Russia and Ukraine

[abaris]

On the other hand, it gives the newer leaders a chance to do better, if their troops aren't worn out after all the combat and then redeployment.

As I said over at AD. The Russian army environment is probably the most brutal in existence. Always was, going back to imperial times. A soldier's life isn't worth shit. As is shown by the horrendous losses they sufferend in WWII.

The Red Army lost 9,7 million men on one single front. The Germans lost 5,5 million on numerous fronts. The Soviet Union or later Russia also have the highest suicide rate of all armies.

[Thumpalumpacus]

As I said over at AD. The Russian army environment is probably the most brutal in existence. Always was, going back to imperial times. A soldier's life isn't worth shit. As is shown by the horrendous losses they sufferend in WWII.

I think those conscripts are victims of Putin too. To my point: They've been in weeks of combat NW of Kyiv. Now they get laded onto trucks, driven six or eight hundred miles tp debark, regroup (with many strangers from other units), try to get a hot meal and a cot, and then go into action.

Those guys will be tired. The question is who is more tired?

[viocjit]

Who's there is interest to give money to Ukrainian forces ? It's legal to do so in the majority of countries of the world.

Who's there is interest to write emails (Or letters and why not a public one) to politicians in European Union/AU/CA/CH/JP/NO/NZ/SG/UK/US (Not forget others countries that put sanctions) to suggest them new ideas of sanctions against Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus ?

When I say politicians in European Union. I'm speaking about those working for countries member of this union and those working in European institutions.

There are many potential targets like MP of national parliaments and MP of European parliament.
There are also head of states , prime ministers (Vice-president in some countries , some countries have one vice-prime minister or more) , members of governments , people (Businessmen for example) for which we know they have links with a person of interest (A MP in a national parliament for example) because these people can potentially influence people of interests.

I listed only a fraction of potential targets for which we can send emails or letters.
It's better to write to politicians of a country if you're a citizen of this country.
It's better to write to politicians working in European institutions such European commission if you're a citizen of an EU state.

[Anomalocaris]

On the other hand, it gives the newer leaders a chance to do better, if their troops aren't worn out after all the combat and then redeployment.

As I said over at AD. The Russian army environment is probably the most brutal in existence. Always was, going back to imperial times. A soldier's life isn't worth shit. As is shown by the horrendous losses they sufferend in WWII.

The Red Army lost 9,7 million men on one single front. The Germans lost 5,5 million on numerous fronts. The Soviet Union or later Russia also have the highest suicide rate of all armies.

While the Russian army has never been known to be particularly sparing of soldier’s lives.  The losses suffered in WWII was created by circumstances well outside of long standing Russian willingness to accept casualties.  In WWII Russia was truly fighting for its existence, and was doing so from a position of tremendous deficit in military institutional knowledge and a very thin pipeline of skilled and experienced middle and senior level officers caused by Stalin’s purges oh the Soviet officer corp 1937-1939.

When you have yo fight or your country and ethnic group perishes, and much of your army’s senior leadership had been relatively new lieutenants, captains and majors just 2 years before,  and your country’s system of staff officer training was not particularly robust and did not particularly emphasize giving junior staff officer trainees early exposure to the skill, practice, and knowledge required for senior command, then you are left with hardly any alternatives to using lives to nullify enemy superiority in tactical skill.

[Deesse23]

When you have yo fight or your country and ethnic group perishes, and much of your army’s senior leadership had been relatively new lieutenants, captains and majors just 2 years before,  and your country’s system of staff officer training was not particularly robust and did not particularly emphasize giving junior staff officer trainees early exposure to the skill, practice, and knowledge required for senior command, then you are left with hardly any alternatives to using lives to nullify enemy superiority in tactical skill.

Even in 1944-45, when sporting huge numerical and material advantages, when the officers were well experienced, the red army was still suffering comparatively high losses. This had nothing to do with (lack of) experience, but with doctrine.

During Operation Bagration, where the entire german Army Group Center was routed, the red army had a 2:1 numerical advantage, yet still suffered 2:1 losses. By that time it was mid ´44.

[Anomalocaris]

Attack exposes the attacker much more entrenched defender exposes the defender.  When you take the offensive against a entrenched defending force at least equal to you in skill, you are likely to suffer far higher casualties than the defenders.    That’s why the classic rule is the attacking force needs 3:1 superiority over entrenched defending force to succeed.    The fact that the Soviets were continuously on the offensive from 1943 to the end of the war means one would expect them to be taking much higher casualties most of the time.   

