Non-existence

[LukeMC]

Of course we experience things which seem to be outside of our mind. The question is whether we positively claim that experience to be an experience of an actually ontologically independently existing reality outside of your mind, or whether we reduce it to be an experience confined to your own mind. There is more complexity in the former case, and less complexity and more simplicity in the latter case.

How can you say that the sensation I feel in my foot is purely in my mind? I experience the sensation of touch where my foot is located in the same way I experience the sensation of thoughts where my mind is located. They're both a physical sensation and experience. Why is it not the case that our bodies are the only thing that is real, and our minds are merely an illusion generated by the body? (As opposed to minds being real and body being illusion).

What criterion do you use to choose between these experiences? "I think therefore I am" could just as easily have been "I feel therefore I am". Both are result of physical sensation experienced in a particular area of what we understand to be the body. I would posit that both must be real unless you can state in greater detail how one would choose which experiences to trust as really being.

If you do accept this, it doesn't damage your argument. You'll just have to say "experience confined to the mind/body" instead of just the mind. And I understand what you are saying to Kyuu. But if you are to deny the senses that tell you there is an objective reality outside of your mind, then how can you trust the thoughts and decisions that led you to the conclusion that there is probably no such objective world? Or are your thoughts more reliable than your senses, perhaps?

And a final question, just to make absolutely sure that you're sick of me, do you live your life under the assumption that everything outside of your mind is an illusion and could change at any moment? (General curiosity).

[Jon Paul]

I think that the burden of proof would be on the strange idea that somehow I was the only one conscious.

You are shifiting the burden of proof then, for you don't have actual evidence of other minds.

I only have direct evidence of my own consciousness...but which is really more probable? Them being philosophical zombies as you say, being indentical in every way except not conscious...

On a naturalist mode of thinking, what is more probable is philosophical zombies, such that the real miracle which defies what you can predict a priori from general principles is that you know you have a mind.

There is no evidence to suggest that consciousness is anything more than the workings of the brain.

There is no evidence to suggest that consciousness exists, from general principles of naturalism. Only from conscious experience itself, only from properly basic knowledge.

When your brain is messed with, your consciousness is.

You can only say that your own consciousness changes when your own brain is messed with. What you probably mean is that peoples behaviour changes according to the changes in their brain. But that would be the case if people were philosophical zombies without minds, as well.

And I see no reason to believe in philosophical zombies

You don't have to believe in philosophical zombies, because the notion of other people as philosophical zombies proposes less than the notion of other minds. What you have to believe in is, then, other minds.

For me to be a total exception and every one else to be philosophical zombies I find to be highly improbable.

But what is improbable is exactly that you have a consciousness at all, because that does not proceed from any general principle of naturalism.

What does proceed from general principles of naturalism is philosophical zombies.

Just like a person has knowledge of Gods existence properly basic to his own personal and qualitative experience and knowledge.

Personal experience is not evidence of God. Unless you can show me that it somehow is.

Then your personal knowledge and experience that you are a conscious mind, is not evidence that you are a conscious mind, either.

For me to be the only one that is 'actually consciousness' when the other around 6 billion people on the planet perfectly emulate it,

But that is exactly what the notion of philosophical zombies predicts, that everyone should behave exactly as they do but without any conscious experience of it in the sense of being a conscious mind.

I consider to be utterly ridiculous. It's not impossible no, I muse over the idea, yes. But I need evidence that I'm some bizarre exception merely because 'I', 'know me'.

Again you shift the burden of evidence. You can't demand evidence that others are not conscious, when you have given no evidence that they are.

Unrefuted to you. I don't know exactly to what you're referring to, but all I've seen is you go on about how the existence of 'God' is required for the existence of 'objective truth'.

That is the TAG, which is merely one of the arguments I presented. All arguments are presented in their general outlines within the first 3 pages of my thread, and more elaborately in the course of the entire thread. The TAG, which you address, happens to be the non-evidential one. The evidential one, from potentiality/contingency, you entirely ignored, which is very ... "convenient" ... since you are obviously of an evidentialist mindset which can't comprehend epistemology, yet you chose to address exactly the epistemology.

