Christianity is heading for a full allegorization

[polymath257]

And I don't think it is logically possible in a way that leads to a hard problem.

It is sort of like asking if it is logically possible to have a high temperature without the underlying molecules moving at high speeds.

Sure, it is *logically possible*, but the actual fact  is that it is physically impossible because temperature *is* the motion of those molecules. But that is what we have found out through a lot of investigation.

Our ignorance doesn't mean it is logically possible for it to be otherwise.

Ok, let's go back a bit then.

The mind being the brain or some such is a position you hold to (which I think is safe to say given what you have said to me), but is that why you think p-zombies are incoherent? I just want to be clear I'm getting you right here.

I would say that the mind is a process in the brain. It's closer to a running program than it is hardware.

So, if two things are physically identical and one is conscious, so is the other. The same physical processes are happening and so whatever is 'in the mind' of one is also 'in the mind' of the other.

And I think that the idea that a mechanism is *required* is a philosophical mistake. There will be things that simply don't have deeper explanations. And that might *be* the explanation.

I certainly agree that at some point you must hit a dead end epistemically, but I don't agree we should therefore give up on trying to go as deep as we can seeking further explanations.

And I would agree with that. But, in the absence of such, the correlation is the explanation.

And what, precisely, is required? If that link between neural activity and conscious states is testable, predictable, and universal, what else is actually required?

An explanation as to how neural activity leads to conscious states ... in the same way that we know how neural activity leads to, say, physical reflexes.

I would say that the neural activity *is* the conscious state, but from outside rather than inside. It is similar to saying that temperature *is* the average kinetic energy of the molecules. The two say exactly the same thing, just from different perspectives.

Think of it like this. How does activity of the circuitry lead to running a program in a computer?

The question itself is the problem. The activity of the circuitry and the running of the program are *the same thing* from different perspectives. We can say that a certain pattern of activity in the circuits is the same as the computer carrying out a certain line in a program. And, just like different computers will have different specific circuitry and perhaps very different machine language, but we can still say they are running the same program, it seems possible, even likely that two people can have different circuitry and different hardware and be thinking the 'same thought'. It does not have to be a one-to-one correspondence.

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Here is another aspect of the consciousness discussion: what, precisely, is a quale?

I have seen it defined as a 'unit of conscious experience'. But it isn't clear to me what that actually is.

For example, if I look at something red, is the sensation of redness the quale? Does the quale include the emotional response? Does it include whatever is in my peripheral vision? Does it include my expectations?

How is a quale different than a sensory detection?

Here's a different question: if philosophical zombies are possible, How do I know whether *I* am one or not? How do I know if what I *think* I am experiencing is actually an experience?

So, for example, I have aphantasia: when I 'imagine' things, I have no visual component to my imagination. Does that mean I am a zombie? why or why not?