My thoughts on the Hard problem of consciousness

[bennyboy]

I've never seen an adequate explanation for why consciousness should be considered a hard problem.

It's only hard for us because we're using our own brain to understand itself.

It's hard because no philosophical view easily reconciles the conflation of subject and object into a single framework.  Idealism misses much of the simple truths that science arrives at; dualism has the problem of bridging; physicalism can't really explain subjective experience at all.

The equation of brain function with qualia, for example, is not so easy as it might seem at first.

[I_am_not_mafia]

I've always wondered, is your perspective just a pragmatic thing because you're a scientist?... in which case I get it and share it for the most part in that the continued and perfect (imo) correlation between neuroscience and consciousness indicates they are one and the same... but nonetheless do you never, even just fleetingly or irrationally, wonder about the phenomenal nature of consciousness?

I think I have a pragmatic view of it because I actually think in terms of how to build an artificial intelligence. Everything has a use. Take emotions for example. People assume that they are a burden, but we need them in order to function. We evolved them for a reason and an AI agent will need them too.

If you want to build an agent that can co-operate with other agents then it will need some way of representing itself in its internal model in relation to others. In other words some a personal identity. Empathy allows animals to work together better as a pack and to learn from each other. That means processing visual stimuli and simulating what would happen if it was applied to oneself. And then there is the other function of self awareness, the check and balance of cognition running alongside emotion. That little voice that knows that you are angry for example and thinks, do you really want to be doing this. All this adds utility to the agent and allows it adapt better.

Asking yourself what it means to sense red is a waste of time. You'll never be able to answer it, and if you could, you wouldn't be able to demonstrate it and it probably wouldn't tell you anything interesting anyway. But that's what people are doing and that's why they think it's a hard problem. As a designer of AI, I know how my agents sense the colour of red and what effect it has on them.

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I've never seen an adequate explanation for why consciousness should be considered a hard problem.

It's only hard for us because we're using our own brain to understand itself.

It's hard because no philosophical view easily reconciles the conflation of subject and object into a single framework.  Idealism misses much of the simple truths that science arrives at; dualism has the problem of bridging; physicalism can't really explain subjective experience at all.

The equation of brain function with qualia, for example, is not so easy as it might seem at first.

This to me then suggests that the fault lays with the use of philosophy. You're using the wrong tool for the job.

You have to find the right paradigm to suit the problem.

[Neo-Scholastic]

The OP sounds vaguely panpsychic. I toyed with that idea when I was an atheist. Ultimately however I think the only logically consistent (and I use that term lightly) naturalistic theory is eliminative materialism.

[emjay]

I've always wondered, is your perspective just a pragmatic thing because you're a scientist?... in which case I get it and share it for the most part in that the continued and perfect (imo) correlation between neuroscience and consciousness indicates they are one and the same... but nonetheless do you never, even just fleetingly or irrationally, wonder about the phenomenal nature of consciousness?

I think I have a pragmatic view of it because I actually think in terms of how to build an artificial intelligence. Everything has a use. Take emotions for example. People assume that they are a burden, but we need them in order to function. We evolved them for a reason and an AI agent will need them too.

If you want to build an agent that can co-operate with other agents then it will need some way of representing itself in its internal model in relation to others. In other words some a personal identity. Empathy allows animals to work together better as a pack and to learn from each other. That means processing visual stimuli and simulating what would happen if it was applied to oneself. And then there is the other function of self awareness, the check and balance of cognition running alongside emotion. That little voice that knows that you are angry for example and thinks, do you really want to be doing this. All this adds utility to the agent and allows it adapt better.

Asking yourself what it means to sense red is a waste of time. You'll never be able to answer it, and if you could, you wouldn't be able to demonstrate it and it probably wouldn't tell you anything interesting anyway. But that's what people are doing and that's why they think it's a hard problem. As a designer of AI, I know how my agents sense the colour of red and what effect it has on them.

I do understand what you're saying... and agree with it (even though it may look like I don't). I think the same way... functionalist epiphenomenalism and with every aspect of consciousness both being essential to the system and with a neural representation... so as you think about it in terms of AI, I just think about it in terms of NNs and NN states and that's my primary way of thinking... relating every experience to NNs. So when I said I considered consciousness to be superfluous I only meant the phenomenal side of it... in my view, everything in consciousness can be (and must be... because everything you can 'notice' in consciousness (which is pretty much everything) you can refer to and label (ie associate with) therefore everything noticeable must have a neural representation) represented neurally. So what I'm saying is in my view, what we term consciousness is represented in the network - every aspect... emotion, qualia, perception, cognition etc - so my only question question was why there was phenomena when all could be achieved without (ie a hypothetical true philosophical zombie would be exactly the same as me... it would still be typing away on a forum, still represent thinking and feeling... it just would not have a phenomenal representation of all those things, only a neural one).

And I also agree with you on the seeing red question. It is pretty much by definition (of epiphenomenalism) that it is a waste of time thinking about it because as it, under that view, has no causal affect on the material, no causal link can ever be proved between neural and phenomenal representation. So I just conclude they are both different sides of the same coin, and treat them as the same thing... talking and thinking about neural and phenomenal representations truly interchangeably - all the time in daily life - and with each informing and predicting about the other. That's where my confidence in this point of view lies but nonetheless, the existence of phenomenal representations is still a curiosity. Scientifically pointless to consider, maybe, but philosophically and existentially, not so easy to truly let go of... at least not all the time.

