RE: Why "mysterious ways" don't matter.
July 16, 2014 at 1:13 pm
(This post was last modified: July 16, 2014 at 1:14 pm by Neo-Scholastic.)
(July 12, 2014 at 1:56 am)Pickup_shonuff Wrote:(July 11, 2014 at 11:46 pm)Esquilax Wrote: I think the issue here is that Chad is talking about knowledge of objective morality, whereas I'm talking about the existence of it. I agree with him that knowledge requires both a subject and a mind to host that knowledge claim, but when we're talking about something that apparently blinks out of existence the moment a certain mind disappears, we're talking about an opinion and not a referent to something that actually exists.
So then with morality, it seems that at bottom one must first claim a value system, which is inevitably subjective, but once one acquires that then an objective paradigm can emerge from which we judge certain actions to be right and wrong--and we say these particular judgments are as objective as anything else because our value system (which places the source of moral value and meaning where it belongs--in the sentient being) is the only one grounded in anything sensible i.e. reality as understood by human perception within the paradigm of scientific (in its broad sense) inquiry. Would that be roughly correct in your view?
I wasn't really concerned with 'objective morality'. What I saw in Esq's comment was a blanket statement about the nature of what we call real and how the distinction between subjective and objective things is a matter of aspect. Here is the quote:
(July 11, 2014 at 5:56 am)Esquilax Wrote: The whole point of objective things is that they don't require subjective experience to exist.
The statement takes for granted a materialist ontology, a dead philosophical position. From a purely scientific perspective matter is largely undefined. There is no symbol in physics for matter. One can safely assume that the symbols and operations refer to something fundamental on the backside, but not everyone makes the assumption that it is 'matter' or even that 'matter' is itself sufficient by itself to serve as a monistic substrate.