The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God

[Whateverist]

It's so easy to forget that the term 'maximally great' means something specific within the context of the argument, as in, the most fully expressed actuality. Outside Scholasticism the term has no meaning.

I think "the most fully expresed actuallity" is a term in need of definition.  

Yeah, very much this.  It is only when you are trying to define something of which you have no actual experience that a descriptor like this is even tempting.  Same goes for "maximally great".  It is obvious that you are reaching for something highly abstract which in no way "must exist".

[SofaKingHigh]

Now, actually looking at the points to break down the problems of the argument:

• P1 is technically true, but you're dealing with nonfalsifiable things here, so take anything that follows with a grain of salt. Lots of grains of salt.
  
• P2 is not given at all. You'd have to prove that there are multiple "possible worlds".
  
• P3 is a non sequitur and cannot be inferred from any of the previous points.
  
• P4 is building off of P3, which is already not logically valid.
  
• P5 is logically valid, but is based off of P3 and P4, so it is not reasonable to infer, despite being logically correct in itself.
  
• The conclusion would also be valid, if not built off of P3 and P4.
  

So, that's where it all falls apart. I mean, once you take out the formal sounding syllogism, you're basically saying "if something could be real, it is real". I shouldn't have to explain why that's dumb. Again, leprechauns could be real.

Yeah!     Finally, someone else sees it.

Well, actually no. I've already said that I think this argument is toast, but Premise (3) is not the problem.

Any being which is MAXIMALLY GREAT cannot be limited in the number of worlds in which it exists. Otherwise, another being which is NOT limited in that way is conceivable thereby making the limited being sub-maximal.

So, no...if a maximally great being exists at all, it must exist in all worlds.

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That actually makes sense.

But now replace 'maximally great being' with 'thing that makes maximally great being's existence impossible'.

There you go. You just proved God exists and I killed him for you. Do I get cookies?

Not really. 

A "maximally great being" is not merely a superhuman being with characteristics that are a lot like ours only bigger and better. God is not merely Superman.



One of the properties of a "maximally great being" is that it does not "come into existence". It has always existed.

So, if it is your conclusion that the Ontological Argument proves that God exists, and you have failed to kill him, then you are left with an existent God.

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A maximally great being is incompatible with many type of worlds/universes. It is not possible in every possible world unless you define "possible" world as only what is compatible with God.  But if it's not defined circularly, there is infinite possible universes in which a maximally great being is incompatible with just as there are infinite possible universes he is compatible with.

Since all worlds are material/natural, how would any of them be incompatible with a god who is not material and supernatural?

Your multi-verse can be whatever you want it to be...and a supreme, supernatural, non-material being would still be outside of them all.

You're just making this shit up as you go along aren't you?

[athrock]

Well, actually no. I've already said that I think this argument is toast, but Premise (3) is not the problem.

Any being which is MAXIMALLY GREAT cannot be limited in the number of worlds in which it exists. Otherwise, another being which is NOT limited in that way is conceivable thereby making the limited being sub-maximal.

So, no...if a maximally great being exists at all, it must exist in all worlds.

I didn't say P3 was the only problem. P2 is simply asserted without proof.

Also, without actually defining "maximally great", there is no reason to assume it would exist in all possible worlds. Wouldn't saying it has to exist in all possible worlds be just as limiting as it not existing in them?

Really, when you look at this, "maximally great" is just a hand wave to say "omnipotent", and both concepts are self defeating.

Evil is the absence of good. It does not actually exist as a "thing" itself.  Consequently, "not existing in all possible worlds" is simply the absence of "existing in all possible worlds" and that is an evil thing - not a good thing - for a maximally supreme being which must, by definition, be "good".

And no, "maximally great" is not another way of saying "omnipotent". We can conceive of a god who is all-powerful but NOT omniscient and thus unable to prevent all evil. But a maximally great god must be both omnipresent and omnipresent along with a bunch of other stuff. 

Which is why the skeptic's problem of evil objection fails, btw.

[The Grand Nudger]

The veneer is wearing awfully thin.

[Cyberman]

No, evil is not the absence of good. Evil is the opposite of whatever we define as good. If it is good to give someone life, taking it away would be evil.

[The Grand Nudger]

Meh, who gives a shit, the skeptics objection is "I don't believe you".  Unless our boy can get a hell of alot more convincing, his definitions of good and evil, and any difference to mine or anyone else's.are irrelevant.

[Cyberman]

I think "the most fully expresed actuallity" is a term in need of definition.  

Yeah, very much this.  It is only when you are trying to define something of which you have no actual experience that a descriptor like this is even tempting.  Same goes for "maximally great".  It is obvious that you are reaching for something highly abstract which in no way "must exist".

It's really very simple. A "maximally great" being is one with "the most fully expressed actuality". What does "the most fully expressed actuality" mean? Why, it means "maximally great", of course!

[Neo-Scholastic]

We conceive of things that do not and even cannot exist all the time.

The Scholastics also distinguished between what can be imagined and what can be conceived. The nomenclature of the argument, like maximally great, conceive, imagine, possibility and necessity, have highly specific applications. I don't mean to disparage anyone not familiar with that philosophical tradition nor am I saying that the ontological argument is correct. I just think there really isn't much point discussing the merits of this particular argument without a contextual understanding of the terms used.

The way I see it, many of their useful and important distinctions have been lost because of general ignorance and modern misunderstandings about the Scholastic tradition. As far as that goes, I too am ignorant about so much about Medieval philosophy and its hard to hold on to the specific meanings of related terms that in everyday life are generally interchangeable. There is so much to learn and everything I have learned has been profoundly illuminating, if only because it provides important context for much of what gets discussed in contemporary philosophy.

[The Grand Nudger]

Not exactly glowing praise for contemporary philosophy.

[Neo-Scholastic]

No, evil is not the absence of good. Evil is the opposite of whatever we define as good. If it is good to give someone life, taking it away would be evil.

While that may be how you think about evil it really isn't a meaningful way of discussing the relationship between the two.

If evil is the opposite of good that precisely because it good's negation. If it is good have a virtue like, temperance or fortitude, then not having that virtue is not good (i.e. evil), like intemperance and cowardice. Virtue, in Scholasticism, refers to the degree to which something actualizes its Ideal. So for example, a spanikopita (sp) is not as good as a yield sign with respect to the Idea of Triangularity.