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Even if you assume YOU are the one doing the dreaming it would mean that the virtual/dream scenario is pointless and no one else was real! Why bother? I don't think you are claiming that though! I think you want to have a hosted scenario with the host being non-existent which brings us back to mental masturbation.

No. All I have said is that proposing only a mind (which is all we have real evidence of) is proposing less complexity than proposing a reality outside of the mind.

I have not said anything about which scenario is true or false.

---

How can you say that the sensation I feel in my foot is purely in my mind? I experience the sensation of touch where my foot is located in the same way I experience the sensation of thoughts where my mind is located. They're both a physical sensation and experience. Why is it not the case that our bodies are the only thing that is real, and our minds are merely an illusion generated by the body? (As opposed to minds being real and body being illusion).

That is sense data. Sense data does not equal sense data representing a reality outside of your mind.

What criterion do you use to choose between these experiences? "I think therefore I am" could just as easily have been "I feel therefore I am". Both are result of physical sensation experienced in a particular area of what we understand to be the body. I would posit that both must be real unless you can state in greater detail how one would choose which experiences to trust as really being.

I think therefore I am is a reductionist view of human being, but there is nothing in that phrase which contradicts solipsism, since in solipsism, your mind actually is.

If you do accept this, it doesn't damage your argument. You'll just have to say "experience confined to the mind/body" instead of just the mind. And I understand what you are saying to Kyuu. But if you are to deny the senses that tell you there is an objective reality outside of your mind, then how can you trust the thoughts and decisions that led you to the conclusion that there is probably no such objective world? Or are your thoughts more reliable than your senses, perhaps?

I never concluded that "there is no objective world", only that proposing such a world outside of your mind, is proposing more complexity, not less, than proposing only your conscious experience (and nothing more).

And a final question, just to make absolutely sure that you're sick of me, do you live your life under the assumption that everything outside of your mind is an illusion and could change at any moment? (General curiosity).

No. I believe reality does exist outside of our minds. I am only disagreeing about how we can know that it does.

Going by mere evidence, reductionism and skepticism, solipsism is the simplest, most reduced form of affirmation of our existence.

Proposing more than the mind is proposing more complexity than is warranted by empirical data, as the empirical sense-data do not require to be actual entities outside your mind, but only require to be affirmed as data we have conscious experience of.

Speculating as to their origin is contrary to absolute skepticism and reductionism, and not warranted by empirii, but only by properly basic beliefs in your epistemic structure on par with "my mind exists", then "reality exists" and "God exists", all things usually justified by properly basic beliefs from personal/subjective qualitative experience and knowledge, even when no evidence explicitly requires them independently of the personal/subjective qualitative experience and knowledge.

[LukeMC]

That is sense data. Sense data does not equal sense data representing a reality outside of your mind.

That's not what I was trying to say. I was trying to demonstrate how our bodies are just as real as our minds, as we experience the physical sensations of our bodies in much the same way as the physical sensations on our minds. I wasn't arguing for a world outside of the mind/body, only making the point that the body must be as real as the mind.

I think therefore I am is a reductionist view of human eing, but there is nothing in that phrase which contradicts solipsism, since in solipsism, your mind actually is.

But your body should also be. This is my point so far.

I never concluded that "there is no objective world", only that proposing such a world outside of your mind, is proposing more complexity, not less, than proposing only your conscious experience (and nothing more).

I am aware of your position on the complexity argument. And until you clarified your position in your last post, I just assumed you took this position seriously. What I should instead say is that in denying ones most basic capacities for knowledge, how can anybody claim a logical progression to solipsism if even their thoughts may not be trust-worthy?

No. I believe reality does exist outside of our minds. I am only saying that going by mere evidence, reductionism and skepticism, solipsism is the simplest, most reduced form of affirmation of our existence. Proposing more than the mind is proposing more complexity than is warranted by empirical data, as the empirical sense-data do not require to be actual entities outside your mind, but only require to be affirmed as data we have conscious experience of. Speculating as to their origin is contrary to absolute skepticism and reductionism, and not warranted by empirii, but only by properly basic beliefs in your epistemic structure (e.g. on par with "my mind exists", then "reality exists" and "God exists", all things usually justified by properly basic beliefs from personal/subjective qualitative experience and knowledge, even when no evidence explicitly requires them independently of the personal/subjective qualitative experience and knowledge).

