My thoughts on the Hard problem of consciousness

[emjay]

Analytic philosophy is generally concerned about the logical structures and relationships within language and then views every other problem through that lens. In practical terms it can deal with problems about beings but not being-as-such. It can look into the contents of consciousness but not consciousness-as-such. I would summarize classical philosophy as talking about truth and analytic philosophy as talking about talking about truth. Then again, I am not an expert on the foundational philosophers like Frege. My focus is elsewhere. I am a conscious being in a phenomenal world. The two are inextricably linked. Everything else, like trying to alienate one from the other (or not), is interpretation.

Can you give an example of what you mean by your first sentence? I roughly get what you mean about the third person objectivity stuff. I would say though that personally I try to understand both beings and being-as-such, but I do think I understand what you mean about the basically indirect, interpretational approach. But I think I'm too far down that particular rabbit hole to ever come out and see consciousness in truly 'naive' terms again; yes neuroscience is indirect knowledge but nonetheless, I can't forget what it has taught me about how I think, and how 'flawed' thinking can be (eg bias... from a neuroscience perspective, an inherent part of how the brain works... for pattern completion etc... that sacrifices accuracy for speed) so going Descartes and trying to go back to first principles... what is knowledge, what is truth, what can I trust... is not as simple as that for me... I can't just turn it off because it directly conflicts with the sorts of conclusions I might come to without it. That said, I do want to do that with my course... go back to first principles as much as possible... after all it is philosophy and a different type of thinking to psychology... but just saying that it is hard because of this neuroscience perspective that is woven into the way I think. But anyway, thanks for the tip... I'll look up Frege to see what foundational philosophy is all about

[Neo-Scholastic]

Analytic philosophy is generally concerned about the logical structures and relationships within language and then views every other problem through that lens. In practical terms it can deal with problems about beings but not being-as-such. It can look into the contents of consciousness but not consciousness-as-such. I would summarize classical philosophy as talking about truth and analytic philosophy as talking about talking about truth. Then again, I am not an expert on the foundational philosophers like Frege. My focus is elsewhere. I am a conscious being in a phenomenal world. The two are inextricably linked. Everything else, like trying to alienate one from the other (or not), is interpretation.

Can you give an example of what you mean by your first sentence? I roughly get what you mean about the third person objectivity stuff. I would say though that personally I try to understand both beings and being-as-such, but I do think I understand what you mean about the basically indirect, interpretational approach. But I think I'm too far down that particular rabbit hole to ever come out and see consciousness in truly 'naive' terms again; yes neuroscience is indirect knowledge but nonetheless, I can't forget what it has taught me about how I think, and how 'flawed' thinking can be (eg bias... from a neuroscience perspective, an inherent part of how the brain works... for pattern completion etc... that sacrifices accuracy for speed) so going Descartes and trying to go back to first principles... what is knowledge, what is truth, what can I trust... is not as simple as that for me... I can't just turn it off because it directly conflicts with the sorts of conclusions I might come to without it. That said, I do want to do that with my course... go back to first principles as much as possible... after all it is philosophy and a different type of thinking to psychology... but just saying that it is hard because of this neuroscience perspective that is woven into the way I think. But anyway, thanks for the tip... I'll look up Frege to see what foundational philosophy is all about

Well again, I'm not an expert on the entire anglo-american tradition so my attempt to summarize something so vast is bound to be a bit rough. An example of the first sentence is a stereotypical question like "What does meaning mean?"

I'll right more later....

[emjay]

Can you give an example of what you mean by your first sentence? I roughly get what you mean about the third person objectivity stuff. I would say though that personally I try to understand both beings and being-as-such, but I do think I understand what you mean about the basically indirect, interpretational approach. But I think I'm too far down that particular rabbit hole to ever come out and see consciousness in truly 'naive' terms again; yes neuroscience is indirect knowledge but nonetheless, I can't forget what it has taught me about how I think, and how 'flawed' thinking can be (eg bias... from a neuroscience perspective, an inherent part of how the brain works... for pattern completion etc... that sacrifices accuracy for speed) so going Descartes and trying to go back to first principles... what is knowledge, what is truth, what can I trust... is not as simple as that for me... I can't just turn it off because it directly conflicts with the sorts of conclusions I might come to without it. That said, I do want to do that with my course... go back to first principles as much as possible... after all it is philosophy and a different type of thinking to psychology... but just saying that it is hard because of this neuroscience perspective that is woven into the way I think. But anyway, thanks for the tip... I'll look up Frege to see what foundational philosophy is all about

Well again, I'm not an expert on the entire anglo-american tradition so my attempt to summarize something so vast is bound to be a bit rough. An example of the first sentence is a stereotypical question like "What does meaning mean?"

I'll right more later....

