RE: Christianity is heading for a full allegorization
January 26, 2022 at 1:32 am
(This post was last modified: January 26, 2022 at 2:45 am by Belacqua.)
Here's my version, since nobody asked:
Substance dualism says that mind and brain are both substances -- two different kinds of stuff. Each type of stuff has its own set of properties, and, in theory, mind-stuff could exist independently of brain-stuff. (I don't think anybody here is a substance dualist.)
Property dualism says that there is only one kind of stuff: brain matter. However, this brain matter gives rise to two very different kinds of properties. These are:
1] electrochemical events in the synapses, which can be detected from fMRI studies, and
2] phenomenological experiences, including qualia and thoughts.
The point is that for property dualists, these two things, while apparently occurring somehow in correlation, are very different properties and the one can't be reduced to the other.
Some people don't want to accept property dualism, because they think that electrochemical events just are phenomenological experiences. They think that 1 and 2 are the same property, despite the fact that we have no idea how 1 appears to us as 2.
I'm also a property dualist because if you crack open somebody else's head you might see their electrochemical events, but there's no way you'd see their phenomenological experiences.
Substance dualism says that mind and brain are both substances -- two different kinds of stuff. Each type of stuff has its own set of properties, and, in theory, mind-stuff could exist independently of brain-stuff. (I don't think anybody here is a substance dualist.)
Property dualism says that there is only one kind of stuff: brain matter. However, this brain matter gives rise to two very different kinds of properties. These are:
1] electrochemical events in the synapses, which can be detected from fMRI studies, and
2] phenomenological experiences, including qualia and thoughts.
The point is that for property dualists, these two things, while apparently occurring somehow in correlation, are very different properties and the one can't be reduced to the other.
Some people don't want to accept property dualism, because they think that electrochemical events just are phenomenological experiences. They think that 1 and 2 are the same property, despite the fact that we have no idea how 1 appears to us as 2.
I'm also a property dualist because if you crack open somebody else's head you might see their electrochemical events, but there's no way you'd see their phenomenological experiences.