Thanks for the clarification. I'm not sure you are correct in asserting that solipsism is the most reduced form of affirmation of our existence. It raises far, far more questions than it can answer. For example, in a solipsistic universe, everything in existence in this universe was generated by the mind. One's mind has created a multitude of languages, a hundred billion galaxies with a hundred billion stars each, a quantum realm of absolute madness and many other complexities which the mind can then experience and observe. For this kind of universe to only exist in ones mind, it raises the question of why the mind created such a universe, how it created such a universe, how long it can keep it the universe up, when it created it, etc, etc.

Concluding that this universe was generated in the mind and exists solely in this isolated mind requires an incredibly complex mind which can not only create a universe unknowingly, but can operate within it and interact with its simulated creation. I consider this a far more complex situation than the universe being a real realm, and humanity (minds included) being a part of this all-inclusive plane. A universe generating itself, forgetting itself and interacting with itself requires quite a bit more than a universe just "being".

[Edwardo Piet]

You are shifiting the burden of proof then, for you don't have actual evidence of other minds.

There is no evidence for philsophical zombies either. There is merely a failure of evidence for the consciousness of others. This doesn't mean they're philosophical zombies. It's far more likely that they are the same as me but...the reason why I can't detect their consciousness....is that I'm not them!.

I need evidence that 'my own consciousness' means I'm 'more conscious than they are'. The fact that they completely emulate it is evidence, since unless I was capable of emulating it too - I myself couldn't be conscious!

As far as I'm concerend there's no evidence for my own consciousness.....in the way consciousness in normally understood.

There is evidence that I think, yeah. But not that there is an 'I' that does all the thinking. Only that thoughts pop in and out. And one thought that thinks 'I thought that' can be a completely different 'self' to another self that later thinks once again 'I thought that'.

I know of no evidence of a 'me' that governs of my mind. Only of thought itself.

So yes, I have self-evidence of my consciousness. But that's it. I dont acually have self evidence of one big 'me' that 'thinks', the 'self', the 'ego'. So in the traditonal sense I guess I'd argue that my consciousness doesn't exist. Because there is no single 'me' or 'self' to 'have' consciousness. There is only a brain itself full of consciousness, attached to the rest of the body that composes 'me'.

Do you know of what Dan Dennett refers to as 'Zimboes' that's on the wikipedia article about Philosophical zombies?

to quote from part of the wikipedia article "

"[...]One response is to claim that the idea of qualia and related phenomenal notions of the mind are not coherent concepts, and the zombie scenario is therefore incoherent. Daniel Dennett and others take this line. They argue that while consciousness, subjective experiences, and so forth exist in some sense, they are not as the zombie argument proponent claims they are; pain, for example, is not something that can be stripped off a person's mental life without bringing about any behavioral or physiological differences. Dennett coined the term zimboes (philosophical zombies that have second-order beliefs) to argue that the idea of a philosophical zombie is incoherent"

[...]Zimboes think they are conscious, think they have qualia, think they suffer pains - they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!""

- I would suscribe to the view of these two quotes. There is evidence of consciousness, but not that it is anything but the brain...because, there is evidence of own belief in consciousness, and the workings of the brain itself, and no further. My brain gets totally effected when it gets effected physically. As far as I know consciousness is nothing special.

EvF

EDIT: An interesting extract from an article on the matter: http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/unzombie.htm

If Philosophical Zombies are behaviorally indistinguisable then they must include consciousness, because if you strip the consciousness off you change the behavior. Because there is no evidence that consciousness is somehow some special seperate part of the brain or whetereever and that stripping it wouldn't effect the brain. There is only evidence of our belief in it (mine of mine, yours of yours, etc), and then other than that there's just how our brains are physically effected.

