing it's still presumably to you not-nothing? If so, then for me, they're tantamount to the same thing; why, and how, is there something not nothing, is to me the same core question as why, and how, is there not-nothing not nothing, so to speak. So in whatever über sense you mean God is above and beyond the material world, whether in a Platonic forms sort of way or something else, that's still not a distinction that makes any difference from my point of view, to the core question of how any non-nothing/thing can either arise from nothing or exist eternally.

Yes, I think it would be a mistake to get bogged down on issues of modern English usage. Whether the word "thing" can refer to Platonic Forms or not isn't really the problem. 

If there are such things as Platonic Forms, they are generally not knowable through the senses. But I would have no trouble with a sentence like "You can't know about those things in the way that you know about rocks and lizards." 

I guess my point is just that whatever kind of thing a Platonic Form is -- or what God is -- we have to be careful not to treat it as something that would necessarily be definable, quantifiable, or locatable in space. For millennia, those are not characteristics attributed to them. 

At the moment I'm reading Plato and Dialectic, by Rush Rhees. This guy worked closely with Wittgenstein, so he's not someone who's stuck in the past. So far in the book he hasn't said anything about what a God would be like, but he does accept that there are aspects of the world that cannot be spoken of adequately in human language. He finds Plato's approach to be relevant and useful here.

Right, well it's in that overarching, comparative sense you've described that a 'thing' is meaningful to my own questions of why, and how, something not nothing. So I'm asking 'how can any 'thing', regardless of type or even kind, material, immaterial, knowable or unknowable etc, come into existence from nothing or exist eternally?'. Call this question 1.

Whereas the question from theology would seem to be different, more like 'how can one type/kind of thing - material things - come into existence from nothing or exist eternally?' and with the answer given 'by being created by another type/kind of thing - unknowable, spiritual, Platonic etc - that does come into existence from nothing or exist eternally'. Call this question 2.

From my perspective then, question 2, and its answer, is not satisfactory in the slightest because it does not address question 1 in the slightest. So I was basically asking if question 2, and its answer, is wholly satisfactory to you, and if so, why you and theology in general seem to have no interest whatsoever in question 1 (correct me if I'm wrong)? To me, question 2 is at best kicking the can on some questions, but not the key questions, and at worst, a red herring.

(January 26, 2024 at 8:32 am)neil Wrote:

(January 24, 2024 at 8:08 am)Gwaithmir Wrote: Let God move the needle on my Yo, God! Detector.

Does it work on similar principles as an EMF ghost sensor?

No, it doesn't operate on batteries. The needle can only move by a god's divine power. I purchased this device over 15 years ago. The needle hasn't moved. 

(January 21, 2024 at 12:01 pm)Ahriman Wrote:

(January 21, 2024 at 11:30 am)Gwaithmir Wrote: I always get a chuckle when theists presume to know what I'm thinking. You don't know me. You don't know about my educational background, prior religious beliefs or how I came to be an atheist. Your statement is puerile. Grow up! Present your credentials as a qualified clairvoyant and I'll take it seriously.

I don't need to know any of that. And being "clairvoyant" doesn't mean reading people's minds.

I also find it amusing how theists resort to splitting hairs when they're called out on groundless claims. Again, Ahriman, you're exhibiting puerile behavior. Grow up and admit you don't know what you're talking about.

(January 28, 2024 at 7:17 am)emjay Wrote:

(January 27, 2024 at 7:26 pm)Belacqua Wrote: That's an interesting question. I hadn't thought of all this in terms of my personal satisfaction. 

I know from reading lots of things that these are basic themes in theology and philosophy, so it makes sense that anyone interested in those fields would look into them. 


Yes, I think it would be a mistake to get bogged down on issues of modern English usage. Whether the word "thing" can refer to Platonic Forms or not isn't really the problem. 

If there are such things as Platonic Forms, they are generally not knowable through the senses. But I would have no trouble with a sentence like "You can't know about those things in the way that you know about rocks and lizards." 

I guess my point is just that whatever kind of thing a Platonic Form is -- or what God is -- we have to be careful not to treat it as something that would necessarily be definable, quantifiable, or locatable in space. For millennia, those are not characteristics attributed to them. 

