LOL…somehow, Genkaus, I knew it would come down to you and me.
Points 1 &3: Agreed. What I hoped to address was the dismissal of any ‘proof’ other that physically observed phenomena or empirically supported inferences. That shows an unwillingness investigate the intellectual tools and methods, like the scientific method, we use to investigate the natural world. Materialism doesn’t get a free pass on its metaphysical assumptions.
Point 2: Sure. Angels, symbols, and qualia fall into different categories of being. I don’t see that as directly relevant to the discussion, which I’m trying to focus on subjective experience.
Point 4 (the important one): Materialism does not adequately address the issue of subjective experience because it only speaks to half of the problem: brain functions. Materialist explanations of consciousness focus exclusively on operations, i.e. observed behaviors, neural activity, etc. The missing part is why the brain feels the way it does, i.e. how this specific form of wet grey matter gives interior life to our thoughts and sensations. ‘Emergent properties’ are sufficient for describing how various functional components can join to perform new functions, like gears and levers assembled into spring driven toys. Going beyond that causes a category error because combining simple physical operations to make a single complex operation is much different than making a sensation, or qualia.
First I would like to know, from a materialist perspective, why one set of neurons firing, identical to all others except physical location, gives rise to pain, another to the smell of vinegar and another the memory of your grandmother. Next, is sensation limited to biological matter and why? For example, if a robot behaved like a human does that automatically make it a sentient being?
(May 9, 2012 at 10:30 am)genkaus Wrote: .[1.] Materialism isn't the only philosophy which relies on proof… [2.] not all metaphysical entities have equal status…[3.] Therefore, demand for proof for all other metaphysical entities is a valid request…[4.] subjective phenomena can be explained as an emergent property of a particular arrangement of matter...(numbers added for clarity)
Points 1 &3: Agreed. What I hoped to address was the dismissal of any ‘proof’ other that physically observed phenomena or empirically supported inferences. That shows an unwillingness investigate the intellectual tools and methods, like the scientific method, we use to investigate the natural world. Materialism doesn’t get a free pass on its metaphysical assumptions.
Point 2: Sure. Angels, symbols, and qualia fall into different categories of being. I don’t see that as directly relevant to the discussion, which I’m trying to focus on subjective experience.
Point 4 (the important one): Materialism does not adequately address the issue of subjective experience because it only speaks to half of the problem: brain functions. Materialist explanations of consciousness focus exclusively on operations, i.e. observed behaviors, neural activity, etc. The missing part is why the brain feels the way it does, i.e. how this specific form of wet grey matter gives interior life to our thoughts and sensations. ‘Emergent properties’ are sufficient for describing how various functional components can join to perform new functions, like gears and levers assembled into spring driven toys. Going beyond that causes a category error because combining simple physical operations to make a single complex operation is much different than making a sensation, or qualia.
First I would like to know, from a materialist perspective, why one set of neurons firing, identical to all others except physical location, gives rise to pain, another to the smell of vinegar and another the memory of your grandmother. Next, is sensation limited to biological matter and why? For example, if a robot behaved like a human does that automatically make it a sentient being?
