Christian morality delusions

[The Grand Nudger]

So getting back to a common ground theme, we both agree that morality is objective. We probably also agree that something can't be morally true and false. I believe your stance is that what is right or wrong, at one time, can be objectively true or false based on a collection of beliefs or subjectively true or false as individual morality. Is that accurate?

I do think that any given moral proposition can be an objective or subjective proposition (and other things as well..ranging all the way from the non cognitive to the absurd, lol)...yeah.  Rather than mire things down in mind dependence vs mind independence, an easy way to distinguish between the three most common is this:


X is wrong because:

-some fact of the matter x...moral realism.
-some fact of the presenter speaking about x....moral subjectivism.  
-some fact of the presenters culture or society in relation to x.....moral relativism.  

Mystery moralities and what we might call societal moralities commonly fall under the latter two categories with the exception of some moment when they manage to refer..rather than to a personally held belief or the overarching cultural belief set of the people, including their religion, to some moral fact of the matter x. 

*More on this in a moment.

We just differ that there necessarily needs to be a morality giver correct?

That would be an area of disagreement, yeah.  Facts of a matter x require no "giver".  They are facts of the matter x.  The sky isn't made blue on account of someone having told us that it's blue or on account of our culture having decided that it is thus.  That's not how facts work, though it is...commonly, how misapprehensions of facts work, and since the contention of realism is that moral facts are facts like any other (this is what alot of people have trouble with) no moral fact would be made so on account of someone (anyone) having told us that it is so, either.  

*It may be the case that some "giver" (be it the culture we live in, our family, a respected figure of authority, or some god we imagine)  agrees with a realist moral conclusion incidentally or coincidentally but this state of affairs is akin to getting the answer on some quiz right for the wrong or no reasons.  Each has value as a heuristic, and even more value when it comes to moral compulsion, but no value whatsoever as a justification for a realist proposition.  

It may be that fred, or freds granddad, our freds city, or freds god says that burning your neighbors house down is bad (you know, when they say that, rather than when they tell you to burn that bastards house down!)...and it may be that you really trust fred, and fred respects his granddad, and his granddad is a true patriot, and everyone super duper believes in that god...but that's not what makes burning a house down right or wrong, to a realist.   The only way in which any of these "givers" can be considered a moral authority is in that (and if) they accurately convey the moral facts of a matter x and proceed with a sound evaluative premise in a valid inference.  

Hence my earlier comments on the redundancy (at best) of mystery moralities and their "givers".  Things we are told are good or bad for reasons unknown or unknowable to us.  This is all that a "giver", themselves, could provide.  

I do note that there is vast overlap between realist and subjectivist and relativist moral conclusions, and I suspect that this is because we at least attempt to justify our propositions by what we take to be evident...though we commonly mistake what is evident about us or our ingroup as evident of the matter x, and lacking a robust justification we appeal to authorities.  That's the nature of the human creature as a moral agent regardless of the ontological status of morality.  Just as it's our nature to privilege those moral conclusions gifted to us by whatever we take to be figures of moral authority and imagine that our moral authority is necessary or instrumental to such a conclusion.  A cursory glance at the track record of those authorities ought to disabuse us of this notion..but it doesn't.  Except, amusingly, in the case of people who actually do make reference to facts of the matter x but withhold acceptance of the designator "moral realist" on account of how hilariously wrong we and all of our "givers" have consistently been about pretty much any moral issue, at some point or place....or their own inability to lay out such a case to satisfaction.  

It would be nice if there were time as your buddy held the club up over some kids head to hit the pause button and lay out a compelling objective justification for why clubbing the kid to death was wrong (or right) and why that matters to our club wielding friend...but I suspect that "because fred/freds granddad/our society/our god would be disappointed/proud" fits better in the space of time between the club falling and some kid dying.  In this, all "givers" serve as deontological props for convenience (or urgency's) sake regardless of what sort of morality they ultimately refer to.  This is at least a part of why we're commonly incapable of justifying our positions.  We've been relying on the cliff notes, the cheatsheet, the heuristic.  We've memorized the tables but do not understand or cannot communicate the principles of multiplication.

Hence my earlier comments on the futility or damaging nature (at worst) of mystery moralities and their "givers".  

Ultimately, our disagreement is an epistemic one.  You contend that a "giver" would be necessary or desirable.  I argue to the contrary, for all of the reasons above.  Reasons which run the gauntlet of cogency all the way to observed rates of success and failure, down to a a fundamental understanding of the subject and it's nature.  "Givers" are only as good as whatever it is they're communicating, they are redundant to that thing they are communicating, their communication does not satisfy the conditions of an objective assessment, they are commonly wrong, not only by an objective measure, but even by reference to their own propositions....and in the event that they incidentally or coincidentally get anything right the recipients exhibit abject failure to lay out the case for the contents of what has been given. However, in spite of all of this, we have a strong compulsion to align ourselves with such "givers" and that alignment is a profoundly motivating force for good..or ill. As commented upon by so many people in so many ways, it can make a good man do a bad thing. They aren't alone in this (givers), but because they are so commonly institutional or cultural, their effect is more pronounced than our disparate and commonly cross purpose and cross canceling personal motivations.

Might it be nice if some "giver" currently unknown to us gave us a better quality of cheatsheet? IDK..that would still have alot of the problems above..but whatever improvement it created (and it's not clear that there would be any) would be better served by having the facts, themselves, which that "giver" sought to communicate and it is only by reference to those facts, not the "giver" having given them or the "givers" existence or any attribute of the "giver" that a person can rationally contend to accept or communicate moral objectivity, moral realism. To be blunt, contending that there is a necessity of a "giver" strongly suggests that a person is a subjectivist or relativist.