At the moment I'm reading Plato and Dialectic, by Rush Rhees. This guy worked closely with Wittgenstein, so he's not someone who's stuck in the past. So far in the book he hasn't said anything about what a God would be like, but he does accept that there are aspects of the world that cannot be spoken of adequately in human language. He finds Plato's approach to be relevant and useful here.

Right, well it's in that overarching, comparative sense you've described that a 'thing' is meaningful to my own questions of why, and how, something not nothing. So I'm asking 'how can any 'thing', regardless of type or even kind, material, immaterial, knowable or unknowable etc, come into existence from nothing or exist eternally?'. Call this question 1.

Whereas the question from theology would seem to be different, more like 'how can one type/kind of thing - material things - come into existence from nothing or exist eternally?' and with the answer given 'by being created by another type/kind of thing - unknowable, spiritual, Platonic etc - that does come into existence from nothing or exist eternally'. Call this question 2.

From my perspective then, question 2, and its answer, is not satisfactory in the slightest because it does not address question 1 in the slightest. So I was basically asking if question 2, and its answer, is wholly satisfactory to you, and if so, why you and theology in general seem to have no interest whatsoever in question 1 (correct me if I'm wrong)? To me, question 2 is at best kicking the can on some questions, but not the key questions, and at worst, a red herring.

Well, gee -- you're only asking the biggest and most difficult metaphysical questions ever asked. There may be people who can give concise and persuasive answers to these, but I don't think I'm one of them. 

One way we might want to approach it is through act and potency. Or actualization and potentiality, in more modern terms. 

God is perfect actualization with no potential. Prime matter, in which no actualization has taken place, is entirely potential. So here we're not talking about spirit vs. matter, or mind vs. physical stuff. There aren't two types, there is only a continuum. One end is potential with no actualization, the other end is pure actualization with no potential. 

The way they explain it is that for completely unactualized potential to begin to actualize, it must be actualized by something which is already more actualized. Prime matter, which has no form or function, needs to be acted upon in order to become more than prime matter. But prime matter is just unactualized potential, not something globby and shapeless like clay. It's not really possible for us to picture prime matter in our minds, because we will always imagine something stuff-like. 

Anything which is at any level of part-potential and part-actuality (like you and me and rocks and lizards) is acted upon by something else in order to increase its actualization. At the end of this causal chain is the thing which is all act and no potency -- God. The thing which is all act and no potency (God) must always have existed because there is nothing of greater actualization which could cause it to exist. For anything at all to rise up from the level of pure potency (prime matter) this God must exist. So in this system, God never came into being. This is a fundamental point in classical theology.

There cannot have been another being before this God, because only one thing can be actus purus. If there were a more actualized being acting on God, then the God that's acted upon isn't actus purus, and therefore isn't really God. 

There was never a time when the actus purus -- full actualization -- didn't exist. This is because, as Augustine pointed out, it doesn't make sense to speak of time if there are no things to be in motion. Just as there was no time before the Big Bang, it doesn't make sense to ask what God was doing before he began the actualization of potency. 

As actus purus, with no potentiality, God doesn't act in the world, or create it, by reaching down and changing things. He takes no actions and undergoes no changes. Nonetheless he causes all things to happen because all potentiality in the world actualizes due to the existence of the already-actualized thing. 

So I guess if we call act and potency things, then things have always existed. If, on the other hand, we think of the beginning of the world as the point at which prime matter began to take on form, then we could say that the world had a starting point. 

As with all thumbnail explanations like this one, I'm not expecting it to persuade anybody. Each sentence that I've typed would need to be explicated more fully to be in any way persuasive. 

Nor am I arguing that this must be true, or that I believe it has to be true, or that anyone here should believe it. I am reporting what classical theology says.

(January 28, 2024 at 8:17 am)Gwaithmir Wrote:

(January 26, 2024 at 8:32 am)neil Wrote: Does it work on similar principles as an EMF ghost sensor?

No, it doesn't operate on batteries. The needle can only move by a god's divine power. I purchased this device over 15 years ago. The needle hasn't moved. 

How much does it cost, adjusting for inflation?

(January 28, 2024 at 9:02 am)neil Wrote:

(January 28, 2024 at 8:17 am)Gwaithmir Wrote: No, it doesn't operate on batteries. The needle can only move by a god's divine power. I purchased this device over 15 years ago. The needle hasn't moved. 

How much does it cost, adjusting for inflation?

You can simply print it on paper because it would be no problem for god to move a needle on a picture of a clock-like device.