Christianity is heading for a full allegorization

[polymath257]

And I don't think they are conceivable. I certainly cannot conceive of something that is physically identical to a conscious being that is not itself conscious. That seems nonsensical to me.

I can. For me, it's not that hard. In the same way I can conceive of centaurs and cyclopes. It's not logically contradictory.

Metaphysically possible, on the other hand, I don't know. My position on consciousness doesn't rest on the zombie argument anyway. But I don't think the idea of zombie is incoherent.

I guess I cannot see how such would be possible.

But that connection depends on our knowledge of that link. Previous to that, and even after molecules were known, it was certainly 'logically possible' that temperature was not the average kinetic energy of the molecules.

Temperature is the average kinetic energy of the molecule. They're not two distinct things here. You observe the motion of molecules and you attribute the descriptive label of "high temperature" or "low temperature" to the observation.

We know *now* that they are not two distinct things. But that is the result of the development of statistical mechanics. Are they *logically* required to be the same thing? Not at all.
If the laws of physics were different,t hey would not be the same.

Of course, I'm assuming by temperature, you're not including one's experience of it and thereby conflating things.

No, the experience of temperature is quite different than the temperature. It has to deal with how *we* process information our senses collect about temperature.
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I think it holds. We do not know the specifics of how neural activities correlate to conscious states. Until we do, saying what is and what is not possible is going to be fraught with dangers.

No, it doesn't hold. Even if you want to refer to neural activity as "consciousness", there's still that "perceptibly separate quality" on top of that.
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Just like temperature is a quality 'on top of movement of molecules'?

And if we can 'explain' how conscious states work by pointing to their correlates in neural activity?

That would not be enough. If that's how one explains how computer programs exist, then they're not giving the full explanation. But we know theoretically how a computer program arises by explaining it in terms of a series of 0s and 1s. It is basically 0s and 1s.

Actually, it would be better to explain it in terms of semi-conductors and the actual physical properties. The 0/1 description isn't how it *actually* happens: it happens by our *coding* of 0 and 1 in terms of some physical phenomenon, like different voltage levels.

But, again, they are *the same thing* in a certain sense.

I hope you're not conflating a computer program with our interactive experience of it, by the way.

Well, the interactive part is certainly crucial. We collect sensory data, process it, using our memories and expectations, and that is what ends up in a conscious experience.

I'm not sure what you mean here. If I detect something visual, it is 'vivid flashy'. Since I don't detect 'in the dark', if it is detected, it is not 'in the dark'. If I detect something auditory it is 'vivid soundy'.

An advanced computer arguably can detect things, but it does so "in the dark". So I wanted to be sure that's what you considering when you say "sensory detection".

1. If it detects, it isn't 'in the dark' since (visual) detection cannot happen without light.

2. Which means you are making a metaphor. But a metaphor of what, precisely? Since humans are very visual creatures, the metaphor is visual (light) as opposed to auditory
or olfactory. But what is it a metaphor about?

3. Don't forget that Chalmers proposed that thermostats might have a degree of consciousness. So how do you know the advanced computer isn't conscious to some degree?

4. Most likely, the 'conscious experience' is partly due to the complexity of processing of the information, the linkage to memories, the linkage to emotions, and the sharing with other processing pieces of the mind. So the computer is still way to simple to have what we would call consciousness.

But to your question earlier, whether there's a difference between a quale and sensory detection. I would say they're different. That the latter is one type of the former.

OK, so what is the difference? Give an example showing the difference.

And how can I determine that?

Via awareness of having such experiences.

Awareness: I have the information that I have perceived it. OK, how is that different than simply having the perception and remembering it?.

And yet, for some reason, they *report* having such, just like their physically identical conscious counterparts do.

Yeah, they may report but it doesn't mean they have it.

But here's the question: WHY would they report it if they don't have it? The only reason I can see for them reporting it is if they actually have a perceptio, remember it, and can report it. How is that different than being conscious?

Now, why would they report this if it is not the case?

I don't know, because they're conditioned to do so? Or some other reason?

The most obvious reason is that they actually have the experience. You are assuming that *we* are not similarly 'conditioned'. The conditioning isn't exclusive of being conscious.

Again, this isn't reflex: it involves complex brain processing of the information, the formation of memories, the processing of emotions, the use of the frontal cortex for planning, etc.

In every way, they are physically identical to a conscious person. That, to me, means that are clearly conscious.

Anyway, I don't think the thought experiment necessitates that a zombie report having experiences without any reason whatsoever.

And the only possible reason is that they actually have the experience and are thereby conscious.

And doesn't that show that zombies are an incoherent concept?

Not really. It may be counterintuitive, but it's not an incoherent concept.

OK, I disagree with that. The only reason for something to have the complex interaction with their environment that demonstrates consciousness in ordinary people is that they *be* conscious.

How can I determine if I actually have 'phenomenological experiences'?

By being aware you're having the experiences.

So, having the information that I have sensed something and having that information readily available?

What is the difference between 'seeing stuff' and 'vividly seeing stuff'? Is the alternative to 'dimly see stuff'?

It's probably the same thing, depending on how you're defining "seeing". But if you consider a car with sensors to have the capacity to "see", then there is a difference and the difference is relevant.

