(November 23, 2018 at 10:24 am)Gae Bolga Wrote:

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(November 23, 2018 at 10:05 am)tackattack Wrote: Look man I was simply, pardon the pun, separating the wheat from the chaff. I was just trying to clear what we agreed on so we could reduce the discussion to what we disagree on. Do I have biases that come from my beliefs yes. This isn't a set up and doesn't have a long and thought out apologetic strategy where I'm waiting for the gotcha moment. I would just like some clarity and conciseness and to reach some common ground.

I'm not worried about setups or gotcha moments bud..just getting to the core of difference between our moral concepts, is all.

Quote:You answered my simple yes or no statement by saying that we'd agree on the ground in common in our everyday moral propositions but no common ground on objective morality as a matter of justification or concept. I'm fine with that, enough said.
To get this back on track

Quote:then would you consider yourself a external moral realist? Would you consider yourself a moral rationalist? I'm not sure so I need a hint please.

External and rational are redundant to moral realism.  Yeah, though.  

Quote:I'll answer your questions even though you assume too much about me.

Ah, but did I assume wrong?

Quote:"Is it possible that the two have become so enmeshed in your mind..that, properly, you were asking me if it would be nice if there were a god? Are those not the things you believe that a god could bring to the table?" No if I wanted to ask you if it were nice if there were a God I'd ask you if you needed Jesus in your life. Are my beliefs integral to my view of reality, yes.There wasn't any questions bubbling under the surface. It's not some game where I move around chess pieces and try and think 10 moves ahead. It's not a debate it's a discussion and my statements, including the OP are reactionary and at the most probe-ative, not plotting.

It's not about plotting.  I was pointing out that your questions indicate more about your religious beliefs than they have to do with objective morality..which..again was the core of the comment that kicked off the thread and another answer to the question you asked in response in the op.  

Quote:I disagree that there is no test of time. I agree that there are mind independent moral facts, but I don't believe that mind independent facts are the only thing that can justify a moral stance.  I don't believe facts change, a fact is a truth statement. Our understanding of it's implications and our explanations may change but a fact is simply true. The fact that misinterpretations in the lay of the land occur is exactly the reason this conversation came about, that's not good enough. Our subjective perspectives, with all their biases included, are not enough to justify something as right or wrong.

There are plenty of ways to justify a given moral stance, but only one way to justify a moral realists stance, and it simply doesn't include a test of time.  If the facts of a matter change our moral conclusions must change with them.  Moral realism is not moral absolutism or eternalism.  That relevant facts can change ought to be apparent.  There are things that would have been morally permissible or morally imperative a hundred years ago that no longer are.  Similarly, there are things that would have been morally impermissible 100 years ago that are not only permissible..today, but, perhaps..moral imperatives. 

A person raising a family on the american frontier could very well have been within the remit of an objective moral appraisal to simply shoot people who approached their home in an untoward manner.  The same person, on the same frontier..certainly should -not- have tried some fantastically risky medical procedure.  Fast forward to today where one has less or no reason to shoot a person on account of their having knocked on the door at midnight..and where procedures once commonly lethal are now routine and would produce moral failure if they were not immediately carried out in service of that persons care.

A shorter way to say all of this..is that if things were different, things would be different..and moral realism contends that our moral propositions refer to facts of things as they are, not as they once were.  Are things different, today, than they once were..yesterday?  Well, yes.  

Quote:You're positing that a loving God, if He exists, is bad or possibly worse at morality than us and that if it's not better than what we can do on our own, it's not necessary/beneficial. I agree. Feel free to support your assertion.

I' noted that all gods in all magic books are moral failures.  Take a look at their cheat sheets.  That's the support for my assertion.  Their own magic books.  Their own statements and positions as contained in those stories which purport to inform people of both their existence and their stance on this or that issue.  The OT god is monstrous, the nt god no better.  Rinse and repeat with others.  I also posited some hypothetical god that is not the god of our various magic books.  In this I'll note that in order to even maintain the disparity between us you've posited some other god, that no one knows anything about.  Certainly not the one you believe in, and believe to be a moral authority. Loving has no bearing on objective morality.  Many loving people fail at and by an objective moral appraisal.  Often enough, precisely because of a compelling love.  We do some of the worst things we do for that very reason.  This is another qualifier which has no bearing on moral realism.  

Quote:You also posit that a creator God, if He exists, would offer no unique insight. I'm going to have to see the reasoning and support before I can agree to this, I don't think I will but I'm open.

