Anyone here a Category 7?

[vulcanlogician]

There was a reason that spinozas critics called him an atheist.  

Uh, yeah. Because he was. He not only said all the gods listed in all holy scriptures did not exist; he said they were absurd. And somehow kept his head attached to his body. I love Spinoza. If ever there was a truly righteous philosopher, it was him. His genius stood head and shoulders over his contemporaries, yet he turned down all teaching positions offered to him by prestigious universities. Instead he lived the simple life of a lens grinder, so that he could devote himself fully to his work. A lesser man would have positioned himself behind a lectern and stood before crowds, wowing them with his incredible intellect. But not Spinoza.

Pantheism to me is hardly distinguishable from atheism (disbelief in gods). Except that pantheism is a positive belief, or perhaps more accurately, a reverence and love for nature. Why not love, revere, even perhaps worship nature itself? But not in a crude way. Not like a bunch of old lady wiccans. In a way that demonstrates genuine knowledge of nature, a sincere knowledge won via study and contemplation of science and philosophy.

As I said before, pantheism is materialism seen through a divine lens. It has more to do with the attitude and reverence of the "believer" than it does god-like properties of the universe. Do you revere nature as a supreme and awesome force, and love it with all of your heart? Then you are a pantheist. Do you simply not believe in gods? Then you're an atheist. Spinoza's pantheism isn't a departure from materialism or atheism in the slightest. It is materialism plus. It is atheism plus.

EXCERPT from the Ethics that explains some things concerning Spinoza's reverence and love for God (ie. nature):

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PROP. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Proof.—All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without passions. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Corollary.—Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.

PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.

Proof.—The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect (II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God, we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God. Q.E.D.

Corollary.—Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.

Note.—It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause of pain. But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to that extent feel pleasure.

PROP. XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love him in return.

Proof.—For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V. xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is absurd (III. xxviii.). Therefore, he who loves God, &c. Q.E.D.

PROP. XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love.

Proof.—This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.), it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note); but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein. Q.E.D.

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I'll get to the rest of what you said in a bit.