But looking deeper, another cause of higher Soviet casualties is their tactical level leadership remain far inferior to German’s even in 1944 and 1945, even while Russian operational level leadership caught up with the germans.

the number of senior operational level officers needed by an army is very few compared to total number of officers needed by an army,  The Ruthless filtering process from 1941-1943 identified maybe 100 very talented and capable individuals and their supporting staff.    That is not surprising in an army with literally millions of officers to chose from. 

but at the bottom of the million officer pyramid things are different. The very high casualty rate for junior abs field grade officers during the first 3 years also mean new not enough survived to give large large percentage of tactical units the benefit of their experience,   snd their attrition rate means traing and promotional program can’t be as lengthy or thorough as required.     the lack of large enough body of highly qualified junior officers at the beginning of the war created a hole so deep at tactical level they never managed to climb out of it before the end of the war.     So even by 1945, when quality of most german units have declined precipitously, German units on company and battalion level were still much more effective man for man than their soviet counterpart. 

So at the end of the war, the soviet army was led well at the top, at the level of marshals and colonel generals.   indifferently led at mid level of colonels to lieutenant generals.   much better led at tactical level than in 1941, but still notably poorly led at the lieutenant colonel and below compared to the germans.

[The Grand Nudger]

Same thing happened to the japanese air force in the pacific. Horrendous casualties from their very successful assualts..in the end, led to a drain of experienced pilots that a tactically superior maneuver drill could exploit despite inferior airframes and the relative inexperience of their operators.

I'd say that russia is having a similar problem (and more problems, even). I can lay out a scene that explains why officers are dying doing what we would call ncos jobs.

Lead abrams reports contact front right. At ambush, fortified position, 200 meters. Track out. The other abrmas pop smoke and nose in to contact around the disabled vehicle. IFVs rush forward under smoke to cover the first 100m in a dash. Dismount. That's two teams of infantry, 3 men each, sometimes 4. Each time headed by an nco. Sometimes a fresh nco in training (e4corporal as opposed to specialist)- but rarely. The heavy weapons team sets up on the spot - the ifv backs off covering with fire. At least two ncos still in that ifv. Command and guns.

Out of a minimum nine man squad, at least four are ncos. The remaining five underneath them are unlikely to be e1 /2 exclusively, also. At least two ncos are out of any armor cover - one of them is in a stationary position and the other is actively trying to cross 100m under fire to flank the position. So, if we were failing like the russians are failing in the environment that they're failing in, we'd probably see similar rates - but in junior and mid level ncos. Ukrainians have reported that the mech infantry aren't dismounting...but if they've lost their nco equivalents, why would (and how could) they?

[Anomalocaris]

Same thing happened to the japanese air force in the pacific.  Horrendous casualties from their very successful assualts..in the end, led to a drain of experienced pilots that a tactically superior maneuver drill could exploit despite inferior airframes and the relative inexperience of their operators.  

I'd say that russia is having a similar problem (and more problems, even).  I can lay out a scene that explains why officers are dying doing what we would call ncos jobs.

Lead abrams reports contact front right.  At ambush, fortified position, 200 meters.  Track out.  The other abrmas pop smoke and nose in to contact around the disabled vehicle.  IFVs rush forward under smoke to cover the first 100m in a dash.  Dismount.  That's two teams of infantry, 3 men each, sometimes 4.  Each time headed by an nco.  Sometimes a fresh nco in training (e4corporal as opposed to specialist)- but rarely.  The heavy weapons team sets up on the spot - the ifv backs off covering with fire.  At least two ncos still in that ifv.  Command and guns.  

Out of a minimum nine man squad, at least four are ncos.  The remaining five underneath them are unlikely to be e1 /2 exclusively, also.  At least two ncos are out of any armor cover - one of them is in a stationary position and the other is actively trying to cross 100m under fire to flank the position.  So, if we were failing like the russians are failing in the environment that they're failing in, we'd probably see similar rates - but in junior and mid level ncos.  Ukrainians have reported that the mech infantry aren't dismounting...but if they've lost their nco equivalents, why would (and how could) they?

The magnificently trained japanese prewar carrier pilot corp was squandered by being used ad land based force in the solomons due to toxic relationship between army and navy that made it impossible for IJN to ask IJA to deploy japanese army aviation in a role that was suited for the organization of the army aviation .

basically the fate of the original carrier pilots corp can be likened to that of a corp of elite corp of paratroopers being squandered as infantry for the meat grinder trench warfare.

[The Grand Nudger]

Exactly so, and that's what the russians have done to however many of it's own officers might have been called competent. They're not organized for this, and they're the attacking force, so they're taking casualties. Still, the meat grinder approach isn't subtle or brilliant - but it can make gains. Hard to hold em, but they'll cross that bridge when they get there, eh?

[Anomalocaris]

a view of Russian officer losses

short video of Moskva on fire