This is my version of Idealism, and there's a thread about it already. I won't link it, though, because it would be epic necro. 
As I see it, there's no way to "prove" that the material world exists. All you can really say is that the relationships among objects in our experience are consistently true, which makes the material model of experience very useful. Whether a bridge is data, or a collection of formulas which manifest as an experience, or an idea in the mind of God, or just a physical thing in an actually-existent space, it's going to stand up if made properly, and you are going to get hurt if you jump off of it.
I do not like the process of taking a philosophical position of convenience, i.e. that there's a real physical universe, and then using physical observations to prove that philosophical position. This seems to me to represent a nasty circle, akin to God and the Bible supporting each other. It seems to me that the relationships we have labeled the "physical universe" work just as well as ideas as they do as existent "things," but that the mental world does NOT work well when expressed in physicalist terms.
As I see it, there's no way to "prove" that the material world exists. All you can really say is that the relationships among objects in our experience are consistently true, which makes the material model of experience very useful. Whether a bridge is data, or a collection of formulas which manifest as an experience, or an idea in the mind of God, or just a physical thing in an actually-existent space, it's going to stand up if made properly, and you are going to get hurt if you jump off of it.
I do not like the process of taking a philosophical position of convenience, i.e. that there's a real physical universe, and then using physical observations to prove that philosophical position. This seems to me to represent a nasty circle, akin to God and the Bible supporting each other. It seems to me that the relationships we have labeled the "physical universe" work just as well as ideas as they do as existent "things," but that the mental world does NOT work well when expressed in physicalist terms.