EvF

[Jon Paul]

That's not what I was trying to say. I was trying to demonstrate how our bodies are just as real as our minds, as we experience the physical sensations of our bodies in much the same way as the physical sensations on our minds. I wasn't arguing for a world outside of the mind/body, only making the point that the body must be as real as the mind.

But with the body you are already presuming that a reality exists outside of the mind - the body, which in solipsism, would just be another part the sense data that the mind is conscious of. Our knowledge of the body depends exactly on the sense-data that is in our mind, about the body (for instance, the sensation of the body).

Note that I explicitly said that solipsism makes no positive affirmation on whether there is a reality outside the mind, and so, it can't possibly make any affirmations as to the origin of our sense data, beyond that it is in the mind.

But your body should also be. This is my point so far.

Not in solipsism.

I am aware of your position on the complexity argument. And until you clarified your position in your last post, I just assumed you took this position seriously. What I should instead say is that in denying ones most basic capacities for knowledge, how can anybody claim a logical progression to solipsism if even their thoughts may not be trust-worthy?

Solipsism does not state that all thoughts (such as: I experience this sense-data, or, I am a mind) are untrustworthy. What it does state is that all thoughts about the origin of our sense data and reality outside the mind are untrustworthy.

Speculating in untrustworthiness of other thoughts is not an inherent part or affirmation of solipsism.

Thanks for the clarification. I'm not sure you are correct in asserting that solipsism is the most reduced form of affirmation of our existence. It raises far, far more questions than it can answer.

Because it does not make any positive claims as to the answers to those questions.

For example, in a solipsistic universe, everything in existence in this universe was generated by the mind.

No. Solipsism does not positively state anything about where our sense-data comes from. It does not positively deny the existence of anything outside the mind either; but it exactly does not affirm it, either. It only affirms the conscious experience, the mind.

---

There is no evidence for philsophical zombies either.

Philosophical zombies is not a claim which requires evidence on the point of minds, in contradistinction to the claim that we do have minds.

For everything that philosophical zombies predict of human behaviour is verifiable and holds true.

Whereas, the idea that others have minds is an unverifiable presupposition based on personal inclination to that generalisation.

There is merely a failure of evidence for the consciousness of others. This doesn't mean they're philosophical zombies.

Of course it doesn't prove it, because it's not a claim which needs to be proven, as it is readily verifiable that what philosophical zombies does predict does occur. That does not prove the exclusion of mind; but it proves that postulating mind in others is unnecessary, is to claim more than needed to explain the same fact, and the only really important thing - is unverifiable.

It's far more likely that they are the same as me but...the reason why I can't detect their consciousness....is that I'm not them!.

Now you are going into the nature of ontology. The problem is that there is no reason to assume the possibility for the ontogenesis of a conscious mind to begin with, if we are to proceed from general naturalistic principles. So that under naturalism, in fact, your own conscious mind is a surprise rather than something you should expect and predict. And importantly, it is externally unverifiable, and only an internal surprise.

- I would suscribe to the view of these two quotes. There is evidence of consciousness, but not that it is anything but the brain...because, there is evidence of own belief in consciousness, and the workings of the brain itself, and no further. My brain gets totally effected when it gets effected physically. As far as I know consciousness is nothing special.

Daniel Dennet doesn't address the points I've raised, and I have already read much of what he has to say about consciousness and qualia, which largely adds absolutely nothing to our understanding of these phenomena, except an introduction of some new semantics.

If Philosophical Zombies are behaviorally indistinguisable then they must include consciousness, because if you strip the consciousness off you change the behavior.

There is no need to "strip consciousness off", unless you already expect consciousness to occur. And you have no neutral source in naturalistic principles for that expectation, only your own qualitative experience of consciousness, which, insofar as it is not itself predicted by any generative principles, and is externally unverifiable, does not mandate such a prediction in general, from the causal mechanism (brain) which can be explained as a philosophical zombie just as well, to the internal ontology (conscious mind) which is externally unverifiable and unpredictable by methodological principles.

[LukeMC]

No. Solipsism does not positively state anything about where our sense-data comes from. It does not positively deny the existence of anything outside the mind either; but it exactly does not affirm it, either. It only affirms the conscious experience, the mind.

