Sam Harris On Defining Consciousness

[The Grand Nudger]

If you are trying to judge consciousness in others, then their behavior is your best bet, I guess, though there's that original "pragmatic" assumption always hiding behind the curtain like the Wizard of Oz-- that your observations are at least a reasonable representation of an underlying objective reality.  If you are trying to define what consciousness IS and why it exists, then none of that matters, unless you can see others' qualia.

Your own observations, of your own qualia, are in no better a shape.  They are that very -same- pragmatic assumption, made by that very same apparatus- whatever it is-.   

Demanding this criterion basically says, "Whatever is a mystery must be redefined so it no longer sounds like a mystery."  Redefinition for a science lab is great.  You can get your Conscio-matic 3000 to watch things and decide whether they are interacting with the environment.  But that has nothing to do with the philosophical point of interest, IMO.

Again, no redefinition has occurred.  When we say that something is conscious, we are saying that it is aware.  We determine that something is aware by response to it's environment.  Your point of interest is qualia.  In making a statement about consciousness, limited as I try to keep myself, I'm not, necessarily, making any statement about qualia, let alone the entirety of the human experience, as I make clear in every post.

 

It depends what you are aware of, and what you mean by awareness.  Is this just adding another word into the mix for the semantic shell-game?  I'd say that the awareness you are talking about still has an associate qualia: what it's like to be aware of things.

This is the definition I've used for conscious since the beginning, I'm adding no extra semantical anything Ben.  It's a definition you'll find if you google the word, and it's what we mean when we say that something is conscious.  Just -what- you are aware of is exactly why we have the terms conscious -and- self conscious.  A creature may be aware of it's environment, but not itself.  We use a mirror test to try to determine that.  It's crude, but it's something.  What it's like to be aware "from the inside" of any given creature, or how that presents itself as an experience to the "owner"...is qualia.  Three terms, already, because there is a distinction between each.  There are more.

But, if you insist that awareness and qualia cannot be separated, that there cannot be awareness without qualia, that if we see awareness there -must- be qualia.... I'll insist that this means that qualia is indeed demonstrable. I'll also insist that machine awareness then must also have machine qualia. That last bits a strange one for me, since I don't actually think that all machines which are aware of their environment are candidates for qualia...nor do you, if I recall....but in order to remain consistent.......

It's only evidence because you operationalize the definitions to allow what you can observe to serve as evidence.  That's not evidence of the actual capacity for experience that most people would call consciousness-- it is avoidance.

As opposed to what I -can't- observe being evidence?  We go with what we've got man.   

Okay, that was really a rhetorical statement.  The science of mind, of AI, of robots, etc. is very interesting.  And I understand that in that context, the word "conscious" as you define it is pragmatic.  But I won't stand by and allow that definition to be conflated with the kind of consciousness that humans (and presumably other living things) have, because while you certainly can watch both living and non-living things to see how they interact with the environment, it seems very likely to me that all non-living things that you say are conscious are philosophical zombies at best.

You don't have to stand by and watch anyone conflate that, and I certainly haven't been.  I am conscious, self conscious, sentient, sapient.  I experience qualia.....the list could go on and on, narrowing in on a fuller description of what it;s like to be a -human being-. The list of non-living things I would consider candidates for conscious -alone-...even without all the other stuff, is very, very short. It's comprised of only those things which satisfy the test we use to determine that a living thing is conscious. They may be philosophical zombies, but so may be many living things. What it's "like" to be an earthworm..may be nothing at all. That may sound strange, to you, as a creature with a sense of self, thinking "It's like this to be me. It's like this to experience awareness".....but an earthworm may not have any correlate to that. There are plenty of animals that might not. Very few pass the mirror test. That sort of "experience of awareness" might not be all that common, even though awareness itself seems to be.

[Angrboda]

While slow delta brain waves occur during sleepwalking, it has also been found that there is a significant amount of high oscillation waves, just like in people who are fully awake. Sleepwalkers have their eyes open: They can see their environment but not consciously. While sleepwalkers are in a state of deep sleep, the part of the brain in charge of motion is awake. Only the part of the brain that correlates with awareness and cognition remains asleep. Sleepwalkers are essentially awake and asleep at the same time. As the cortex, which is the part of the brain that controls thinking and voluntary movement, is asleep during slow wave sleep, the movements sleepwalkers make are controlled by other parts of the brain and are more or less reflexive.

https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the...ep-killing

It's inconclusive, but there appears to be support that you can be aware but not conscious as I suggested.