Correct, because it would not be able to offer us anything that we could not..ourselves, vouch for.  If it did, we couldn't call that objective, it would be a mystery, as so much else about god and god knowledge and god propositions and god justifications already are.  Creator...like so many other qualiiers bandied about in thread..also irrelevent to an objective morality.  Many people create things, this act does not make them a moral authority..and opften enough..those things are created explicitly to perform some immoral x y or z..or the act of that creation was, itself, immoral.  

Quote:If we truly weren't capable of vouching for that information (because, say, our agency was so vastly inferior with respect to it's own) than we could never legitimately call it objective in the first place.  It would be a mystery morality.  Things right or wrong for reasons unknown and unknowable to us. I can agree to this statement. The question would then be is God knowable or is the morality and revelations He points us to independently verifiable?

Then you have seen my reasoning..and agree with it.  If the things this hypothetical god that no ones ever heard from..which has no magic book, tells us were not independently verifiable then, see above.  If they were...then there would be no need for such a god.  Even in the hypothetical case of an unknown god that overcomes the simplest and most apparent objections, rather than what gods exist and are available for reference, gods run a range between useless and actively damaging to an objective moral schema.  Between telling us what we ourselves can known, and what is unknowable by us.

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I know that these are massive responses to short questions, but I like to be concise.

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It's late so pardon my sloppiness. I'm glad I was able to see your perspective. Just because it's a mystery now doesn't mean it can't be knowable, just that it is currently.
If you are a moral realist and moral realism contends that our moral propositions refer to facts of things as they are, not as they once were. Please explain to me, without an objective morality how we ever decided socially that slavery was wrong? Without another standard objective to the societal standard why would a societal standard change?

To the point of verifiability, I see what God would tell us as independently verifiable but why does that negate the need? What if what we knew ourselves (disease comes from bad smells) is wrong (or amoral to an objective morality) because it can't be properly verified and measured. by waiting several hundred years and someone inventing the microscope, we now know diseases come from bacteria. Just because we know what is moral for us individually, doesn't mean that it's a morally right truth. Just because we think we have a good societal standard for what is right, doesn't mean it will stand the test of time to prove to be a morally right truth.

If a sliding scale is good enough evidence for you then I can accept that. I learned a lot about moral realism so thanks. I still believe a more rigid yardstick to be an improvement.


Jehanne, you'll have to cite that because it's my understanding that hebrews did have an idea of an afterlife called Sheol. While I would classify most as materialsts (as opposed to the duality of humans) they didn't believe in original sin, if that's what you were getting at. Original sin was refined by Augustine and stands opposed to pelagianism. What's your point?

(November 25, 2018 at 11:12 pm)tackattack Wrote: It's late so pardon my sloppiness. I'm glad I was able to see your perspective. Just because it's a mystery now doesn't mean it can't be knowable, just that it is currently.

If it's just a "not currently known" then we're back to something that we could know.   A redundant mystery morality is redundant, and still not objective.  

Quote:If you are a moral realist and moral realism contends that our moral propositions refer to facts of things as they are, not as they once were. Please explain to me, without an objective morality how we ever decided socially that slavery was wrong? Without another standard objective to the societal standard why would a societal standard change?

The short answer is moral failure. 

The long answer is that if you really dig in you'll often find that a given society certainly -doesn't- think slavery..for example, is kosher..only that alot of unkosher things are cool so long as you're doing it to The Other Guy™.  Needling in further, you'll see the appraisal of slavery change as you more closer and closer to the core of one's family, and then one's self.   Some may interpret this as a pyramid of self interest, and to an extent that's so, but self interest, just like our affection for our families, friends, and fellow tribe mates is a compelling motivation to "get it right", so to speak.  The important bit in all of this, is that the core of why some x might be wrong is often present, and it's a failure to extend that principle to it's sensible limits that routinely produces such a failure, as our spotty agency routinely produces failure elsewhere for exactly this (and many other) reasons regardless of what moral schema we adhere to.   

Quote:To the point of verifiability, I see what God would tell us as independently verifiable but why does that negate the need? What if what we knew ourselves (disease comes from bad smells) is wrong (or amoral to an objective morality) because it can't be properly verified and measured. by waiting several hundred years and someone inventing the microscope, we now know diseases come from bacteria. Just because we know what is moral for us individually, doesn't mean that it's a morally right truth. Just because we think we have a good societal standard for what is right, doesn't mean it will stand the test of time to prove to be a morally right truth.

