(January 24, 2023 at 10:03 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote: The pz proposition defines mental events as subjectivity - the thing the pz is lacking. Conflating a thing for some other thing it must not be might speak to the conceivability of the notion. In effect, you're laundering the pz's rep by means of some other conceivable thing. Machine subjectivity, in this case. It's just too delicious to pass up - because this trouble is going both directions. Machine subjectivity rejects the pz proposition and deeply calls into question the ep proposition...which certainly cannot be argued for by rejecting the notion of mental events altogether ala pz.
This one's gonna take a bit of unpacking... I'm sure you're right, you always are
but again I find it hard getting my head around this because again subjectivity seems like a process to me; but maybe that's an improvement in trying to narrow down this conflation/confusion in that subjectivity implies let's say an integrated whole (ie the experience of phenomenal consciousness is of of an integrated whole, a subject looking out at the world) whereas I find it very hard to say the same when looking at the underlying physical correlates, in this case neurons and the brain. But then maybe that's yet another conflation/confusion added to the mix.