[Neo-Scholastic]

...under that view, has no causal affect on the material, no causal link can ever be proved between neural and phenomenal representation. So I just conclude they are both different sides of the same coin, and treat them as the same thing... talking and thinking about neural and phenomenal representations truly interchangeably.

What I find interesting is the tendency to consider third-person 'objective' phenomena real while first-person qualia and intentionality are the illusory epiphenomena. That is a completely arbitrary position. It seems to me that one could just as easily say that qualia and intentionality are what is truly real with causal power and that our model of the objective world is the epiphenomena without causal power. That is a dilemma that only occurs within the vocabulary of Anglo-american analytic philosophy though. Classical approaches do not suffer that problem.

[emjay]

...under that view, has no causal affect on the material, no causal link can ever be proved between neural and phenomenal representation. So I just conclude they are both different sides of the same coin, and treat them as the same thing... talking and thinking about neural and phenomenal representations truly interchangeably.

What I find interesting is the tendency to consider third-person 'objective' phenomena real while first-person qualia and intentionality are the illusory epiphenomena. That is a completely arbitrary position. It seems to me that one could just as easily say that qualia and intentionality are what is truly real with causal power and that our model of the objective world is the epiphenomena without causal power.

Yes, I'm starting to find that interesting too... as I'm currently reading about Berkeley's idealism. If some form of idealism were true, then for it to be satisfying to me personally it would have to have some explanation of why the 'out there' was stable and highly correlated with the 'in here'... even more so regarding neuroscience than with any other scientific discipline... as in correlation between what 'out there' predicts and explains about 'in here'... and in the case of idealism 'out there' obviously is still 'in here', as it also is with materialism, but I mean what's deemed to be external and objective from the subjective point of view from either a materialistic or idealistic perspective.

For Berkeley, his explanation of the stability of the world is that it's the mind of God... or in the mind of God... but that doesn't really satisfy about why neuroscience correlates so well with mental experience... why a neural network perfectly explains (imo) the dynamics of experience, and at a much rougher level, why surgical manipulations, drugs, brain damage etc have predictable and explainable effects on phenomenal experience... so in a world before neuroscience, Berkeley's arguments might be a bit more convincing, but with it, there is that extra aspect, I think, for idealists to explain... how and why the subjectively external affects the very experience of the subjective... otherwise I'd invite them to forego mind altering drugs and painkillers if they think there is no relation 

But yes, it is an interesting point... why, in the case of two sides of the same coin, one side should... almost arbitrarily... be given precedence (from a causal point of view) over the other. And likewise interesting if there is any way to understand the neuroscience correlation from the sort of perspective you envisage... one where phenomenal mind has the causal power and matter is the, I guess, 'epimaterial' bystander ... just as a philosophical exercise.

[bennyboy]

This to me then suggests that the fault lays with the use of philosophy. You're using the wrong tool for the job.

You have to find the right paradigm to suit the problem.

There is no better tool than experience itself. You, I know, will suggest science-- but science will do no better than philosophy, at least until you have invented the Qualiometer 3000™ which can tell what physical systems do/do not experience qualia. Until then, qualia cannot really be said to exist at all, at least in scientific terms, unless you beg the question by redefining them in terms of neural correlates.

Until self-reflection is considered the prime method of understanding the self, we will be trying to fit a round block through a square hole. And that's neither the job of science or even of common sense.

[emjay]

@Benny, as the closest thing to an idealist around these parts what's your view on the correlation between neuroscience and your own subjective experience? How does something you presumably still consider external, come to affect how you actually experience? Ie how does a 'stable' idea 'out there' come to affect how you actually experience ideas of 'out there' and 'in here' from the subjective perspective?

[emjay]

@Neo. Can you summarise the difference between 'Analytic Philosophy' and Classical Philosophy, as you understand it? From what you've said in the past, I gather the former is to do with having materialistic assumptions, and from the wiki entry of it, basically a much more scientific form of philosophy... as opposed to Classical Philosophy which looks at foundations? But assuming by classical you're particularly looking at Aristotle... leading on to Aquinas, and therefore 'Formal' and 'Final' causes as well as 'Material' and 'Efficient' causes (which I have yet to get to properly in my reading... though I have started reading Aristotle after now having read a thorough book about the Five Ways... but you talk about them often enough )... it would seem to me that they also are assumptions, initially arrived at through reason but thereafter used as foundations for further study... so in that sense I can't see the difference between that and using materialistic assumptions arrived at through reason as the basis for what follows.

[Neo-Scholastic]

Analytic philosophy is generally concerned about the logical structures and relationships within language and then views every other problem through that lens. In practical terms it can deal with problems about beings but not being-as-such. It can look into the contents of consciousness but not consciousness-as-such. I would summarize classical philosophy as talking about truth and analytic philosophy as talking about talking about truth. Then again, I am not an expert on the foundational philosophers like Frege. My focus is elsewhere. I am a conscious being in a phenomenal world. The two are inextricably linked. Everything else, like trying to alienate one from the other (or not), is interpretation.