I'm not concerned with tests of time, as I mentioned..I'm a moral realist, not a moral eternalist or moral absolutist.  Sure, though, we could always get our facts wrong.  This is true of anything.  With an objective morality, there is at least the possibility and means to realize this.  With a mystery morality, not so.  

Quote:If a sliding scale is good enough evidence for you then I can accept that. I learned a lot about moral realism so thanks. I still believe a more rigid yardstick to be an improvement.

I think it's amusing that moral facts become a sliding scale.  If so, okay, but if so, any other purported fact is no more and no less of a sliding scale.  Including any purported fact of or by your own rigid yardstick.  The rigidity of your yardstick, it;s only (allegedly existent) defining feature.... will amount to what, precisely, if it's units of measure are inaccurate?  Looking at the cheat sheet of this "rigid yardstick"... I think that you're going to have alot more trouble than myself on each count raised above by you..is it actually rigid, or is it the changing morality of a society expressed as the whim of the divine?  When you asked me why society was once gung ho on slavery.  Well, to a certain extent, because everyone's favorite rigid yardstick said it was cool, and a mystery morality was good enough for them.  Until it wasn't, and when it wasn't, it was by those objective facts of the matter of slavery itself that the injustice of the practice was made clear in contradiction to so many measurements made by that rigid yardstick. Moreover, the rigid yardsticks explanation for illness..was demons, even though that rigid yardsticks betters already knew better without a microscope, and certainly knows much better with one.

How were they to know..using that yardstick, that slavery was wrong?  That illness and bacteria have a causal relationship? How were they to overcome moral failure conceptualized as virtue and piety? How were they to overcome ignorance conceptualized as timeless revelation? This is the danger of referring to somethings longevity as though whatever were long lived must then be true, rather than justifying one's propositions by reference to facts which are.

This is a great time to re-approach the OPQ. You are not referring to an objective moral authority. You are referring to a mysterious divine authority, and prefer that and argue for it in opposition to an objective moral authority, which you deride as a sliding scale. Just keep that in mind the next time the compulsion to say "because I believe in an objective moral authority" crops up. The people you're discussing the matter with probably have a greater commitment to objective moral values than yourself. Particularly in that you have no commitment to them whatsoever.

I do have a commitment t objective moral values. It just disagrees with yours. We both agree that objective moral truths exist. You still haven't explained moral reflection and argument.

To test whether I have your stance correct: I believe you feel moral facts must tend towards social stability or what we have reason to to. The problem with that being that the beliefs that inform the morality reflects the way the world is now hence my poorly phrased sliding scale. I apologize if it offended your sensibilities. I simply meant to convey that is is mutable without an exterior reference to the society it's being constructed in. I understand your objection that it can't be a universalized consensus of opinion. If this is your belief.

None of the rest of your pointed responses were really a question you desired to have answered, so to be brief I'll also re-approach the OP, then I'll get back to work. In a universe where moral facts exist, there is a moral realm. Objectivity and measurability are the desire of the realm, ie. what is "good" must represent what I would desire under calm and informed conditions. Universality can't be reached because desires inform decisions and because knowledge of all things is out of our reach.

Could we at least agree that objectivity would be a valuable goal and that a proper environment with reflection and sharing of knowledge could increase education on morality and bring us closer to consensus on morality?

(November 26, 2018 at 12:57 pm)tackattack Wrote: I do have a commitment t objective moral values. It just disagrees with yours. We both agree that objective moral truths exist. You still haven't explained moral reflection and argument.

What do you want to know about either from a realists pov?  

Quote:To test whether I have your stance correct: I believe you feel moral facts must tend towards social stability or what we have reason to to. The problem with that being that the beliefs that inform the morality reflects the way the world is now hence my poorly phrased sliding scale. I apologize if it offended your sensibilities. I simply meant to convey that is is mutable without an exterior reference to the society it's being constructed in. I understand your objection that it can't be a universalized consensus of opinion. If this is your belief.

No, to all of the above.  More importantly, that's a description of moral relativism....not moral realism. 

Quote:None of the rest of your pointed responses were really a question you desired to have answered, so to be brief I'll also re-approach the OP, then I'll get back to work. In a universe where moral facts exist, there is a moral realm. Objectivity and measurability are the desire of the realm, ie. what is "good" must represent what I would desire under calm and informed conditions. Universality can't be reached because desires inform decisions and because knowledge of all things is out of our reach.

