Good and Evil

[Pyrrho]

...

The point is, what gives these things their importance is our feelings about them.  Thus, the basis for their importance is feeling.  In other words, Hume is right.

That says nothing about whether those feelings of actual goods, that every individual shares and in which there is found widespread agreement, have any basis in objective (or conversely, relative) truth. So, even though I never said Hume was wrong, I do insist that applying his arguments here misses the point.

If we apply Occam's Razor we end up with Hume.  There isn't anything left for the "objective morality" to do, even if we had any evidence for it, which we don't.  

As for truth and an affection for scientific principles, you really like to bring up diverse subjects all in one place.  

The issues, of objective truths and of objective goods, are not actually all that diverse. Any attempt to justify the one can easily be made to accord with the other. Notice that the question of whether objective truths and objective goods exist and can be known is not the same as the question of how we can come to know them and distinguish either from falsehoods or evils. As I already said, the quotes from Hume on sensation have more to do with difficulties in resolving the latter of those two distinct topics (in other words, your confusing ontology and epistemology).

Postulating ontological entities, that neither do anything discernible, nor for which we have any evidence, is a bad idea.  Or do you think we should all believe in Russell's teapot?

If things were constructed as you describe, there would be a very serious problem with deciding which "first principles" should be used.  And how could you justify using one set rather than another?  What you end up with is making everything essentially subjective, based upon the whims of selecting first principles one likes.

Have you missed something in the 2,500 year old epistemological debates over that very question? The entire issue of existentialism (likely predated in Protagoras' declaration that "man is the measure of all things") and the relativism that necessarily results is derived from the very difficulty in establishing objective first principles that everyone can agree on. As I said, this isn't related simply to the question of ethics, but of minds, logic, truth, etc.

Establishing objective first principles and everyone agreeing on them are completely different things.  No one has done the former, and trusting the latter would simply be committing the fallacy known as argumentum ad populum.

There is a problem with the model of all knowledge being like a geometric proof.  You don't seem to like that assertion, given what you have stated about the parts you have not quoted.  But the simple fact is, for all knowledge to be like a geometric proof would mean that knowledge is impossible, because it would all be based on presupposing first principles that could not be known to be true and then building on them.  Therefore, a different model is required, or the only reasonable conclusion is one of complete skepticism.  (Like my namesake.)

There is no evidence of "the good" as a thing independent of beings having feelings.  There is no evidence of "the good" being good for its own sake.  You may as well tell me that you believe in God.

There is not "evidence" in the sense of physical qualities that we can touch, see, hear, etc. Of course. But there is evidence, in a priori knowledge, that any discussion of "better and worse" requires a framework outside of ourselves through which a determination regarding the status of an object can be made with the expectation of agreement that is substantiated by more than merely personal dispositions, i.e. as in through syllogistic demonstration coupled with our feelings of empathy and the like.

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There is no a priori knowledge of "the good."  That is just nonsense.  It is a way that people try to beg the question in an argument, to pretend that one's prejudices are based on reason.  

There is no evidence of any kind that "something more" is going on as the basis for morality than that beings feel about things, and so those things are important to them.


Indeed, the whole idea that we somehow need some awareness of some metaphysical entity called "the Good" is absurd.  Since we do not know of it, it is unimportant for our actual moral practice.

[Hatshepsut]

I don't fucking know, it's too complicated for me. I just try and be nice. Give me a maths sum to do.

You're in good company. I don't even try to read Hegel at all, given I don't know what a numberwang is! Pyrrho's back, so I'll just watch more of the debate.

[Pyrrho]

... We had Zeno's paradox of the arrow arguing that motion or change can't be real when obviously Zeno must have seen arrows in flight. ...

It should serve as a warning for trusting an abstract argument too much and not paying attention to counter-evidence that is readily available.  The error of Zeno's reasoning is explained in Calculus, but even without the explanation, it should be clear enough that he made a mistake somewhere, even if one does not know what the mistake is.


This also reminds me of Voltaire's Candide, in which he mercilessly ridicules Leibniz's insane idea that this is the best of all possible worlds.  I have heard some complain about that, that they imagine that Voltaire should have used abstract reasoning and looked for the precise mistakes Leibniz made in his reasoning.  But Voltaire took the approach that is analogous to dealing with an abstract argument that it cannot be raining, by pointing out the window at the rain.  One need not bother with the precise mistake, when one can directly prove that the conclusion is wrong.  Some positions are so absurd that they are more worthy of ridicule than of argument.

Of course, if someone wishes to tease out the precise errors in someone's reasoning, they may do so, and it can serve a useful function.  But it is far from necessary in many instances.  As, for example, with these specific cases involving Zeno and Leibniz.

[Pyrrho]

I don't fucking know, it's too complicated for me. I just try and be nice. Give me a maths sum to do.

Most people don't sort it out precisely, as should be obvious.  So we know that an exact knowledge is not required for actual moral conduct.  Consequently, any theory that requires a precise knowledge to be workable is not a theory that explains what actually occurs with real people.  Which means such a theory is irrelevant to explaining what people really do when it comes to morality.

Also, your answer makes me think of the film The Meaning of Life.  It is worth watching.

[robvalue]

Sure is! I grew up on Python. Yeah, I know the bit you mean, when they open an envelope.

[Hatshepsut]

I seem to always recall the scene where they requisition Mr. Brown's liver.