Oh, right... so that's what you meant before about my philosophy course being Analytic Philosophy?... not exactly what does meaning mean, but the whole first section being Epistemology... what is knowledge etc. I gotta say, I love those sorts of questions... I'm no more in my element than when I'm trying to define something or drill down into its inner workings, looking for the essence (not your sort of essence ). Anyway, sorry, I didn't mean to sound pushy... it's just you've brought it up a few times, so I wanted to be sure what you were talking about... but (obviously) you don't have to write more if you don't want to... I think I've got the gist... thank you

[bennyboy]

@Benny, as the closest thing to an idealist around these parts what's your view on the correlation between neuroscience and your own subjective experience? How does something you presumably still consider external, come to affect how you actually experience? Ie how does a 'stable' idea 'out there' come to affect how you actually experience ideas of 'out there' and 'in here' from the subjective perspective?

In whatever world view you choose, unless you take the external world as a complete illusion, you will have to reconcile the subjective and objective into a single framework, which is no easy task.  I'm not an idealist, but I don't think any idealist is arguing that brains don't exist, or that they don't matter to our experiences.

I'd actually like to start with a material world-view and work from there.  In this view, all our experiences are symbolized before we experience them, and are encoded in brain function.  So one view is that the brain is an active agent, which kind of absorbs information, processes it, and subjectively experiences part of that process.

However, we can flip-flop between objects and their properties as brute fact (materialism) and objects as the expression of immaterial formative principles (idealism) in tracing the history that led to our qualia.  For example, the brain, a thing, is the expression of an idea-- "brain" as encoded in DNA.  The DNA is a merging of formative principles which themselves are a record of the genetic history of two individuals.  Ultimately, these go back (we believe) to a primordial soup: a multitude of organic molecules interacting in liquid water with energy provided from the sun and/or geothermal venting.

How do those molecules have the capacity to interact?  Are they objects with properties that allow them to interact, or are they better seen as the expression of formative principles-- physical rules and so on, which are not themselves "stuff"?  We can only observe objects and their properties scientifically, since science is intrinsically objective.  However, it seems that for any object, no matter how refined, there must be some formative principles which provide the framework in which it may be said to exist-- and those are called "ideas."

That's the idealistic view-- not that there are no brains, but that everything is rooted in formative principles which are themselves neither materials nor properties of materials-- and these principles underly time, space, and everything in them.  Brains are the expression of a tremendous chain of layered ideas interacting with each other over billions of years.  Brain function, then, is ideas interacting with other ideas.

I know all this doesn't answer your question: I show how you can reconcile brain function and qualia in an idealistic world view, but not HOW the brain allows for qualia. That's because qualia is a big freaking mystery no matter what world view you try to examine it in.


(sorry if too long I tried to be as concise as possible)

[emjay]

@Benny, as the closest thing to an idealist around these parts ;-) what's your view on the correlation between neuroscience and your own subjective experience? How does something you presumably still consider external, come to affect how you actually experience? Ie how does a 'stable' idea 'out there' come to affect how you actually experience ideas of 'out there' and 'in here' from the subjective perspective?

In whatever world view you choose, unless you take the external world as a complete illusion, you will have to reconcile the subjective and objective into a single framework, which is no easy task.  I'm not an idealist, but I don't think any idealist is arguing that brains don't exist, or that they don't matter to our experiences.

Tell me about it especially in the case of the clockwork universe vs subjective 'choice' in the moment and the subjective paradoxes it seems to create. I read about one person's solution... I believe her name is Susan Blackmore, author of a book called 'Conversations on Consciousness'; she takes the extreme step of referring to herself all the time in the third person ie 'she did this, she did that' rather than 'I did this, I did that'. I think that's taking it a bit far... we are what we are, and what we are includes a first person perspective. As to the idealist position, I'll have to take that on faith for now, cos it's not at all clear to me what exactly an idealist thinks, even with this post of yours. But getting there

I'd actually like to start with a material world-view and work from there.  In this view, all our experiences are symbolized before we experience them, and are encoded in brain function.  So one view is that the brain is an active agent, which kind of absorbs information, processes it, and subjectively experiences part of that process.

However, we can flip-flop between objects and their properties as brute fact (materialism) and objects as the expression of immaterial formative principles (idealism) in tracing the history that led to our qualia.  For example, the brain, a thing, is the expression of an idea-- "brain" as encoded in DNA.  The DNA is a merging of formative principles which themselves are a record of the genetic history of two individuals.  Ultimately, these go back (we believe) to a primordial soup: a multitude of organic molecules interacting in liquid water with energy provided from the sun and/or geothermal venting.