---

Then what are you babbling about complexity for? From this new definition, solipsism has as much relevence to the universe as atheism does to the big bang. If solipsism only deals with the fact that we can know our minds, you cannot claim it to be the least complex option when faced with Occam's razor, as it has nothing to do with such a subject, and my original point still stands. Either the universe is fabricated in our minds (complexities inherent) or the universe exists objectively and we are a part of it (complexities also inherent, but to a lesser degree). Regardless of whether we can know it.

The point I have raised is that postulating the reality and world of our qualitative, subjective sense experience to be an actually ontologically independently existing reality outside of your mind is something far more complex and far more extensive than not doing so.

I never concluded that "there is no objective world", only that proposing such a world outside of your mind, is proposing more complexity, not less, than proposing only your conscious experience (and nothing more).

The question is whether we positively claim that experience to be an experience of an actually ontologically independently existing reality outside of your mind, or whether we reduce it to be an experience confined to your own mind. There is more complexity in the former case, and less complexity and more simplicity in the latter case.

It's stuff like this which I have been driven to disagree with ^ and was mistaken into thinking this was a part of solipsist thinking.

Either way, regardless of whether or not we can know the universe, I still find my point valid. A universe which exists objectively with us contained within it contains far less complexity than any other hypothesis. Solipsism has no role to play in this debate, for as you have said, it posits nothing of where the sense data comes from and in such a case, it cannot be used to demonstrate how an objective universe is more complex than an imaginary one. We can't know anything further than our minds, nor feel anything further than our bodies, but that doesn't mean an imaginary universe is the plausible conclusion (in terms of complexity). These are separate arguments and I'm puzzled as to how they became merged during the discourse. Perhaps that was my fault.

[Jon Paul]

Then what are you babbling about complexity for?

That positively affirming the existence of an independent reality, is to affirm more complexity than does solipsism, and is to positively affirm more than is empirically or epistemically needed from the same data.

Either way, regardless of whether or not we can know the universe, I still find my point valid. A universe which exists objectively with us contained within it contains far less complexity than any other hypothesis.

It contains far more complexity than solipsism; for it affirms far more and far more complex entities and realities than solipsism, out of the same empirical data.

Solipsism has no role to play in this debate, for as you have said, it posits nothing of where the sense data comes from

It exactly does not, because it posites that it is fundamentally unknowable, that all we actually know is our conscious experience, and that anything else requires a leap of faith in reality.

and in such a case, it cannot be used to demonstrate how an objective universe is more complex than an imaginary one.

It can be used to demonstrate that the proposition of an objective universe proposes much more ontological complexity than does the proposition of a conscious mind which doesn't affirm anything outside of that mind.

[LukeMC]

That positively affirming the existence of an independent reality, is to affirm more complexity than does solipsism, and is to positively affirm more than is empirically or epistemically needed from the same data.

No. Solipsism states that the mind exists. In our minds, we experience a universe. One way or another, the universe is there. If it is inside our minds then our minds fabricated the entire universe and all of its wonder and complexities, then forgot about doing this and began experiencing the universe in 1st person as an agent of it. If it is outside of our minds, we are agents of it and can learn to know it- even if without certainty. In both cases, we are only sure of the mind. In the former case, there is an immense amount of complexity assumed.

It contains far more complexity than solipsism; for it affirms far more and far more complex entities and realities than solipsism, out of the same empirical data.

Again, no. An objective universe is less complex than a universe imagined by a being which went on to forget this imagination and began living in this universe and interacting as if it were an agent of it. The assumptions leading from solipsism are either a self-contained imaginary world or an objective, outside world. We cannot claim knowledge either way, but one of these ideas is far more complex.

It can be used to demonstrate that the proposition of an objective universe proposes much more ontological complexity than does the proposition of a conscious mind which doesn't affirm anything outside of that mind.

Again, I'm not affirming anything outside of my own mind. Merely stating that if everything IS in my mind, it would be far more complex than myself being a biological machine in an objective universe. This isn't creating a new reality. It is switching the reference frame of what reality is. It is stating "I cannot know that anything ouside of my mind exists, but in terms of complexity, it makes more sense that a universe does exist, regardless of my ability to prove it".