The car's sensors do not have nearly the complexity of processing that our brains do. But we can and do say that the sensors 'picked up' some object and that the computer running the sensor is then 'aware' of it. We can and do talk about a robot 'being aware' of something in its environment when it starts to interact in ways that *we* see as showing awareness.

That may not be simple laziness in our use of language: maybe that car and robot *are* aware in a certain way.

The alternative is "not seeing" or "seeing in the dark" depending on how you're looking at "seeing".

It seems to me that the difference is one of degree of processing of the information, not something greatly different.

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This reminds me of an opinion of Descartes that the torture of animals was OK since animals only 'appear' to be in pain, but are not *actually* in pain because they are not conscious. It also parallels the question of the middle ages about whether women have souls. Somehow, cries of agony and desperate attempts to avoid the torture are not enough to recognize something is in pain.

I see what you're saying... but at the same time, these extreme examples you're giving, notwithstanding their brutality, seem self-refuting and contradictory on the merits of their own supposed logic... in the sense that if the goal/purpose of inflicting torture/punishment is to cause suffering, then if you truly do not believe that the recipient of those actions has consciousness, and thus the ability to suffer, then the act is pointless for that goal... it would be the equivalent of trying to punish a rock for instance. Realistically I think the most you could logically infer from this sort of thinking is that you should be indifferent to that which you do not believe has consciousness, not that you should go out of your way to cause it harm, just as you are indifferent towards the fate of a rock on account of believing it not to have consciousness, rather than trying to hurt it.

Well, an example that isn't motivated by causing suffering is giving an anesthetic to an animal during surgery. Suppose a limb need to be removed. Descartes would say that it is acceptable to hack through it because the animal feels no real pain. I would say that an anesthetic would be required unless there is a good medical reason otherwise. Not all pain is inflicted with the intent to cause suffering.

And this is another aspect of the zombie question: a zombie that is crying out in pain *is* in pain. A zombie that obviously 'appears' deeply moved by a piece of music or poetry *is* deeply moved by the music or poetry. A zombie that appears to be overwhelmed by the beauty of a sunset *is* overwhelmed by the beauty of a sunset.

And this is one reason why zombies are simply incoherent. Whatever they have, we *should* identify as being conscious.

The way I look at it is this; *anything* in consciousness that we can *notice*... beit the content of our senses or meta-content so to speak (ie an example of the latter would be the visual field itself, and the former - content - what we see in the visual field)... *must* in my view have a neurally accessible representation because we are able to name it or mentally refer to it (ie you don't need to explicitly name something, though you can, in order to mentally refer to it as something like an instance in memory... 'ie that [unnamed] experience I had the other day which nonetheless I can explicitly refer to in my memory'), which I believe would require neurally associating either the language representation of a name/label or similar for an instance of memory. Roughly I would liken this view to that of a very complicated switchboard, but the main thing is that there is nothing about this concept that to me implies the necessity for phenomenal consciousness; I think all of this could tick along perfectly fine without it... this constant flux of activation and association, and so to me, the question is why it does not. So where you don't seem to be able to conceptualise the beauty of a sunset as apart from phenomenal consciousness, I disagree, and think that if you can notice it, or anything else, in consciousness, and associate things with it, it must have a neurally accessible representation... and if it has that, then it is subject to physics and determinism, thus making phenomenal consciousness seem, as I said, superfluous and unnecessary.

Granted this is just a theory, and it's been a long time since I've been seriously interested in neuroscience, but the logic still seems perfectly reasonable to me. But all I'm trying to show is where I'm coming from, but like I said, I do accept that this view follows from my own particular perspectives on all this and could well be flawed... and that others, such as yourself, with other perspectives can see it vastly differently. As I said, I'm open to seeing it another way, if convinced, but these are my reasons for seeing it as I currently do.

I do think that one crucial aspect for consciousness is interaction with a changing environment *and* maintaining a record of internal states in memory. So a simple switchboard would not have the memory aspect.

And I also think we need to get a better vocabulary. If I out a noxious chemical in with a bacterium, it will react and move away. That *is* a type of awareness. But I suspect it is quite different than what humans have simply because of the differences in complexity of the information processing. Plants *do* respond to changes in their environment, even releasing chemicals 'informing' other plants of dangers, leading them to react in ways that are protective. That is *also* a type of awareness, but it seems to be significantly different than the other two types.

There is a sense in which *everything* that is alive maintains information about its internal state and its environment in order to maintain homeostasis. That is a type of awareness.

In a different direction, even someone who is asleep (unconscious?) is processing information from the environment and can wake up if something unusual happens.  That is also a certain type of awareness. There other other states like 'conscious sedation' that also seem relevant.

We need a fuller vocabulary to discuss the similarities and differences between all of these different types of awareness. This lack of vocabulary and precision makes the discussion of consciousness very difficult because we cannot point to examples distinguishing the process we want to talk about.

I think this *is* a problem in the study of consciousness, but again, it is a 'soft' problem, not a hard problem.

I see the problem of consciousness as a question about information processing and that alone: how and why do we become 'aware' (have information) of something?