William Lane Craig continues to desperately defend the indefensible.

[Simon Moon]

The Kalam does mainly deal with first cause. Then we investigate what characteristics must the first cause have. We concludes that whatever it is, it must be spaceless, timeless, immaterial, uncaused, and unimaginably powerful. And since a first cause was an intentional act, we can argue that it was a conscious mind.

Nope.

First of all, Kalam (even Craig's version) is fallacious. So, it doesn't even deal with what it is meant to deal with.

But it certainly doesn't get you to anything like what you describe.

All that was necessary was a change of state of whatever form our universe was in before expansion. You need to connect a bunch of steps to get from a state change to "spaceless, bla, bla, bla".

[Jackalope]

Let's also not forget that causality is a feature of temporal frameworks. WLC posits an atemporal ("timeless", amongst other properties) entity as first cause. How's that work, exactly? How is that even coherent?

I'll tell you what, from up here in the cheap seats, it looks like an attempt to put his skydaddy outside critical review - and I'm not buying it.

[Faith No More]

It really is bullshit piled upon layers of bullshit.

[bennyboy]

Asserted without evidence.

How could a first cause be anything but an intentional act?

Because it's a paradoxical statement. Intention implies existence of an agent capable of intention. Therefore the "first cause" would be whatever is responsible for the existent of that agent.

[Esquilax]

I went to see WLC at Rutgers last week. Interesting talk. While you dismiss out of hand the Kalam argument, he spoke for 2 hours defending each premise.

And knowing the actual content-to-word ratio Craig usually works to, those two hours probably contained about twenty words of real applicable content. I don't take "Craig opened and closed his talk-hole for two whole hours!" to be an indicator of the content of what came out of it. You can read the phone book for two hours.

For example, you say that it's just his assertion that there are two categories 1) things that begin to exist and 2) things that don't begin to exist. He went on at some length defend the premise that there cannot be a past infinity so therefore we can conclude that there is at least one thing that did not begin to exist.

Leaving aside the special pleading of arguing that there can be no past infinity besides god, this is also irrelevant, since beginning to exist requires a temporal framework that doesn't necessarily exist beyond the formation of the universe. Actually thinking about the state of affairs shows that it's entirely possible for the universe to not begin to exist, in that measurable time would only occur post-universe creation, while still not being past infinite, in that there was no past to be infinite in.

See, this is the main problem with the way Craig works; he constructs elaborate alternative universes in which his god is a viable conclusion, by fiat assertion alone, but then fails to demonstrate that we live in this fantasy world he needs to imagine in order to get to the conclusion he's already come to.

The Kalam does mainly deal with first cause. Then we investigate what characteristics must the first cause have.

And I've never once seen Craig or anyone else do anything other than assert those characteristics by fiat. Even you are content to tell us your conclusions, while skipping the justification for them entirely.

We concludes that whatever it is, it must be spaceless,

Why are you assuming that the only space there could possibly be is inside our universe?

timeless,

Actions require a temporal framework by necessity, in that the moment an action occurs it can be measured in terms of commonly understood demarcations of time. If you're going to argue that the first cause is conscious, it cannot also be timeless.

immaterial,

Why?

uncaused,

What if it was caused by something else that didn't begin to exist?

and unimaginably powerful.

That doesn't follow. An entity could have universe creation as its sole attribute, while being incapable of anything else. Leaving aside the utter vagueness of the term "powerful," an entity that can only do the one thing while being unable of doing simple things we take for granted cannot possibly be more powerful than us.

And since a first cause was an intentional act, we can argue that it was a conscious mind.

When did you establish that it was an intentional act? Kalam palms this card every time its used, and when you people are called on it you just use an argument from ignorance, as though your own incredulity gets you out of having to justify the things you say.

The Kalam was not meant to get anyone to the God of Christianity.

It doesn't get you to anything, because each individual part of it is flawed.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Furthermore, WLC equivocates on the meaning of "begins to exist". Sure, things that we observe to begin to exist ex materia have a cause, but that's not the kind of existence he's talking about when he's referring to first cause, that would be ex nihilo.

Not necessarily. Its a bit ambiguous because of how he presents it, which is why I don't like his version. People start thinking about the big bang and origin of the physical universe, etc.

[Pizza]

Even if sound it doesn't automatically lead to any deity at all. The first cause could be just an impersonal thing.

---

The problem is most apologists will jump to the conclusion that a first/final cause is identical to the Christian God without arguing for it first. That makes those versions of KCA invalid.

True.

Furthermore, WLC equivocates on the meaning of "begins to exist". Sure, things that we observe to begin to exist ex materia have a cause, but that's not the kind of existence he's talking about when he's referring to first cause, that would be ex nihilo. (Never mind that we observe virtual particles coming into existence without any known cause.)

I can also note that while WLC argues against past infinities ad nauseum, he makes a special case for his pet deity. Special pleading much?

The whole argument is a non-starter, and as WLC uses it, it's stretched far beyond what it's premises would demonstrate even if they were true.

Past infinities are a no-no but future infinities are A OKAY in his book. I don't get it either.

[Jackalope]

Past infinities are a no-no but future infinities are A OKAY in his book. I don't get it either.

Of course. Past infinity would be damaging to his position. Can't have that.

...and actually he does, but only for his timeless, uncreated skydaddy.

[Simon Moon]

Furthermore, WLC equivocates on the meaning of "begins to exist". Sure, things that we observe to begin to exist ex materia have a cause, but that's not the kind of existence he's talking about when he's referring to first cause, that would be ex nihilo.

Not necessarily. Its a bit ambiguous because of how he presents it, which is why I don't like his version. People start thinking about the big bang and origin of the physical universe, etc.

I don't see how.

If he's using examples of everything we observe in our universe, to point to "things that begin to exist", then he is pointing out things that begin to exist ex materia.

But if he's claiming that the universe begins to exist ex nihilo, that is an equivocation fallacy because he is using "begins to exist" with 2 different definitions.

Every version of Kalam I've heard does this.

It also contains the fallacy of composition. The first premise refers to every "thing," and the second premise treats the "universe as if it were a member of the set of "things." But since a set should not be considered a member of itself, the cosmological argument is comparing apples and oranges.

[dyresand]

Not necessarily. Its a bit ambiguous because of how he presents it, which is why I don't like his version. People start thinking about the big bang and origin of the physical universe, etc.

I don't see how.

If he's using examples of everything we observe in our universe, to point to "things that begin to exist", then he is pointing out things that begin to exist ex materia.

But if he's claiming that the universe begins to exist ex nihilo, that is an equivocation fallacy because he is using "begins to exist" with 2 different definitions.

Every version of Kalam I've heard does this.

It also contains the fallacy of composition. The first premise refers to every "thing," and the second premise treats the "universe as if it were a member of the set of "things." But since a set should not be considered a member of itself, the cosmological argument is comparing apples and oranges.

Wouldn't the Kalam also defeat god instead of helping him more or less if you give reasons for things to exist like the material world and if you apply that to anything or a divine being something that isn't proven to be material then well you pretty much said god doesn't exist with that claim.
Also a claim like that would mean since there is no god things exist because they were created the whole argument falls apart.