Reference to what we may desire is a subjective morality, not moral realism.  That is a mind dependent fact of the matter.  

Quote:Could we at least agree that objectivity would be a valuable goal and that a proper environment with reflection and sharing of knowledge could increase education on morality and bring us closer to consensus on morality?

We could agree, but it would be a deceptive agreement so long as we are referring to different things when we employ the term..and we are.

(November 26, 2018 at 3:44 pm)Gae Bolga Wrote:

(November 26, 2018 at 12:57 pm)tackattack Wrote: I do have a commitment t objective moral values. It just disagrees with yours. We both agree that objective moral truths exist. You still haven't explained moral reflection and argument.

What do you want to know about either from a realists pov?  

Quote:To test whether I have your stance correct: I believe you feel moral facts must tend towards social stability or what we have reason to to. The problem with that being that the beliefs that inform the morality reflects the way the world is now hence my poorly phrased sliding scale. I apologize if it offended your sensibilities. I simply meant to convey that is is mutable without an exterior reference to the society it's being constructed in. I understand your objection that it can't be a universalized consensus of opinion. If this is your belief.

No, to all of the above.  More importantly, that's a description of moral relativism....not moral realism. 

Quote:None of the rest of your pointed responses were really a question you desired to have answered, so to be brief I'll also re-approach the OP, then I'll get back to work. In a universe where moral facts exist, there is a moral realm. Objectivity and measurability are the desire of the realm, ie. what is "good" must represent what I would desire under calm and informed conditions. Universality can't be reached because desires inform decisions and because knowledge of all things is out of our reach.

Reference to what we may desire is a subjective morality, not moral realism.  That is a mind dependent fact of the matter.  

Quote:Could we at least agree that objectivity would be a valuable goal and that a proper environment with reflection and sharing of knowledge could increase education on morality and bring us closer to consensus on morality?

We could agree, but it would be a deceptive agreement so long as we are referring to different things when we employ the term..and we are.

Once again having to explain moral realism huh 

Pretty much the default state of affairs.  The religious use the term to refer to some other x, and the irreligious reject that other x as though it were moral realism.

Come on guys, I apologize. I am really trying to understand and I'm not a professional ethicist. There are a cornucopia of philosophies, ideas and labels out there that I'm super rusty on. This isn't an appeal to ignorance, just stating my own ignorance. I apologize for misrepresenting your position of moral realism for relativism. You see morals as objective because there are mind-independent facts. Also, in revisiting the OP I was under misconceptions and fully admit to being sloppy and incorrect in my presuppositions and thinking. I really appreciate the time and education put forth to correct my thinking.

So getting back to a common ground theme, we both agree that morality is objective. We probably also agree that something can't be morally true and false. I believe your stance is that what is right or wrong, at one time, can be objectively true or false based on a collection of beliefs or subjectively true or false as individual morality. Is that accurate? We just differ that there necessarily needs to be a morality giver correct?

(November 27, 2018 at 4:13 am)tackattack Wrote: So getting back to a common ground theme, we both agree that morality is objective. We probably also agree that something can't be morally true and false. I believe your stance is that what is right or wrong, at one time, can be objectively true or false based on a collection of beliefs or subjectively true or false as individual morality. Is that accurate?

I do think that any given moral proposition can be an objective or subjective proposition (and other things as well..ranging all the way from the non cognitive to the absurd, lol)...yeah.  Rather than mire things down in mind dependence vs mind independence, an easy way to distinguish between the three most common is this:


X is wrong because:

-some fact of the matter x...moral realism.
-some fact of the presenter speaking about x....moral subjectivism.  
-some fact of the presenters culture or society in relation to x.....moral relativism.  

Mystery moralities and what we might call societal moralities commonly fall under the latter two categories with the exception of some moment when they manage to refer..rather than to a personally held belief or the overarching cultural belief set of the people, including their religion, to some moral fact of the matter x. 

*More on this in a moment.

Quote:We just differ that there necessarily needs to be a morality giver correct?

That would be an area of disagreement, yeah.  Facts of a matter x require no "giver".  They are facts of the matter x.  The sky isn't made blue on account of someone having told us that it's blue or on account of our culture having decided that it is thus.  That's not how facts work, though it is...commonly, how misapprehensions of facts work, and since the contention of realism is that moral facts are facts like any other (this is what alot of people have trouble with) no moral fact would be made so on account of someone (anyone) having told us that it is so, either.  