[Jon Paul]

No. Solipsism states that the mind exists. In our minds, we experience a universe. One way or another, the universe is there. If it is inside our minds then our minds fabricated the entire universe and all of its wonder and complexities, then forgot about doing this and began experiencing the universe in 1st person as an agent of it. If it is outside of our minds, we are agents of it and can learn to know it- even if without certainty. In both cases, we are only sure of the mind. In the former case, there is an immense amount of complexity assumed.

No. Solipsism solely states that the mind exists. It does not state anything else. It is the most reduced ontology, because it does not state that reality exists, and positing the existence of reality is more complex than not doing so, but the mind exists in either case and is unescapable.

f
Again, no. An objective universe is less complex than a universe imagined by a being which went on to forget this imagination and began living in this universe and interacting as if it were an agent of it. The assumptions leading from solipsism are either a self-contained imaginary world or an objective, outside world. We cannot claim knowledge either way, but one of these ideas is far more complex.

That solipsism does not seem to be feasible or likely given the knowledge we derive from sense-data about the universe, does nothing to say anything about the amount of complexity it proposes. For that sense-data and those intuitions about the world would exist even if solipsism was false, and reality existed. The difference would be that on top of the sense-data in your conscious mind, everything that sense-data records would be actually existing outside your mind, ON TOP of your conscious mind, which is far more complex.

What you are talking about is the absurdity and counter-intuitiveness of solipsism of course. But that is not a rational ground for rejecting it, nor for calling it complex. It posites only 1 ontological entity and reality: your conscious mind. Realism and the belief in other minds posites the existence of a 100 billion ontological entities alone in the number of conscious minds we know to have existed; and many more in the number of unconscious entities that are real.

[LukeMC]

No. Solipsism states that the mind exists. In our minds, we experience a universe. One way or another, the universe is there. If it is inside our minds then our minds fabricated the entire universe and all of its wonder and complexities, then forgot about doing this and began experiencing the universe in 1st person as an agent of it. If it is outside of our minds, we are agents of it and can learn to know it- even if without certainty. In both cases, we are only sure of the mind. In the former case, there is an immense amount of complexity assumed.

No. Solipsism solely states that the mind exists. It does not state anything else. It is the most reduced ontology, because it does not state that reality exists, and positing the existence of reality is more complex than not doing so, but the mind exists in either case and is unescapable.

Where are you losing me? Did I claim that solipsism makes other statements?

That solipsism does not seem to be feasible or likely given the knowledge we derive from sense-data about the universe, does nothing to say anything about the amount of complexity it proposes. For that sense-data and those intuitions about the world would exist even if solipsism was false, and reality existed. The difference would be that on top of the sense-data in your conscious mind, everything that sense-data records would be actually existing outside your mind, ON TOP of your conscious mind, which is far more complex.

What you are talking about is the absurdity and counter-intuitiveness of solipsism of course. But that is not a rational ground for rejecting it, nor for calling it complex. It posites only 1 ontological entity and reality: your conscious mind. Realism and the belief in other minds posites the existence of a 100 billion ontological entities alone in the number of conscious minds we know to have existed; and many more in the number of unconscious entities that are real.

My bolding.
And within that mind exists the thoughts and feelings of the possessor, as well as the experiences with the billions of other would-be ontologically independent minds and the rest of the stuff that comes with it. A mind capable of inventing and maintaining this is far more complex as an entity than an objective universe full of beings. I think you stress far too much importance on existence as a quality. I don't think it is the holy grail of complexity. I think it far more simple that a trillion beings exist in one universe than one being -which spontanesouly and unexplainably poofed into existence with the processing power to create a vast and complex universe in which would-be ontologically independent beings exist and live out their lives as if the universe were objective and outside the mind- exists. It's all balony. Much simpler to have a universe. In the same way no god is less complex than an all-powerful, super-complex god. This being with the mind is basically as stupidly complex as a god, now that I think about it. It is far more complex than the universe, and the process by which it came into existence is surely a mystery.