[Angrboda]

This is the definition I've used for conscious since the beginning, I'm adding no extra semantical anything Ben.  It's a definition you'll find if you google the word, and it's what we mean when we say that something is conscious.  Just -what- you are aware of is exactly why we have the terms conscious -and- self conscious.  

This may simply be an artifact of old philosophical baggage. The soul or mind has been presumed for a long time to be an accurate reflection of perception. That what's in the mind is simply a 'copy' of what's out there. But what if that assumption is wrong? Dictionary definitions are fine for scrabble but not for settling philosophical or empirical questions.

I also see a problem in using behavior to settle the question of what is conscious. It's over-inclusive. It can't differentiate between things that appear conscious because they have a repertoire of unconscious behaviors that mimics awareness and behaviors that are indeed motivated by awareness. From the outside, you can't tell if there is any 'inside' there. You seem to be striving on a two-pronged semantic game: removing the conscious from consciousness on one side, while debasing what is needed to demonstrate consciousness on the other. It may settle an argument but it won't settle the question. It's just a game with words.

[The Grand Nudger]

If I see two things doing some "x" I can't differentiate, and attribute that "x" to awareness for one of them.....saying that the other is not aware, in spite of my inability to differentiate and the presence of that very same "x", removes the justification for accepting awareness in the first. May as well flip a coin or decide on the basis of nothing at all.  Not that this makes it any less possible that one really is aware and the other is not, agreed....but it has nothing to do with semantics,nor is it any more (or less) a game of words than any other philosophical statement. Again, as mentioned many times, whether or not something appears to be aware, and whether or not theres an "in there" can be (and I think should be) handled separately. It's not as though we're suffering under any shortage of terms, specificity and division is useful if it's knowledge you're looking for.

I'm perfectly fine with accepting the possibility that whats in the mind may not be a copy of whats "out there". In many cases it seems that we can demonstrate this to be so. Is that a problem for any particular notion in a way that it isn't a problem for -every- notion?

What is there to debase here, and how might I debase it? I've stated -very- clearly what I mean, I've acknowledged that no matter what argument I offer, no matter how compelling or complete, it makes no comment upon whatever other thing it is you feel is not contained within my self imposed limits, whatever thing you think it is that I'm debasing. Whats the problem?

I have to get this out of the way, because it's been coming up repeatedly in thread. When these discussions turn to terms like dignity and debasement.....I can only say "well, that's like, your opinion, man". I see no debasement, I see no impact on dignity, if you do, you do.....and that's fine, but is that supposed to mean something to me? Consciousness is neither less dignified, nor debased...to me....if it's just tumblers in a lock, and I don't see why there's any requirement that I defend any dignity or loss thereof perceived by another, why I should be concerned with what some other feels is debasement. Neither has -any- bearing on the accuracy of an explanation.

[AFTT47]

I despise these arguments. I just don't feel equipped for them. I got into this when I was a new member (under 30-30 guy) and bennyboy was one of the people who frustrated the hell out of me. Now, I'm on his side.

Rhythm, I respect you as a good, logically-consistent debater but you're looking like a kook to me here.

I get that in the current environment, it's up to the individual to define consciousness. But your definition based on action strikes me as ridiculous. It's ridiculously easy to write a program who's actions will fool people into thinking it's conscious. Eliza is a famous example. My wife likes to joke about the time she had a go with a Eliza. Eliza said, "You seem to feel intense." She replied, "In tents is where Arabs sleep." It's a joke but as you can imagine, Eliza would have choked on that badly. It's possible of course to program a much more sophisticated search algorithm into Eliza that might make sense of that remark and recognize it as humor. I think I could write such a program myself and I wouldn't categorize myself as anything more than an intermediate-level programmer. It might be pretty convincing to the average person based on it's actions but do you really think such an Eliza 23.0 or whatever is actually aware of its existence, that it would feel terror as you reached for the computer off switch?

That's what we're talking about here. When we say, "consciousness," we're talking about something that feels its own existence, values it and is terrified of losing it - just like you and me. We're not talking about some relatively simple construct which can mimic the behavior of such.

[IATIA]

That's news to me. I'd love to see someone demonstrate that an earthworm is conscious.

Can you demonstrate that anything is conscious?

[AFTT47]

I despise these arguments. I just don't feel equipped for them. I got into this when I was a new member (under 30-30 guy) and bennyboy was one of the people who frustrated the hell out of me. Now, I'm on his side.

Rhythm, I respect you as a good, logically-consistent debater but you're looking like a kook to me here.