[robvalue]

Oh boy... now that is evil!

[bennyboy]

There is no a priori knowledge of "the good."  That is just nonsense.  It is a way that people try to beg the question in an argument, to pretend that one's prejudices are based on reason.  

There is no evidence of any kind that "something more" is going on as the basis for morality than that beings feel about things, and so those things are important to them.


Indeed, the whole idea that we somehow need some awareness of some metaphysical entity called "the Good" is absurd.  Since we do not know of it, it is unimportant for our actual moral practice.

Phyrro, I think your ideas pretty closely mirror mine. However, I want to play devil's advocate on a couple of questions.

First of all, is a priori knowledge equivalent to reason? Why would claiming a priori knowledge be basing prejudices on reason?

I could argue that as people we DO have a priori knowledge of what is good or evil TO US, via feelings we had as children. For example, almost every child is upset when other children are shown favor. This quality is so common among people that I'd say it's a priori on a species level, i.e. that humans evolved ALREADY having the sense that seeing a sibling favored is evil. There are other ideas which I'd say have been intrinsic to the species since before it evolved: love of family, fear of death, and a sense of biological satisfaction via sex, food, etc. All these are so common to so many members of the species that I'd say those without them are exceptional: and depending on how they behave, they are likely to be seen either as monsters or as saints, as heroes or villains. But their's enough commonality in human behaviors, especially in infancy, that we can rationally objectivy those behaviors, and the feelings that motivate them, to an objective truth: "Mother's milk is good for babies."

That being said, it is only through feelings that we learn how we are programmed to feel. And (many believe), it is only through the objective function of the brain that one has subjective feelings. Therefore what is objective is objective, and what is subjective is also said to be no more than an awareness of part of the functioning of the objective. The later I would tentatively call a priori knowledge, because it comes from one's human-species nature rather than from one's ego.

In other words, the subjective nature of our moral ideas, and even their variability from person to person, doesn't mean good and evil are not objective-- it just means that they are exactly as complex as our species evolution and existing membership.

[The Grand Nudger]

Mothers milk is good -to- babies, not always -for- them, of course.  Just doing my part in manufacturing some objective truths.

/tipshat

[Pyrrho]

There is no a priori knowledge of "the good."  That is just nonsense.  It is a way that people try to beg the question in an argument, to pretend that one's prejudices are based on reason.  

There is no evidence of any kind that "something more" is going on as the basis for morality than that beings feel about things, and so those things are important to them.


Indeed, the whole idea that we somehow need some awareness of some metaphysical entity called "the Good" is absurd.  Since we do not know of it, it is unimportant for our actual moral practice.

Phyrro, I think your ideas pretty closely mirror mine.  However, I want to play devil's advocate on a couple of questions.

First of all, is a priori knowledge equivalent to reason?  Why would claiming a priori knowledge be basing prejudices on reason?  

I could argue that as people we DO have a priori knowledge of what is good or evil TO US, via feelings we had as children.

I think you have given up the game right there.  Yes, people have feelings, but feelings are not knowledge.  The position I am advocating is that people have feelings, due to what they are, and it is a proper subset of those feelings that are the source of morality.

 For example, almost every child is upset when other children are shown favor.  This quality is so common among people that I'd say it's a priori on a species level, i.e. that humans evolved ALREADY having the sense that seeing a sibling favored is evil.  There are other ideas which I'd say have been intrinsic to the species since before it evolved: love of family, fear of death, and a sense of biological satisfaction via sex, food, etc.

Many of those desires are shared with quite a range of animals.  What you are describing is more properly called "instinct" than reason.

 All these are so common to so many members of the species that I'd say those without them are exceptional: and depending on how they behave, they are likely to be seen either as monsters or as saints, as heroes or villains.  But their's enough commonality in human behaviors, especially in infancy, that we can rationally objectivy those behaviors, and the feelings that motivate them, to an objective truth: "Mother's milk is good for babies."

That being said, it is only through feelings that we learn how we are programmed to feel.  And (many believe), it is only through the objective function of the brain that one has subjective feelings.  Therefore what is objective is objective, and what is subjective is also said to be no more than an awareness of part of the functioning of the objective.  The later I would tentatively call a priori knowledge, because it comes from one's human-species nature rather than from one's ego.

In other words, the subjective nature of our moral ideas, and even their variability from person to person, doesn't mean good and evil are not objective-- it just means that they are exactly as complex as our species evolution and existing membership.

The basis for morality seems to go deeper than just being human.  You might be interested in:

http://www.livescience.com/26245-chimps-...rness.html

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3690609/

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/...rness.html

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/201...141151.htm

We seem to share a sense of fairness with other primates.

But none of this suggests that it is based on reason.  People feel as they do, largely due to evolutionary forces, but their feelings are not knowledge.  If you think about it, social animals need some way of cooperation, some motivating force to get them to cooperate.  Otherwise, it is every man for himself (as it were), and, for many species, that would not promote the survival of the species as well as cooperation does.

Indeed, the fact that we do seem to share the foundations of morality with other animals strongly suggests that morality cannot be based on reason.  It is the way we feel, due to what we are.  But these feelings do not tell us of some external truth about morality; we simply have such feelings.  We do not thereby see into a mysterious realm of abstract ideas; we simply have feelings that influence our behavior.