*It may be the case that some "giver" (be it the culture we live in, our family, a respected figure of authority, or some god we imagine)  agrees with a realist moral conclusion incidentally or coincidentally but this state of affairs is akin to getting the answer on some quiz right for the wrong or no reasons.  Each has value as a heuristic, and even more value when it comes to moral compulsion, but no value whatsoever as a justification for a realist proposition.  

It may be that fred, or freds granddad, our freds city, or freds god says that burning your neighbors house down is bad (you know, when they say that, rather than when they tell you to burn that bastards house down!)...and it may be that you really trust fred, and fred respects his granddad, and his granddad is a true patriot, and everyone super duper believes in that god...but that's not what makes burning a house down right or wrong, to a realist.   The only way in which any of these "givers" can be considered a moral authority is in that (and if) they accurately convey the moral facts of a matter x and proceed with a sound evaluative premise in a valid inference.  

Hence my earlier comments on the redundancy (at best) of mystery moralities and their "givers".  Things we are told are good or bad for reasons unknown or unknowable to us.  This is all that a "giver", themselves, could provide.  

I do note that there is vast overlap between realist and subjectivist and relativist moral conclusions, and I suspect that this is because we at least attempt to justify our propositions by what we take to be evident...though we commonly mistake what is evident about us or our ingroup as evident of the matter x, and lacking a robust justification we appeal to authorities.  That's the nature of the human creature as a moral agent regardless of the ontological status of morality.  Just as it's our nature to privilege those moral conclusions gifted to us by whatever we take to be figures of moral authority and imagine that our moral authority is necessary or instrumental to such a conclusion.  A cursory glance at the track record of those authorities ought to disabuse us of this notion..but it doesn't.  Except, amusingly, in the case of people who actually do make reference to facts of the matter x but withhold acceptance of the designator "moral realist" on account of how hilariously wrong we and all of our "givers" have consistently been about pretty much any moral issue, at some point or place....or their own inability to lay out such a case to satisfaction.  

It would be nice if there were time as your buddy held the club up over some kids head to hit the pause button and lay out a compelling objective justification for why clubbing the kid to death was wrong (or right) and why that matters to our club wielding friend...but I suspect that "because fred/freds granddad/our society/our god would be disappointed/proud" fits better in the space of time between the club falling and some kid dying.  In this, all "givers" serve as deontological props for convenience (or urgency's) sake regardless of what sort of morality they ultimately refer to.  This is at least a part of why we're commonly incapable of justifying our positions.  We've been relying on the cliff notes, the cheatsheet, the heuristic.  We've memorized the tables but do not understand or cannot communicate the principles of multiplication.

Hence my earlier comments on the futility or damaging nature (at worst) of mystery moralities and their "givers".  

Ultimately, our disagreement is an epistemic one.  You contend that a "giver" would be necessary or desirable.  I argue to the contrary, for all of the reasons above.  Reasons which run the gauntlet of cogency all the way to observed rates of success and failure, down to a a fundamental understanding of the subject and it's nature.  "Givers" are only as good as whatever it is they're communicating, they are redundant to that thing they are communicating, their communication does not satisfy the conditions of an objective assessment, they are commonly wrong, not only by an objective measure, but even by reference to their own propositions....and in the event that they incidentally or coincidentally get anything right the recipients exhibit abject failure to lay out the case for the contents of what has been given. However, in spite of all of this, we have a strong compulsion to align ourselves with such "givers" and that alignment is a profoundly motivating force for good..or ill. As commented upon by so many people in so many ways, it can make a good man do a bad thing. They aren't alone in this (givers), but because they are so commonly institutional or cultural, their effect is more pronounced than our disparate and commonly cross purpose and cross canceling personal motivations.

Might it be nice if some "giver" currently unknown to us gave us a better quality of cheatsheet? IDK..that would still have alot of the problems above..but whatever improvement it created (and it's not clear that there would be any) would be better served by having the facts, themselves, which that "giver" sought to communicate and it is only by reference to those facts, not the "giver" having given them or the "givers" existence or any attribute of the "giver" that a person can rationally contend to accept or communicate moral objectivity, moral realism. To be blunt, contending that there is a necessity of a "giver" strongly suggests that a person is a subjectivist or relativist.