I get that in the current environment, it's up to the individual to define consciousness. But your definition based on action strikes me as ridiculous. It's ridiculously easy to write a program who's actions will fool people into thinking it's conscious. Eliza is a famous example. My wife likes to joke about the time she had a go with Eliza. Eliza said, "You seem to feel intense." She replied, "In tents is where Arabs sleep." It's a joke but as you can imagine, Eliza would have choked on that badly. It's possible of course to program a much more sophisticated search algorithm into Eliza that might make sense of that remark and recognize it as humor. I think I could write such a program myself and I wouldn't categorize myself as anything more than an intermediate-level programmer. It might be pretty convincing to the average person based on its actions but do you really think such an Eliza 23.0 or whatever is actually aware of its existence, that it would feel terror as you reached for the computer off switch?

That's what we're talking about here. When we say, "consciousness," we're talking about something that feels its own existence, values it and is terrified of losing it - just like you and me. We're not talking about some relatively simple construct which can mimic the behavior of such.

[IATIA]

I have yet to get through this thread, so if I am being redundant, Eh .. been there, done that.

IMHO anything alive, is aware and anything with a brain, is conscious. Plants demonstrate survival tactics and co-operation. Planarians can be taught to run mazes.

[AFTT47]

That's news to me. I'd love to see someone demonstrate that an earthworm is conscious.

Can you demonstrate that anything is conscious?

No. The best I can do is point to the fact that we can modify feeling and behavior with drugs in a predictable fashion. That suggests to me that consciousness is a byproduct of processes of the physical brain. But I don't know how it works as there is no theory of chemistry or electromagnetism that can account for those processes resulting in consciousness. I can observe that a human being seems a lot more with it than an iguana which in turn demonstrates more intelligence than a roach. But I cannot say where the critical threshold is which is the minimum bar for consciousness. I can only observe that the brain of an earthworm is so simple, we have mapped the entire thing and we can see how it works. The functionality is simplistic, a simple search algorithm. If that is conscious, what to heck isn't?

[The Grand Nudger]

I get that in the current environment, it's up to the individual to define consciousness. But your definition based on action strikes me as ridiculous.

I define conscious as " being aware" - I -test- for awareness by using action, response, and that's not just how I test it........

It's ridiculously easy to write a program who's actions will fool people into thinking it's conscious. Eliza is a famous example. My wife likes to joke about the time she had a go with a Eliza. Eliza said, "You seem to feel intense." She replied, "In tents is where Arabs sleep." It's a joke but as you can imagine, Eliza would have choked on that badly.

-as would many human beings.......

It's possible of course to program a much more sophisticated search algorithm into Eliza that might make sense of that remark and recognize it as humor. I think I could write such a program myself and I wouldn't categorize myself as anything more than an intermediate-level programmer. It might be pretty convincing to the average person based on it's actions but do you really think such an Eliza 23.0 or whatever is actually aware of its existence, that it would feel terror as you reached for the computer off switch?

I don't know if it's aware of it's own existence,but that would be -self consciousnous-.  On the grounds you've provided and nothing else, I'd say no, it doesn't seem to be aware of it's own existence.  There are many things that don't seem to be aware of their own existence, most of the animals we've tested for that don't seem to be, or if they are, we can't tell. Regardless, most of them are conscious, or at least seem to be.

That's what we're talking about here. When we say, "consciousness," we're talking about something that feels its own existence, values it and is terrified of losing it - just like you and me. We're not talking about some relatively simple construct which can mimic the behavior of such.

There's a better, more specific term for something that is aware of it's own existence, rather than just it's surroundings.  Self conscious.  Theres a better, more specific term for valuing existence and being terrified..sentience.

That something is conscious does not mean that it is self conscious, or sentient. My calling something conscious is not calling them those other two. If I sound like a kook on any of this it;s because you;re either unfamiliar with these terms..or you've ignored the -many- posts in which I've made that crystal clear. If a person insists on lumping all of these things together, they're going to have trouble discussing them with any specificity. Theyre going to have trouble seperating problems with one, with problems with another. They're going to have trouble distinguishing, for example...between a worm, Eliza, and a human being logically and consistently in this context. It's trouble -of their own making- not trouble with the concepts or terms.

Computational models offer an explanation, btw, ATT. We aren't completely in the dark as to how a brain (or any structure) might produce these things we call experience. We just don't know if that's how -we- do it. As far as earthworms go, they're conscious by any measure we use to judge it in any other creature, or ourselves. That doesn't make them any of those other things, and there's still a long list of things that aren't conscious.