Christianity is heading for a full allegorization

[polymath257]

I guess I cannot see how such would be possible.

Logically possible means it's not logically contradictory, that's all. Is a zombie a square-circle? Is a rainbow-farting unicorn a square-circle?

Forget the actual laws of physics or biology. Those are relevant for when you're pondering physical possibility, not logical possibility.

But again, it doesn't really matter to me whether zombies are physically possible or not. I was curious as to why you think they're incoherent as a concept, but it seems you're referring to physical impossibility here rather than logical impossibility.

Now as for the thought experiment itself, even though my position on consciousness does not rely on it, let me see if I can give it a proper go.

For the thought experiment, maybe avoid mentally putting yourself in the zombie's shoes and stay where you are. As far as you're concerned, you cannot distinguish between a zombie and a conscious being. Even if we granted zombies extra differentiating properties (besides lack of qualia), as long as you cannot determine if they are zombies or not, then the thought experiment still stands. As far as you're concerned, they behave just like conscious beings. It may be they have to be intentionally giving false statements when they report having experiences. Or they only report having experiences because they see you do the same and think it must be the case for them as well, even though they lack the knowledge of what it is like to have experiences. Even so, you will not be able to make the differentiation.

Now contrast with you, who has experiences. These zombies behave exactly like you; they can react to a bad smell with a wrinkling of the nose, reflexively move their hand away from a hot stove upon touching it, physically express sexual arousal when they are in close contact with someone sexually attractive. Their nervous systems even operate the same way yours do. The key difference is they don't ever have the phenomenal experiences accompanying these behaviors and reactions.

Now the question you want to ask yourself is: are these zombies metaphysically possible? Could this actual reality (given its laws of nature) grant room for these zombies somewhere?

If the answer is yes, then this is a threat to strict physicalism or strict materialism.

If the answer is no, then you don't need to concern yourself with this argument.

And if they respond *exactly* in the same way as conscious beings, then I see no reason to say that they are not conscious. The neural activities perform the role of information acquisition and processing that *is* consciousness. So, no, I don't think that they *can possible be without* whatever 'phenomenal consciousness' is supposed to be.

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I fail to see how you can have temperature on top of the motion of molecules unless temperature per se is being conflated with temperature as experienced by us. But if so, that would defeat the point of such an analogy, since you would just be illustrating an instance of the hard problem rather than trying to explain it away.

Think of it like this. Before the rise of statistical mechanics, was it logically possible that temperature was NOT the average kinetic energy of molecules?

And the answer has to be 'of course it was logically possible at that time'. it was only after the development of statistical mechanics and the resulting *explanation* of temeprature that the identity was accepted (after appropriate testing, of course).

Stripped off from our experiences, temperature is just a label applied to the motion of molecules. In this sense, there is nothing to be "felt by us", so there is "no extra layer of temperature on top". It's only when you add us into the picture that we hen have something extra about temperature.

Not true. We can measure temperature via the expansion of liquids and solids. There is no *logical* reason that must be the result of molecular motion. In fact, it doens't even *logically* require the existence of molecules at all.

With regards to computer programs, similar thing. Stripped off from our experiences (though it's hard to visualize, admittedly), a computer program is the series of 0s and 1s (when converted to binary code).

Not true. And easy way to see this is that the same program can operate on different processors with different machine codes. The sequences of 0 and 1's would then be quite different even though it is the same program.

To get the computer program executed, you need the hardware, circuitry, switches, voltages, and so on, to process the 0s and 1s per that program. And you get the intended output as a result, such as words on the screen. Everything is adequately explained in terms of the hardware and circuitry and such. Particles that are arranged a certain way manifest as printed words on the screen. But the "on top of the particles" part of such an output comes from our experiences of the program. We point our heads towards the screen with open eyes and vividly see these words.

No person actually needs to interact with the program, though. It can still 'monitor' incoming data, respond to it in a variety of ways, and adjust the computers internal state to remember that.

Once again, I remind you this is the hard problem; how is it we can not only make use of a program, but we can vividly experience it?

You like the word 'vivid' in this regard. But what does it actually mean? Why would a zombie, that is admittedly able to detect and react to sensory data not have a 'vivid' sensation?

Chalmers has flirted with panpsychism (at least in the past) which is probably why he said that thermostats have a degree of consciousness. But put aside panpsychism for now. Does a thermostat vividly experience things? Probably not. Based on its programming, it detects change in surrounding temperature and then performs a series of actions that adjusts the temperature and keeps it within the desired range ... or however it works. But it doesn't feel anything, right? It just does what it's programmed to do.

And perhaps we just do what our brains and physics dictates that we do. So? Does that mean we are not conscious?

Does the thermostat have a feedback loop where it actually members its actions?

What does it mean to 'feel something' in the context you require. how can I determine if I am 'feeling something' in the sense you are using it?

Now we also detect things, but we also have experiences when we detect things. We feel the heat, not just detect it. We hear sounds, not just detect motion of molecules in air. We see objects, not just detect light waves. Thermostats detect stuff, but without these vivid experiences. They detect things "in the dark". That's all I mean by "in the dark".

What is the difference between detecting the heat and feeling the heat? What is the difference between detecting the light from something and seeing it?

And, again, that word 'vivid'. Can you give more detail about what that exactly means? How do I know if my sensations are 'vivid' in the sense you mean?

I'm not sure what else to say. I know I've left a few questions unanswered, but maybe I'll attempt those next time.

I like the view expressed by emjay, though. Epiphenomenalism is a view I briefly held in the past. It sounds quite reasonable, but there's a bit of iffiness about consciousness not having any effect whatever on the physical. When I'm talking about my own consciousness for example, that seems to refute epiphenomenalism (at least in the strict sense).

I think maybe the key in your exposition is that word 'vivid', but how does that differ from simply being reactive to the stimulus? Being sensitized to the possible reception of that stimulus?