How do those molecules have the capacity to interact?  Are they objects with properties that allow them to interact, or are they better seen as the expression of formative principles-- physical rules and so on, which are not themselves "stuff"?  We can only observe objects and their properties scientifically, since science is intrinsically objective.  However, it seems that for any object, no matter how refined, there must be some formative principles which provide the framework in which it may be said to exist-- and those are called "ideas."

I'm sorry to say, you're losing me with all this   So your view is a kind of materialistic/idealistic hybrid? Okay, 'immaterial formative principles'... 'physical rules' etc... those are 'ideas' to an idealist? How is that different from a materialist accepting physical laws of the universe, like gravity etc? I thought idealism simply referred to the qualia... the opposite of realism. I'm really sorry but it's just not making the slightest bit of sense to me, not even enough to know what sort of questions to ask to clarify it What would a neuron be? an idea? an immaterial formative principle (in the sense that it is the ultimate functional building block of the brain, just as a gate is in an electronic circuit)?

That's the idealistic view-- not that there are no brains, but that everything is rooted in formative principles which are themselves neither materials nor properties of materials-- and these principles underly time, space, and everything in them.  Brains are the expression of a tremendous chain of layered ideas interacting with each other over billions of years.  Brain function, then, is ideas interacting with other ideas.

Well, I hope to understand it better at some point, but you had me at 'layered' From that perspective, there is an appeal because that's what evolution is really... layers and layers of slow but sure development. Is there any particular idealist that inspires you or is this all you?  

I know all this doesn't answer your question: I show how you can reconcile brain function and qualia in an idealistic world view, but not HOW the brain allows for qualia.  That's because qualia is a big freaking mystery no matter what world view you try to examine it in.

(sorry if too long I tried to be as concise as possible)

No worries It answers some of my questions   But asks a lot more  

[bennyboy]

I'm sorry to say, you're losing me with all this   So your view is a kind of materialistic/idealistic hybrid? Okay, 'immaterial formative principles'... 'physical rules' etc... those are 'ideas' to an idealist? How is that different from a materialist accepting physical laws of the universe, like gravity etc? I thought idealism simply referred to the qualia... the opposite of realism. I'm really sorry but it's just not making the slightest bit of sense to me, not even enough to know what sort of questions to ask to clarify it What would a neuron be? an idea? an immaterial formative principle (in the sense that it is the ultimate functional building block of the brain, just as a gate is in an electronic circuit)?

As I said, I don't claim to be an idealist. If I had to choose among material monism, dualism, and ideal monism, I'd probably go with the latter. But I think reality is much more slippery and ambiguous than that-- I'd have to make up a new term, like "paradoxist" or something, to describe my view, but I usually just throw up my hands and identify as agnostic-- not only in the religious sense, but in pretty much every sense. In truth, I believe very much in reality-in-context-- that reality not only SEEMS different but IS different depending on context.

As for idealism being different than materialism-- I've said before that idealism subsumes, rather than replaces, physicalism. In other words, all that we believe or know about physical reality can be viewed simply as a collection of ideas; some things that are NOT readily explained by materialism, like the existence of qualia-experiencing mental agents, also work fine as ideas. So do things like QM particles-- you cannot represent them unambiguously in a 3D spacetime framework, but you can encapsulate them with equations and descriptive terms-- more ideas. Trying to fit modern science into a world view based on our everyday experience of life simply doesn't work.

Well, I hope to understand it better at some point, but you had me at 'layered' From that perspective, there is an appeal because that's what evolution is really... layers and layers of slow but sure development. Is there any particular idealist that inspires you or is this all you?  

The truth is I probably horribly abuse the term "idealism," but I don't really claim to be an idealist, so I'm okay with that. I generally try to think of and express original ideas until someone says, "Oh. . . you're talking about boobledyboo-ism" or whatever.

[The Grand Nudger]

Benny thinks that he can make a cogent argument out of a stolen concept.  

He enjoys pointing to the professed truth of necessarily materialistic explanations and assumptions as proof that materialism not only does not explain some x, but is incapable. He get's a little testy when you inform him that arguing in such a manner is logically fallacious, and unambiguously agreeing with the countervailing position to which he objects.

[bennyboy]

Benny thinks that he can make a cogent argument out of a stolen concept.  

He enjoys pointing to the professed truth of necessarily materialistic explanations and assumptions as proof that materialism not only does not explain some x, but is incapable.  He get's a little testy when you inform him that arguing in such a manner is logically fallacious, and unambiguously agreeing with the countervailing position to which he objects.  

I don't remember saying your name three times.  What are you doing here?

---

Benny thinks that he can make a cogent argument out of a stolen concept.  

He enjoys pointing to the professed truth of necessarily materialistic explanations and assumptions as proof that materialism not only does not explain some x, but is incapable.  He get's a little testy when you inform him that arguing in such a manner is logically fallacious, and unambiguously agreeing with the countervailing position to which he objects.  

