A Conscious Universe

[bennyboy]

When I say ideas in the context of a candidate for reality, I don't mean ideas, like me sitting around thinking up stuff. I mean those elemental principles which make up the framework by which "stuff" operates, and of which stuff is better said to be an expression than vice versa.

I don't mean we think up ideas with our monkey brains, and that suddenly becomes our reality.

Okay... so you're not really advocating idealism here at all, which, as I understand it (and to quote a dictionary definition), asserts that "objects of knowledge are held to be in some way dependent on the activity of mind." Perhaps what you're trying to express is more similar to the neutral monism of two of my favorite thinkers, William James and Bertrand Russell?

I think I will have to study neutral monism before I can comment intelligently on how it relates to my views. Since my reason for selecting idealism is that I think some parts of QM and some philosophical issues with mind aren't compatible with physical monism, then whether I'd accept a neutral monism would depend on their view on those issues. I'm sure Russel didn't have much to say about QM, but I'll bet he said a lot about mind. Thanks for the heads up.

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Even if we decide to believe that it is in principle possible to model nature exactly in a theory of everything using mathematics, we can never know empirically when we have truly reached this goal. The insight is therefore of limited value. Those who believe that mathematical structures are real in the sense that they correspond to structures in nature exactly in some way, may be right but have in my opinion no good evidence for this view.

Discussion of this stuff is a little complicated, because there are a lot of equivocations and semantic confusions possible with the way we are using words-- in particular, the words "idea" and the word "real."

My view is that there is an underlying idea, principle or formula, and that particles and supervenient objects are a realization of those ideas. We then infer through the particles or objects those underlying rules, which are the deepest layer of reality, and which are themselves not "things." And because the things we observe are imperfect representations of those underlying perfect truths, there's never a perfect match. An example would be a wave on water. I think there's a perfect wave, which would be the resolution independent (i.e. contiguous) interplay between gravity and other forces, then there's the "actual" wave, in which water molecules are approximately aligned to that perfect wave, and then there's the forumulaic wave which we infer, which is also perfect, at least in principle.

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I wouldn't say that you're "experiencing brain chemistry", I'd say that "brain chemistry -is- experience". Until you can really let that sink in I don't think you understand my position at all.

All day we can do this. I'll explain the difference between subjective and objective, which of course you already know, and you'll argue the difference is semantic. But at the end of the day, when I'm watching little Mario jump around, that's my experience. I'm agnostic about the mechanical state of the computer-- and there's no way I can infer that state without stepping out of that game experience. In real life, there's no way to step out of the system and see what's driving it: ideas about the source of experiences can only be assumed.

It is because of QM, in which I don't see ideas to represent what can usefully be called "a thing," and because of qualia, which I also don't think can be resolved unambiguously in geometric space, that I break from that mundane view.

You seem to have some strange beliefs about QM, as others have mentioned. That qualia -can be- resolved in geometric space is precisely what any of my explanations are trying to bring you to

That's fantastic news! Show me how "redness" resolves in geometric space.

If I ask you to think about the color red, a very material collection of things is going to start doing work - and we can observe that to occur, and that's precisely what happens when you ask an NES to make Mario jump.

I can do that with a computer, too: hook up a breadboard to a USB adapter, shine a blue light on it, and observe what memory registers change when I do so. Have I now established that the computer is experiencing qualia?

If so, then qualia means nothing, and the fact that everything I do, including making observations, is through qualia, represents a serious philsophical quandary. You may be disinterested in this quandary, and wave it away with a nod toward the brain (or the computer), but I have a sincere interest in the nature of my experiences, and the reason for their existence, that isn't answered by "Duhhh, you're stupid. It's in the brain, of course!"