Ben Shapiro vs Neil deGrasse Tyson: The WAR Over Transgender Issues

[The Grand Nudger]

It seems like you're suggesting that moral arguments, even from objectivists, are presuppositional? Apologies if I have misunderstood, but if not then I agree, we must base our moral worldview on some axiom, even if it is subjective. Then we can make objectively true claims about how best to be "moral", but the word moral then defines a subjective position at it's core. I have already said for example, that I have no problem encompassing harm into moral discourse, as it is expedient to do so. Though this I think remains a subjective view. 

I was asking you if the moralizers use of the term immoral was equivalent to the round earthers use of the term flat.  I'll come back to this later in the post. I think you're wrong about expediency, btw. I think it takes a hell of alot of time and effort to fully consider harm. Time and effort we often don't have in the moment, assuming the person(s) considering as much are competent to begin with. I think that's why we've had heuristic lists of do's and don'ts more often than systematic and specific exploration of moral content on real time. Why we say "because god said so you twat" rather than remake a moral case anew for every request.

Here's a list and god signed it, is, in my view, a moral expedient - and not explicitly referent to facts of the purported matters as harm and harm consideration are.

If I've understood you, then I think we concur on this, but given we both are atheists that's perhaps not a surprise here. So even though they claim god X has made objectively moral claims, and these are absolutes, they are simply wrong, as the claims are subjective absolutes that are not supported by objective facts? It becomes more problematic for theists when the immutable moral truths are contradictory of course, either in some indirect way, or in an unequivocal way. 

Correct, though being wrong isn't what makes them subjectivist.  Objectivist claims can also be wrong and still be objectivist claims. Just as a fun aside...contradictory moral absolutes are not a problem for metaethical subjectivism.  I mentioned this before.  In a truly subjective world, all genuinely held moral claims are as true as any other and all for the same reasons none of which having anything to do with the specific content of the claims or the nature of their expression, even contradictory claims are all simultaneously true.  

I think this then would the kind of subjective axiom I am talking about. A basis for objective claims about morality, that is itself subjective. 

We can add health and the badness of crack addiction to the pile with flatness and immorality. 
 

I think this leads down to why we bother with morality at all, leaving aside the precursors are likely in our evolved past, societal cohesion without some understanding, or some ability to learn what is and is not acceptable behaviour to the group. This would explain why we find including harm in a morality expedient, though I think it is still a subjective axiom when we examine the reason, or go deeper as you say. When I asked earlier you said that without including harm in moral discourse, morality would be meaningless. So in a way we form a priori subjective opinion we use as a moral axiom, on which to base our moral worldview. 

Immorality is a linguistic axiom, in that sense, no matter which metaethical theory is true.  Like flat, like health.  

They overlap in their conclusions of course, most human societies no matter how disparate they appear, tend to have some moral moratorium on certain behaviours. I am just not sure that this makes labelling them wrong objectively true, with an a priori subjective moral axiom. I would suggest they stem emotionally from our evolved past, we have evolved the ability to reason, and to make objective claims about the world, and these all combine to form our moral worldview, which is ultimately based a subjective view we consider a moral axiom, perhaps for expedience, or because it is emotionally intuitive. Hearing a child or baby cry is almost unbearable, and it's not hard to see why this trait evolved. 

More than one way to skin a cat, more than one road into a town, sure.  Society's moral moratoriums are, on their own, relativist rather than subjectivist or objectivist in a metaethical sense. Moral statements that are misreported emotions are not cognitivist at all.  Cannot be subjective, relative, or objective.  They are not truth alike, they just masquerade as such.  But let's add it to the pile.  Emotivism and relativism are all subjective as well.

Yes but the reason we consider X an objective fact, and y an entirely unsupported subjective opinion is because of those epistemological limits. I am not a scientist, but if I can see that there is universal consensus among elite biologist that evolution is objectively true, then I am inclined to accept this, as they are best placed to understand the evidence, and the methodology is designed to expose and discard subjective bias as much as is possible. 
No amount of consensus will sway me, in the absence of sufficient objective evidence, it's simply a bare appeal to numbers. 
Anyway I have to go out now, so thanks, I will catch up later if anyone still wants to discuss this.

You accept the consensus of experts in their fields -except- when it comes to ethics, it seems, even though those professional ethicists also have scientific evidence to support their logical assertions.  Now we can add all of that to the pile too.  Words, word use, explicitly distinct and disparate cognitive and noncognitivist basis, health, harm, expert consensus, logical demonstration, and empirical evidence are all "subjective".  

This is what I mean when I say that repeating "everything is subjective" is not a good argument against objectivity (or for subjectivity, for that matter).  A word that means everything means nothing in particular.  We can't accurately communicate our respective beliefs using that term in this way, you can't even consistently communicate your own beliefs using the term this way. You don't actually believe or communicate as though you believe that these things are subjective, they're collateral damage in maintaining the assertion about moral assertions. I want to stress here that this isn't me saying you're a fuckup - it's reiterating the issue of metaethical objectivity's homefield advantage if truth makers are objective and empirical facts in a rational conversation. Rightly or wrongly, that's exactly what moral realism says morality is about, that this is what we're trying (and constantly failing) to do. They're saying that we can make moral considerations that are like those statements, or, if they're different, that they're not different in an obvious way. Your skepticism is all recognizable and acknowledgeable from within an objectivists viewpoint....as a list of human moral/rational failures and the fundamentally compromised nature of human agents as moral/rational agents. Moral realists can easily and enthusiastically agree with you that "things are all subjective" in this way, but that's not a comment on moral content exclusively, or metaethical reality specifically, and it's accurate of a great many things.

Do you believe that your assertions that morality (and any other poor dead soldier already discussed or yet to be discussed) is subjective....are objectively true..... or is that also subjective? Is it absolutely objectively/subjectively true, or conditionally subjectively/objectively true?