"The most fundamental particles are expressible only as mathematical ideas."  Yeah. . . not necessarily materialistic.

[emjay]

I'm sorry to say, you're losing me with all this  :-( So your view is a kind of materialistic/idealistic hybrid? Okay, 'immaterial formative principles'... 'physical rules' etc... those are 'ideas' to an idealist? How is that different from a materialist accepting physical laws of the universe, like gravity etc? I thought idealism simply referred to the qualia... the opposite of realism. I'm really sorry but it's just not making the slightest bit of sense to me, not even enough to know what sort of questions to ask to clarify it :-( What would a neuron be? an idea? an immaterial formative principle (in the sense that it is the ultimate functional building block of the brain, just as a gate is in an electronic circuit)?

As I said, I don't claim to be an idealist.  If I had to choose among material monism, dualism, and ideal monism, I'd probably go with the latter.  But I think reality is much more slippery and ambiguous than that-- I'd have to make up a new term, like "paradoxist" or something, to describe my view, but I usually just throw up my hands and identify as agnostic-- not only in the religious sense, but in pretty much every sense.  In truth, I believe very much in reality-in-context-- that reality not only SEEMS different but IS different depending on context.

As for idealism being different than materialism-- I've said before that idealism subsumes, rather than replaces, physicalism.  In other words, all that we believe or know about physical reality can be viewed simply as a collection of ideas; some things that are NOT readily explained by materialism, like the existence of qualia-experiencing mental agents, also work fine as ideas.  So do things like QM particles-- you cannot represent them unambiguously in a 3D spacetime framework, but you can encapsulate them with equations and descriptive terms-- more ideas.  Trying to fit modern science into a world view based on our everyday experience of life simply doesn't work.

Well, I hope to understand it better at some point, but you had me at 'layered' From that perspective, there is an appeal because that's what evolution is really... layers and layers of slow but sure development. Is there any particular idealist that inspires you or is this all you?  

The truth is I probably horribly abuse the term "idealism," but I don't really claim to be an idealist, so I'm okay with that.  I generally try to think of and express original ideas until someone says, "Oh. . . you're talking about boobledyboo-ism" or whatever.

I think you've just solved the name problem... instead of Agnostic or Paradoxist, why not call yourself a Boobledybooist? I will, even if you don't

But okay I get where we are now, back to subsumes and all that Does it basically ultimately come down to a kind of 'whatever I can coherently conceive of (as an idea) is real' sort of perspective... where ideas are the building blocks of the world that get around physicalist problems because they can be abstract? If so then I don't disagree with you at a certain subjective level (which I guess is all there is to an idealist... I know you said you're not one... but just relating it to that; it would also be the same for Boobledybooists I'd guess )... in the sense of what I've talked about before... that any coherent context is experienced as true/real whilst you're engrossed in it... a book or a film for instance. But for me that's as far as it goes; it doesn't make those things objectively true, just subjectively true/real in the moment. If that's what you mean by truth in context, then I understand that point of view to the extent I've said. Are you arguing a Descartes style case... that you can't tell a dream from 'reality' (at a fundamental level I mean)? Arguing that all those contexts are somehow equally valid regarding 'objective' truth? I realise that 'objective' is a prickly subject... especially to an idealist ... but unless you truly see no difference between the context that is dreaming and the context that is waking reality... then you know what I mean by it. Or arguing that they are equally valid in shaping the truth, or even causing it, since they're coherent contexts (ideas)?

[bennyboy]

By truth-in-context, I mean that reality is paradoxically multi-faceted, and which facet you are presented with depends on context. Basically, using the idea of quantum superposition, I'd say that reality itself is in a state of superposition: physical/ideal/dual/other-- but that reality doesn't really "resolve" until someone attempts to interact with it. In other words, I don't think the squirrelly-ness of QM particles is a local quirk; I think it indicates very much how reality itself works.

The Universe, I believe, will forever resist our attempts to pin it down. But we do have one stroke of good fortune-- in a particular context, we can usually make observations and collect ideas which unlock new contexts for us to explore.

---

but unless you truly see no difference between the context that is dreaming and the context that is waking reality... then you know what I mean by it. Or arguing that they are equally valid in shaping the truth, or even causing it, since they're coherent contexts (ideas)?

Clearly, it's hard to talk about universal idealism, which is a collection of immaterial formative principles, and "ideas" which we have when experiencing the world or even when dreaming, without conflating them. I'd agree with you and Khemikal that human ideas are things encoded and experienced in the brain-- though why we have a subjective experience of that is a mystery.


--edit--
Maybe I can start describing myself as a superpositional realist or something. I'll have to think about that.