Why "mysterious ways" don't matter.

[Esquilax]

I think when Christians talk about "mysterious ways" it means that they do not presume to know all the factors Divine Providence takes into consideration. As limited beings our lack of knowledge prevents us from fully comprehending how the Lord governs His creation.

Which leaves us with two problems: the first is the one I started this thread with, which is that if a being accused of a crime refuses to explain himself, we aren't required to suspend judgment, nor are we to blame if that judgment comes down against the person refusing to speak. In fact, our laws are configured in such a way as to punish those who knowingly keep pertinent information from the authorities.

The second is that, properly phrased and taking into account the unspoken portions of any "mysterious ways" argument, the christian is saying this: "You don't know what god's intentions are, so you can't call him evil. I don't know what god's intentions are either, so it's perfectly okay for me to call him good." The same argument they use to prevent us from naming god evil should also, if it's applied consistently, stop anyone not only from calling him good, but also from making any declarative statements about god at all. If god's ways are so vast and complicated that we can't comprehend them and, apparently, the way things look aren't necessarily the way they seem, then the assumption that his good actions really are good can't be made either. Hell, even the assumption that the words in his holy book really mean what they mean, or were written truthfully, isn't a safe one either. A christian who actually believes that god's ways are mysterious has no safe ground to believe anything about him at all.

That's an unprovable philosophical assumption. The distinction between objective and subjective knowledge is a false dichotomy. Knowledge of an object presupposes a knowing subject. A knowing subject requires an object of its knowledge.

The problem is in your last sentence: a knowing subject only ever has belief that he knows something. The level of certainty that the subject possesses about a given object does not affect whether or not that object truly exists. You can know something for absolute certain and still be dead wrong. Which is the point I'm making: if objective moral values collapse without god around, then they were never objectively real, they were merely thoughts in his head, and hence subjective.