Why "mysterious ways" don't matter.

[Esquilax]

When I say that God's nature is good, that means that in no possible scenario could God shed that essential attribute. The definition of God is "the greatest conceivable being". If there could be a greater being, then that would be God. This definition means that He is morally perfect since it is better to be morally perfect than morally flawed (and therefore wouldn't be the greatest conceivable being).

Again, you're not going to evade the dilemma by simply defining it out of existence. "Greatest conceivable being" is a nonsensical definition to start with, as any quantified being can instantly be topped by something just slightly better than the now defined limitations on the first being: your only choice is to make your god completely amorphous to avoid the instantaneous contradiction of ever speculating about his attributes.

Case in point, you say it's impossible for god to shed his morally good nature, which means that's something god cannot do. The greatest conceivable being wouldn't have anything that it couldn't do, because limitations are at odds with greatness, and therefore either your god claim is contradictory, or your god can in fact shed his good nature.

And all that is simply ignoring the other baseless assertion you've made, which is that it is better to not be morally flawed; which yardstick are we to use there? Is god having to stick to your definition of greatness, or is there a set standard outside of your own opinions that you're just not bothering to tell us?

And I'm being kind here, in even entertaining any of this, because your central premise is relying on yet more assertions. I don't care what you define god as, I care how you intend to demonstrate that god fits that definition. I took you to task in my last post for attempting an end run around a problem with your god by making assertions of his attributes based on no information, and your answer to that is to make yet more assertions, based on no information. Again I ask: what is your referent for god, what yardstick are you using for greatness, and what determination was there that strict moral goodness is a part of that?

Also, how do you square this new "everything god says is good" attitude with a claim of objective morals? An objective thing wouldn't change due to the opinions of another, after all.

Doesn't the atheist have the same problem of infinite regress when defining good and evil? One needs a stopping point. So the question then is is your ultimate stopping point a plausible stopping point? A theist would stop with God (the greatest conceivable being). An atheist would stop where?

An atheist would stop with the needs of the minds required to sustain a moral framework. Have you even been reading my posts? Morality ceases to exist if there's nobody to observe the universe and act within it, therefore that which sustains the lives of conscious observers is, at bottom, a morally good act. Easy.