Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[The Grand Nudger]

My purpose was to point out the difference between that, and my assertion about basing morality on caring about how others are treated and what happens to them, obviously my reasoning that formed that emotion differs to the Nazis ideological beliefs. Though both moral worldviews are ultimately subjective. One moral worldview is only better than the other, if one accepts the subjective assertion that caring about others and how they're treated is moral, and not caring immoral. 

Emotivism is when no reason or truth alike thing whatsoever is behind a moral position or assertion.  This is what distinguishes it from cognitivist positions like subjectivism, relativism, and objectivism which all share the characteristic of making truth-alike claims.  If something is emotivist, it is not subjectivist.

I feel like this point keeps getting repeated, but the fact that an assertion contains an objectively true statement, and contains a moral assertion, does not make the moral assertion objectively true, lets try an example:

That's what it would mean if it were any other type of statement.  When a moral assertion makes a claim to facts and satisfies that claim to facts in the same way that other statements which make claims to facts satisfy those claims to facts and are considered true, then we are going to need some compelling reason not to consider the moral assertion true in the same way, by the same means.  Or, alternatively, if a mechanically equivalent moral statement cannot be objective then we might have to acknowledge that those other (purportedly) objective statements are also in error or deficient. This is what I'm referring to when I say moral objectivity is a non-novel system.  The homefield advantage of moral realism in logical discussions (rightly or wrongly). It treats moral assertions of truth like any other assertion of truth.

This seems like the same error above, I already accepted that if we have a subjective moral assertion we can base objectively true claims on it, but ultimately they all rest on a subjective moral assertion. This has been true of every example you have offered so far. 

 A relative moral assertion rests on relativism.  Relativism and subjectivism are not interchangeable.  If any moral statements are relativist not all moral statements are subjectivist.  

I don't think all moral assertions are relative of course, I can imagine no context in which rape would be acceptable, or torturing a baby for fun, for example, though sadly others have, and can. However these are examples, not a rule, so we must be careful not to dismiss moral relativism, but rather to be cautious, as the idea seems to have grave ramifications if applied universally. On what moral basis did we prosecute Nazis war criminals for crimes against humanity, if all morality is relative, and subjective, it's a disconcerting thought to be sure. I think the best we can hope for here are international laws, that enshrine certain universal human rights. I should not want to be murdered or raped, and this alone is sufficient for me to think these ought to be illegal, one of them at all times, and in all places, the other with the caveat: unless it is necessary to prevent a greater harm. 

If there is such a thing as moral relativism then not all moral statements are subjective.

Yes I'd have to agree that this at least reflects my experience of discussing morality. Though I find moral absolutes to more problematic than subjective morals, as I can use my reason to evaluate the consequences of an action, and even though my conclusion is not objectively true, I can see how best it serves the wellbeing of as many humans as possible. Since morals are anachronistic, claiming we have a set of immutable moral rules, derived from bronze age patriarchal Bedouin societies, is always going to be problematic two millennia later, in post industrialised societies of hundreds of millions. 

Your specific reasons do not matter, consequences do not matter, the wellbeing of human beings in any number does not matter, the anachronistic nature of morals does not matter, whether there are any rules and any circumstance of history does not matter, problematic does not matter...if morality is subjective.  Metaethical subjectivity is very plainly and simply whatever anyone says it is, and all competing claims are simultaneously true.  Because, in metaethical subjectivity the persons belief, every persons belief, is itself the truth maker.  All of the rest is all irrellevent.  All subjectivist claims, even directly competing ones, are simultaneously true and all of them no matter what they are are true for the same reason not related any of the stuff you mentioned.  If that sounds like an absurd state of affairs...consider that it only seems so because we implicitly believe we live in an objectivists universe. There are various moral error theories to this effect which make claims that range from expansive to specifically targeted.

Well one need not be tied to one distinct moral philosophy of course, but I think ultimately our moral worldview is subjective, from there we can make objectively true claims, and label them moral, but this does not mean they are objectively moral or immoral, merely that it's objectively true they best serve our subjective moral worldview. 

.............if emotivist and relativist moral positions exist... then not all moral assertions, positions or systems are subjective.

So for example, in a Christian culture where the bible is cited as containing immutable moral truths, it was easy to cite biblical texts that specifically and emphatically justify owning slaves, and thus assert it as being moral. So I don't think moral absolutes necessarily best serve human wellbeing, even as disconcerting as moral subjectivity can seem at times. Why tie ourselves the moral ravings of bronze age patriarchal Bedouin societies, two millennia later, in post industrialised democracies of hundreds of millions. I am sure our own moral distinctions will be evaluated millennia from now, (if humans survive that long), and just as sure they'll be found to be flawed, as they cannot be otherwise, since we ourselves are flawed.

Moral objectivity and moral absolutism are not interchangeable.  Because magic book says so is either subjectivist or relativist..depending on whether a person thinks a god wrote a magic book. Pure greed would be an easy emotivist justification for the same, for completeness. Like you, I don't think that the moral ravings of bronze age patriarchs are a good example..or any kind of example, of an objective moral system. Like you, I also think that our moral assertions have a tendency to inherit our general and specific incompetence. We're not perfect or ideal agents - another us problem regardless of the metaethical reality. It's a longshot, but even an emotivist can be in some state of meaningful error because of this. They can be confused or conflicted. The homophobe who says bad, means yuck...and is trying to suppress yum, for example.

How could our moral disinctions be found flawed in the absence of facts of those matters..and what moral position do you think contends there even are facts of those matters, to judge our moral positions against?