Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[The Grand Nudger]

I would agree, but none of the examples appear to do this? The conclusion that X is moral / immoral remained subjective, even when it was preceded with a fact that Y led to X. 

Remained subjective in some way not described by metaethical subjectivism, and subjective in some way that other mechanically equivalent assertions are not, or remained subjective in some way that any assertion of any type or kind or quality about anything whatsoever..is subjective?  

Well I find the "idea that moral claims are true if they accurately describe objective features of the world" dubious. Since we saw you offer examples that contained true statements, or partially true, and yet the moral conclusions were still subjective, or required further subjective assertions. 

That is, very quickly and dirtily speaking, the way other truth assertions which you consider to be objective are determined to be so.  By accurately reporting whatever fact they purport to report.  

Well, in as much as they are distinct concepts yes, but both moral relativism and subjectivism deal with the idea that morality isn't absolute, and on that point at least I agree. 

Subjectivism, relativism, and objectivism all deal with moralities that are not absolute.  Objectivism perhaps the least so, as it does not contend that there is any moral truth statement which, once true in a given set of factual circumstances must then be true forever, everywhere, and always., in other and different factual circumstances.  

Consider the set of things that we do which used to cause an immense amount of harm, which we now do in other ways that cause less or even no harm.  It was true at one point that it would be immoral to do x by this understanding of morality.  It is no longer true by that same understanding.  Objectively speaking.

Though they will ultimately rest on a subjective moral assertion. For example we can say it is true that murder causes harm, if we then accept the subjective assertion that causing harm is immoral, then the assertion that murder is immoral would be objectively true. The problem is that the first subjective claim is also relative, what if the harm were considered necessary? Then the statement murder is immoral is not objectively true, no? 

An emotivist morality rests on emotivist assertions.  Relativist moralities rest on relativist assertions.  Objectivist moralities rest on objectivist assertions.  Necessary harms are still harms.  Necessary evils are still evil. It's right there on the tin.  We have or imagine all sorts of reasons to do good and bad things....but the difference between these isms and ists is the truth making property in a given system or assertion.  

 

Your specific reasons do not matter, consequences do not matter, the wellbeing of human beings in any number does not matter, the anachronistic nature of morals does not matter, whether there are any rules and any circumstance of history does not matter, problematic does not matter...if morality is subjective. 

Isn't that a subjective claim as well? If it matters to me, it informs my morality, subjective or not. Though I accept my subjective notions of morality need not matter to anyone else. 

No, it's a descriptive claim about truth making properties in metaethical analysis. Things mattering to you is actually emotivist.  Just that experience of caring.  When I say they do not matter to subjectivist metaethics I mean they are not the truthmaking properties in subjectivist metaethics.  It's not even the specific fact assertion that a metaethical subjectivist makes that's the fact making property.  It's their posession over whatever fact assertion they make.  That they genuinely believe x it is all it takes or means for a thing to be subjectively true.  As a consequence, if other people believe not x, not x is also true - in a metaethically subjective universe, despite how that sounds to us as practical objectivist in a seemingly objective universe. In their universe, our situation seems absurd.

Well they share the idea that morality is universal, and that there is a single set of rules that apply to everyone all the time in all places. I'd assumed at least, that a moral absolute would have to be objectively true? 

No, they do not share this....and fwiw I think that moral absolutism has a long history of showing just how divorced from objectivity it can be.  

I drew the inference that since we are not infallible, no idea we create can be infallible, hence flawed or imperfect.

Math is flawed.  Math is imperfect.  Science is flawed.  Science is imperfect.  Logic is flawed.  Logic is imperfect.  In the fullest sense, an objectivist morality can never be complete because we lack access or lack detail even if we were not specifically or generally incompetent.  Every relevant fact of every matter with any moral import would have to freeze and remain in state everywhere and forever for us to even catch up the the event horizon of ideal truth.